Distr. GENERAL S/1999/882 16 August 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In their statement (S/PRST/1989/16) of 27 May 1999, members of the
Security Council expressed their alarm at the serious deterioration in the
political, military and humanitarian situation in Somalia and their concern
at the reports of increasing external interference in the country. They
requested me to submit periodic reports on the situation in Somalia.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. It covers
developments since the last report on the situation in Somalia, submitted
on 16 September 1997 (S/1997/715). In response to requests to relevant
regional organizations to submit information on concrete efforts that have
been undertaken or are under active consideration in the search for a
peaceful solution to the situationa, information has been received from the
League of Arab States (see annex I) and Ethiopia (see annex II).

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Peacemaking efforts

3. The "Sodere Group" intended to hold a national reconciliation conference
at Bossaso on 1 November 1997, and efforts were being made to secure the participation of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and Hussein Mohamed Aidid, who had not joined the meeting of the 26 factions at Sodere, Ethiopia, which had formed the National Salvation Council.

4. However, Hussein Aidid and some of his supporters travelled to Cairo,
where they joined with Ali Mahdi Mohamed and a number of other Somali
faction leaders to attend a reconciliation meeting of Somali leaders.
Declared open on 12 November 1997, the meeting was attended by
representatives of the National Salvation Council and Hussein Aidid's
group. On 22 December 1997, a joint agreement was signed by participants at the Cairo meeting, including Hussein Aidid and Ali Mahdi as Co-Chairmen.
Under the agreement, a national reconciliation conference was planned at
Baidoa in February 1998 but never took place.

5. Two leaders, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and General Aden Abdullahi Nur "Gabyow", refused to sign the agreement and left for Addis Ababa. There, in conjunction with some other leaders who had signed the agreement, they convened a meeting of the National Salvation Council, which proposed, without success, some changes to the agreement. Ethiopia blamed Egypt for "hijacking" the Sodere process and a national reconciliation conference has not taken place since then.

6. Somalia has been discussed in various international and regional forums
during the period covered in the present report. The first ministerial
meeting of the Joint Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Partners Forum, held in Rome on 19 and 20 January 1998, decided to
establish a Committee of the IGAD Partners Forum to support the IGAD peace process in Somalia.

7. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), on several occasions in 1998,
expressed grave concern that, in spite of the efforts of several actors,
substantive progress was still lacking and called for redoubled efforts in
the search for a peaceful settlement of the Somali crisis. Grave concern
was also expressed over the increased flow of arms into Somalia. At its
meeting last month at Algiers, OAU commended the efforts of the Standing
Committee on Somalia and, inter alia, stressed the need for continued and
close coordination in the efforts aimed at ending the conflict in Somalia.

8. At its seventeenth session, the Council of Ministers of IGAD, meeting at
Djibouti on 14 and 15 March 1998, attributed the lack of progress in
Somalia to the proliferation of parallel initiatives, a lack of the
necessary resolve on the part of the faction leaders and insufficient
humanitarian and development support from the international community. It
reaffirmed the role of Ethiopia as the country mandated to lead the peace
process in Somalia on behalf of IGAD. The international community was
invited to adopt a new approach: the Somali peace process should be
broadened, shifting the focus away from faction leaders to include
representatives of civil society. In particular, the international
community was invited to support preferentially those areas of Somalia
whose leaders showed a commitment to peace (the so-called "peace dividend" approach). To reduce the danger of "parallel initiatives", IGAD proposed the creation of a mechanism, possibly through its Partners Forum, allowing other countries interested in the Somalia peace process to associate themselves with it. These proposals were endorsed by the IGAD heads ofGovernment at a meeting which immediately followed the ministerial meeting.

9. The Liaison Group on Somalia, formed under the aegis of the IGAD
Partners Forum to assist international actors in reaching a common position
on Somalia, met for the first time at Addis Ababa on 12 June 1998 under the Chairmanship of Italy. Those attending included IGAD Member States, donors, including the European Commission, and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as well as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Another consultative body, the Standing Committee on Somalia, whose membership is open to IGAD and its Partners Forum Liaison Group members and other interested States and organizations, was formed and met on 5 November 1998 at Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of Ethiopia. Since then, the Liaison Group and the Standing Committee have continued to meet approximately every two months at Addis Ababa at about the same time.

10. From 1 to 5 December 1998, a fact-finding mission of the Standing
Committee visited Hargeisa, Garowe and Bossaso. It intends to visit cities
in southern Somalia when conditions permit. In the Standing Committee
meeting of 29 July 1999, Djibouti outlined a peace plan. The plan contained
both cultural and political elements. The cultural element incorporated a
programme scheduled to take place between January and June 2000. The
Djibouti proposals also involved the establishment of a representative
council based on region rather than clan, with one third of the seats
reserved for civil society. The council itself would be composed of two
chambers: one reserved for elders and the other for political
representatives. The council would have a three-year mandate to prepare a transitional constitution and a referendum. An executive council was also
proposed to act as the interim government. The Djibouti representative
emphasized that the international community should play an important role
by providing technical and financial support ab initio. The plan was
welcomed by other members of the Standing Committee who agreed to study it.

11. Ministers of the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries in the ACP-EU Council, meeting at Brussels on 29
June 1999, considered Somalia. They expressed the view that only a process leading to a Somali-driven national reconciliation conference inclusive of all geographic areas and all segments of Somali society, could lead to national and international acceptance of a transitional government. Theyreaffirmed that European Development Fund resources would be made available to Somalia once it could adhere to the Lomé IV Convention.

12. In his 28 October 1998 letter to me, the Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States, Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, reported that the Council of the League had adopted a resolution calling on its member States to provide immediate financial assistance in order to support the
implementation of the Cairo joint agreement. He expressed his gratitude for
the continuing work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in
Somalia, and asked me to find ways of supporting the Mogadishu
administration, together with the preparations for the convening of the
national reconciliation conference envisaged in the Cairo joint agreement
at the earliest possible juncture.

13. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, meeting in Burkina Faso
from 28 June to 2 July 1999, called for an international peace and
reconciliation conference on Somalia, to be held as soon as possible.

B. Internal situation

"Somaliland"

14. North-West Somalia/"Somaliland" continues to enjoy relative peace,
although some skirmishes, which in most instances are not political in
nature, are reported from time to time. On 12 October 1997, the leader of
"Somaliland", Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, announced a deployment of his troops
along "Somaliland's" border with Ethiopia. He accused Ethiopia of providing
training and equipment to 300 militia, who allegedly came from the Sool
region with the intention of destabilizing "Somaliland". There has been
some tension between "Somaliland" and the "administration" in North-East
Somalia/"Puntland" over administrative control of the Sool and Sanaag
regions. On 21 February 1999, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal warned "Puntland"
against deploying to Sool 100 men who had been recruited from Sool and
trained at Garowe for police work.

15. The previous hard-line position taken by the "Somaliland" leadership on
the issue of secession of the territory appears to have softened. Mr. Egal
told my Representative, David Stephen, on 24 November 1997, that, given the peaceful environment established there, "Somaliland" should be given
special status as an autonomous territory until such time as the leaders of
"the South" were in a position to negotiate a mutually acceptable future.
Such a status, he felt, could allow "Somaliland" access to international
financial institutions as well as to other international organizations,
such as the International Telecommunication Union.

16. Nevertheless, Mr. Egal has on occasion continued to demand sovereign
status for "Somaliland". In his letter of 3 January 1998, he suggested that
France, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America should form a panel to organize the formation of a state
in the Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa. Not to do this,
he claimed, would make any call for the territorial integrity of Somalia
unrealistic; as an alternative, "Somaliland" demands recognition of its
sovereignty and resents vehemently any equation of itself with the factions
of Somalia.

17. During a visit to Egypt and Yemen, between the end of February and 12
March 1999, Mr. Egal proposed that "Somaliland" should assist the clans in
the "South" in reaching peace and subsequently enter into negotiations on
an appropriate formula for reuniting the country. While his proposal
reportedly resulted in some tension with hard-line elements in "Somaliland"
adamantly opposed to any dialogue with the rest of Somalia, the reactions
of some of the neighbouring countries have been positive. The Yemeni Prime
Minister was delighted about what he viewed as the softening position of
Mr. Egal, and thought that with "Puntland" joining hands with "Somaliland",
the first step could be taken towards the resuscitation of Somalia. At
Cairo, the Deputy Assistant Minister for Bilateral African Relations
described the meetings with Mr. Egal to my Representative as positive and
said that Egypt considered that Mr. Egal had a role to play in reuniting
the country. Between 27 June and 2 July 1999, Mr. Egal paid a visit to
Nairobi at the invitation of President Daniel Arap Moi and had several
meetings with him.

"Puntland"

18. On 20 February 1998, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf told my Representative
that his priority was to achieve an administrative structure for the
North-East regions at the local level as a constituent unit of a future
Somali state, and as the basis for future participation in any national
reconciliation conference. Subsequently, the Majerteens, the majority clan
in North-East Somalia, held a meeting, together with other smaller clans,
at Garowe from 25 February to 4 March 1998. The meeting approved the aim of a single regional administration and chose Garowe as the venue for a
constitutional meeting. A follow-up meeting from 10 to 12 March 1998, which included delegates from Sool and Sanaag, agreed to give the name "Puntland State" to the new regional administration. The Garowe constitutional conference elected Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf "President" of "Puntland State" and Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman of United Somali Party/Somali Salvation Alliance as "Vice-President" on 23 July 1998. The meeting endorsed an interim charter and established a 69-member parliament. The result of the election was challenged by General Mohamed Abshir Musse, the Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and Boqor Abdullahi Boqor Musse, a Majerteen traditional leader, both of whom had competed with Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf for presidency.

Mogadishu

19. Following the Cairo joint agreement of 22 December 1997, Ali Mahdi,
Osman Hassan Ali "Atto" and Hussein Aidid returned to Mogadishu at the end
of January 1998. As it became clear that the national reconciliation
conference scheduled for Baidoa on 15 February 1998 would not take place,
they embarked on an effort to set up an administration for Benadir region
(Mogadishu). Their efforts were encouraged by the Egyptian Special Envoy
for Somalia.

20. Progress towards the formation of such an administration was beset by a number of problems, including the claim of Hussein Aidid to be "President"
of Somalia as well as the opposition to Ali Mahdi within his Modulod clan.
The opposition, which was led by Hussein Haji Bod and Hagi Musse Sudi
"Yallahow", both former aides of Ali Mahdi, later included Osman "Atto".

21. On 5 July 1998, 40 Somali leaders left Mogadishu for Libya, to join
prayers on the birthday of the Holy Prophet Mohamed. They returned to
Mogadishu on 11 July 1998 accompanied by the Libyan Envoy for Somalia.
Colonel Muamar Ghaddafi reportedly urged them to finalize the establishment
of an administration for Benadir region and to reopen the sea and airports,
and promised to provide equipment and six months' financing for a police
force for Mogadishu. While Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aidid promised that the
Benadir administration would come into being on 18 July 1998, Musse Sudi
and other opposition groups claimed that consultations were incomplete and
that any attempt to put in place an administration would result in bloody
confrontation. There was also a division over the representation of some
clans, including minorities.

22. On 3 August 1998, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aidid announced the formation
of an administration for Benadir region. A 50-person Supreme Council was
set up to oversee an administrative body for the region. This body was to
be led by Hussein Ali Ahmed, a businessman who was named "Governor". On 6 August 1998, Ali Mahdi stated that the seaport had been reopened. Abdi
Hassan Awale "Qaybdid", was named Chief of a police force. However, Osman "Atto", Musse Sudi and Hussein Bod opposed the claim that the Benadir administration had been formed. On 10 August 1998, Musse Sudi fired at a ship to prevent its approach to the seaport.

23. For a few months, the administration offered some hope. However, the
political situation, especially in North Mogadishu, degenerated. Tension,
banditry and intermittent clan fighting increased after March 1999, and
fighting erupted within the Wabudan sub-clan of Ali Mahdi's Modulod clan.
The residence of the "Governor" was attacked, prompting a retaliatory
attack on Musse Sudi's residence. The Mogadishu police appeared to have
disintegrated over its inability to curb intra-clan violence. However,
Benadir administration leaders viewed non-payment of salaries, after Libyan
support was suspended, as the reason for the disbandment of the police
force.

24. The vacuum created by the collapse of the Benadir administration in
South Mogadishu was filled by various Islamic Sharia courts that emerged to
maintain law and order. These courts, with the support of businessmen,
started disbanding the various roadblocks that faction leaders had put in
place to extort money.

25. Ali Mahdi left Mogadishu for Egypt on 23 April 1999 for medical
treatment, reportedly disillusioned about his leadership of the Modulod
clan. Mohamed Hussein Addow was appointed interim Chairman of the Modulod faction. Ali Mahdi told my Representative at Cairo on 30 June 1999 that he intended to return to Mogadishu within weeks to re-establish the Benadir administration and to open the airport and seaport. He said that a national reconciliation conference should be held as soon as possible. Hussein Aidid returned to Mogadishu on 13 July 1999. He also told my Representative that he intended to re-establish the Benadir administration and the police force.

Hiraan region: Belet-Weyne Conference

26. The Pan-Hawiye conference, which began on 19 November 1998, brought together approximately 400 intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders, and representatives of women's and youth groups. Observers from other clans and regions of Somalia were also present. The meeting was reported to have resolved the differences between the Abgal and Murusade clans, on the one hand, and between the Habr-Gedir and the Hawadle on the other. In a statement issued on 26 February 1999, nine traditional leaders announced agreement on a 10-point plan, including the formation of a committee to take the process further. They announced that they intended to move the meeting into a second phase to discuss the political future of the country. At that stage, the Conference Committee intended to make contact with other Somali clans. However, the meeting ended in June 1999 in confusion, with two different persons claiming to have been elected chairman of the Somali Consultative Council, which was established by the conference. Then, a group at Mogadishu claimed to have commenced a preparatory stage of a second phase of a Pan-Hawiye conference now to be held at Mogadishu.

"Jubaland"

27. On 8 May 1998, the Harti militia of General Mohamed Hersi Siad "Morgan"
succeeded in repelling an attack on the Somali Patriotic Movement by
pushing the combined Habr-Gedir and Marehan militia back to Kamsuma, about 90 kilometres from Kismayo. The Kamsuma bridge, which used to be the only all-weather link between Kismayo and Mogadishu, was blown up. On 6 January 1999, at least 60 people, including civilians, were killed and about 80 people reportedly injured, in fighting which saw the Marehan/Habr-Gedir
side briefly entering Kismayo. On 11 June 1999, General "Morgan" and his
militia were pushed out of Kismayo, bringing an end to his six-year hold on
the city. The operation, led by General Ahmed Warsame among others, was
reported by the victors as having been carried out by "Allied Somali
Forces". There have also been intermittent clashes in Ras Kamboni in the
Lower Juba region, between the Al-Itihad Islamic Organization and Maqabul
militiamen of the Absame clan.

Bay and Bakool regions

28. Since the occupation of the Baidoa area by the late General Aidid on 17
September 1995, guerrilla warfare continued to be waged by the Rahanwein
Resistance Army against the militia of Hussein Aidid. On 6 June 1999, the
Rahanwein Resistance Army finally succeeded in driving Hussein Aidid's
militia out of Baidoa. Some Somalis have claimed, however, that Ethiopian
forces crossed the border and actively fought on the side of the Rahanwein
Resistance Army. Both Ethiopia and the Rahanwein Resistance Army have
denied the charges.

Other regions: Gedo, Lower and Middle Shabelle

29. The Gedo region had been relatively peaceful until 14 March 1998, when
the Al-Itihad Islamic Organization engaged the Somali National Front led by
General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale" in a successful bid to control El-Wak
District. About 23 combatants were reportedly killed while many were
injured. By 5 August 1998, however, the Marehan clan appeared to have
settled the rift between Al-Itihad and General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale".

30. On 8 April 1999, at Belet-Hawa in Gedo region, the self-proclaimed
Chairman of the Somali National Front, the Bardere District Commissioner,
and two others were assassinated in what appeared to be a power struggle
within the Somali National Front. Then on 21 April 1999, the militia of
another member of the clan, who claimed to have succeeded the assassinated Somali National Front Chairman, attacked the militia of General Omar Haji who had signed the Addis Ababa agreement of 1993 as Chairman of the Somali National Front at Burdhubo town. Ten people were reportedly killed and 16 wounded before the Burale militia retreated to their bases at Belet-Hawa. There have been persistent allegations of Ethiopian troop movements within the region. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia has not been in a position to establish the veracity of these reports.

Merka

31. Merka, until recently a place enjoying relative peace, had begun to
attract a number of aid agencies, which established themselves in the town
after relocating from Mogadishu. However, the situation has deteriorated
since April 1999.

C. Role of women and minority groups

32. Women and minority groups in Somalia have continued to express concern over the lack of law and order in the country. On 1 June 1999, the
Chairperson of a Somali NGO, Save Somali Women and Children, submitted a
petition on behalf of 120 women to my Representative for transmission to
the Security Council. The petition noted that Somali women have
traditionally been excluded from politics and carry the main burden of the
suffering in Somalia. In particular, because of the situation within IGAD,
they felt that the United Nations may be best placed to help all Somalis to
restore their government, paying particular attention to the role women
should play. At a meeting held in Nairobi from 21 to 25 June 1999, a
delegation of representatives of five women's groups from different regions
of Somalia established a campaign for Somali women's political
participation. Other Somali women have been holding monthly vigils at
Nairobi in support of peace.

33. My Representative has also been meeting with several spokespersons for
minority groups in Somalia, including the Chairmen of the Somali African
Muki Organization, and the Somali National Union as well as the Sultan of
the Jiddo, who emphasized the exclusion of minorities from the political
process and the serious discrimination suffered by minorities in different
parts of Somalia.

34. On 14 July 1999, Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden "Zoppe", the leader of the
Digil and Mirifle people, issued a statement in which he called for the
establishment of an international war crimes tribunal for Somalia, inter
alia, to investigate and punish Hussein Aidid and his militia, who, he
claimed, had carried out ethnic cleansing on the territory of the Digil and
Mirifle people.

D. Allegations of arms flows into Somalia

35. In his letter of 31 March 1998, Mr. Egal said that the neighbouring
countries should be told in unmistakable terms to stop giving arms and
ammunition to the warring factions in Somalia. In his second letter of 8
August 1998, he deplored the fact that, at a time when the reservoir of
ammunition left over from the cold war period was drying up and the
warlords were no longer able to terrorize the population, new supplies
appeared to be arriving in Somalia. He called for the arms embargo against
Somalia to be enforced.

36. There have been claims by Somalis that Eritrea has been shipping arms
and fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front into Somalia. In January 1999,
at least two flights arrived at Balidogle from Assab, Eritrea, and it was
alleged that the flights carried arms. There were also reports of further
arms deliveries by sea at Merka in mid-February and early May 1999, and at
Faax in mid-June 1999. It was also widely reported that together with the
arms, Oromo Liberation Front fighters disembarked at Merka and Faax. On 31
March 1999, Ali Mahdi accused Ethiopia of providing arms to his opponents,
notably to Hussein Haji Bod. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf wrote to me on 6 May
1999 condemning the troops and arms that were allegedly arriving in Somalia
from Eritrea. In mid-July 1999, officials of the Somali Consultative
Council issued statements in which they condemned the presence of Oromo
Liberation Front fighters in Somalia. They drew attention to what they
considered to be a danger of a degeneration of security in Somalia, warning
that the entire region was likely to be destabilized. On 8 April 1999,
Hussein Aidid, Ali Mahdi and General Omar Haji wrote to me claiming that
Ethiopia had not only exported arms into Gedo region but also continued to
occupy Somali territory. They asked the Security Council to request
Ethiopia to remove its troops from Somalia. UNPOS has neither the mandate
nor the capacity to verify these reports. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have
denied any involvement in arms shipments into Somalia.

 

III. WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

37. Since my last report to the Security Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, has
convened on four occasions ambassadorial meetings of external actors on
Somalia, on 7 October 1997, 16 June 1998, 15 December 1998 and 13 April
1999. They were attended by members of the Council, countries that have
undertaken peacemaking initiatives, and relevant regional and subregional
organizations. The meetings offered an opportunity for an informal exchange
of views and coordination of initiatives on Somalia. It was suggested that
such meetings take place more frequently than in the past, and the
Under-Secretary-General has undertaken to convene them three times a year, or more frequently if need be.

38. I visited the Horn of Africa region between 29 April and 10 May 1998,
and consulted on Somalia with the leaders of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and
Eritrea. The then President of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Aptidon, expressed
the views of most of the leaders when he called for a halt to what he
described as "political tourism" of Somali leaders, in which they go to
various capitals to sign documents which are not honoured. He said he would like all future reconciliation efforts to take place inside Somalia. At
Nairobi, I had a meeting with external actors involved with Somalia,
including the ambassadors of Member States and representatives of
international organizations and non-governmental organizations. At my
request, Mohamed Sahnoun, my Special Envoy in Africa, met a wide range of
Somali leaders at Nairobi.

39. I asked Under-Secretary-General Prendergast to visit Nairobi in
November 1998 to assess the prospects for peace in Sudan and Somalia. On
Somalia, he exchanged views with President Daniel Arap Moi and Foreign
Minister Bonaya Godana at Nairobi and met the Italian Special Envoy for
Somalia, a delegation of the European Commission and a wide range of Somali faction leaders or their representatives, as well as leaders of Somali
civil society, including women. In addition, he exchanged views with other
external actors on Somalia, including heads of United Nations agencies and
programmes, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
Under-Secretary-General Prendergast reported that the Kenyan authorities
were supportive of the IGAD "building-block" approach as the way forward in
Somalia, and that they were optimistic that the Standing Committee could
assist the international community in speaking with one voice on the Somali
peace process.

40. A common strand in Under-Secretary-General Prendergast's discussions
with his Somali interlocutors was a strong feeling that the days of the
"warlords" were over. Most of them called for a renewed United Nations
effort to disarm militia members in the country. However, there was less
disagreement on the way forward in the peace process. While many supported the "building-block" approach, some expressed the fear that it could lead to unsustainable "emirates" and/or to many "presidents" in an absurd fragmentation of the country, ultimately reaching as far down as the
district if not the village level. Under-Secretary-General Prendergast
emphasized my continued interest and that of the Security Council in
finding a solution to the Somali problem, and assured the Somali leaders of
continuing commitment of the United Nations to a political solution. At the
same time, he stressed to them that the onus for peace rested with Somalis
themselves, and that members of the international community could only
assist them in those efforts.

41. As the Council is aware, following submission of my report dated 16
September 1997 (S/1997/715), I appointed David Stephen as my Representative for Somalia as well as head of UNPOS. With the approval of the Security Council, a professional staff member has been added to UNPOS, which continues to be based at Nairobi. This has enabled UNPOS to enhance its briefing and reporting role, and in particular to improve its contacts with
Somali leaders in Somalia. UNPOS staff have, during the period covered by
the present report, made visits to all parts of the country, ensuring
regular contacts and dialogue with all sectors of opinion inside Somalia.
My Representative has also paid several consultation visits both to the
capitals of Governments and to the headquarters of regional organizations
that are involved in the peace process in Somalia. These efforts have
helped to improve the flow of information among external actors, and have
also enhanced understanding of the need for a uniformity of approach in
fostering peace in Somalia, in an environment previously characterized by a
multiplicity of approaches and initiatives.

 

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

42. The United Nations agencies distinguish three different operational
environments within Somalia: "zones of crisis", "zones of transition" and
"zones of recovery". Each of these environments requires different
humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy, and distinct types of external
assistance. Integral to the analysis is the need to address five
fundamental issues: (a) chronic food insecurity; (b) population
displacement; (c) collapse of social services and infrastructure; (d) lack
of good governance and associated security; and (e) the recurrence of
natural disasters and lack of emergency preparedness. In zones of crisis,
the emphasis is on ensuring better food security, provision of basic and
life-saving social services, and assistance to community-level
capacity-building. In zones of transition, greater focus is placed on the
latter. In zones of recovery, the emphasis is on providing technical
support for good governance and support to capacity-building in the
economic and social sectors.

43. As outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 1999, the main
objective of the United Nations is to prevent the current situation in the
South from developing into famine and to continue the groundwork for
establishing stability, self-reliance and security in the North. In order
to meet these objectives the United Nations has adopted a number of
sectoral interventions, including in the areas of food security, health and
nutrition, water and sanitation, education and public administration. In
addition, there are a number of cross-cutting interventions to ensure
programme coherence and protection of civilian populations, including the
promotion and protection of human rights, and inter-agency planning and
coordination. It is envisaged that if the programme is fully implemented it
will benefit about two thirds of the population. The 1999 Consolidated
Appeal presents the programme in detail, outlining the priority
requirements: $65.7 million for humanitarian activities, and $29.3 million
for rehabilitation and recovery activities. Emergency relief activities,
targeting over one million persons at risk, have been reasonably well
funded, while rehabilitation and recovery programmes have not.

44. The implementation of a humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy for
Somalia requires the efforts of a number of key actors ranging from
international organizations, including eight United Nations agencies (UNDP,
the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations), the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and
some 40 NGOs, as well as local communities, administrations and national
NGOs. The implementing partners of the United Nations include the following
international NGOs: Action Contre La Faim, Agency for Cooperation and
Research in Development, African Medical and Research Foundation, European Committee for Agricultural Training, Coordinating Committee of the
Organization for Voluntary Service, Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo
dei Popoli, International Medical Corps, InterSos Humanitarian Organization
for Emergency, Mediche hulp aan de derde wereld (Health for all in the
third world), Mercy International, Médicins Sans Frontières - Spain,
Netherlands and Belgium, Muslim-Aid-UK, Norwegian Church Aid, Swedish
Church Relief, Trocaire and World Vision. In cooperation with the partners
of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, overall coordination of humanitarian
aid is undertaken by the office of the United Nations resident and
humanitarian coordinator for Somalia.

45. Approximately two thirds of the United Nations staff working on Somalia
(international and national) are located inside the country and mainly
concentrated in the northern regions. For the purposes of maintaining a
"cross-border" operation into the unstable South and Central areas and to
provide overall coordination and programme support, the operational
headquarters of most international organizations remain at Nairobi.

46. The effects of the continuing internal armed conflict upon the
population have been compounded by extensive flooding in the southern
regions followed by drought in most areas of Somalia. Severe food
insecurity and disease, including cholera, have put one million persons at
risk in the South, while in the North water and pasture shortage has
dramatically depleted livestock, the resource base for most of the
population.

47. The 1997-1998 floods in the southern region were the worst in decades
and affected the lives of nearly one million Somalis, killing over 2,000
people in the acute phase of the emergency. In support of community
responses, United Nations agencies and NGOs engaged in a massive relief
operation. In the first phase, flood victims were supplied with basic
survival items, including food rations, blankets, plastic sheeting,
sandbags and cooking utensils. A second phase of the operation was planned for the rehabilitation of rudimentary services, including safe water and sanitation, agricultural infrastructure and for strengthening local health
units to address major health problems. The planned follow-up was realized
only marginally, however, due to the paucity of funding - in marked
contrast to funding for the first phase - thereby making these areas of
chronic disaster more vulnerable for the next crisis. A food crisis
accompanied by drought soon followed, beginning in the last quarter of
1998, just one year after the floods.

48. By the end of 1998, food insecurity and deterioration in health
conditions were rife in central and southern Somalia due to the conflict
and climate. The crisis continued as of mid-1999. Unusual population
displacement, the most obvious sign of severe stress, had begun by November 1998. Sedentary farmer households began to move from the worst areas of Bay and Bakool (normally the breadbasket of Somalia) to other areas in search of food, better security and water. Over 40,000 persons moved to Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba and Mogadishu. The communities are particularly vulnerable to outbreaks of communicable diseases, notably measles, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases, such as cholera. After the first confirmed cases of cholera in early December 1998, by the end of February 1999 there were over 3,000 cases and nearly 200 deaths reported. By May 1999, the situation had stabilized.

49. In the southern and central regions, over one million people are facing
serious food shortages and 300,000 of them are currently in need of food
aid. Their long-term food security situation is alarming and likely to
deteriorate as a result of ongoing insecurity and poor prospects for the
current harvest. The number of people requiring humanitarian assistance is
therefore likely to increase. In response, United Nations agencies and NGOs
have continued the large cross-border operation from Kenya, delivering
urgently needed humanitarian supplies, including food aid, medicines and
shelter. Since January 1999, nearly 13,500 tons of relief food have been
distributed by WFP and CARE, benefiting over 700,000 people at Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle regions. UNICEF and its partner agencies have distributed over 2,600 tons of "supermix" (a nutritious blend of corn and sugar), benefiting about 200,000 children. Some 80,000 children received vaccination against measles together with vitamin A
supplementation. Over 27 water sources were rehabilitated, benefiting over
100,000 people at Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Middle Shabelle and Hiran.

50. In the effort to support farming communities in the South, United
Nations agencies and NGOs completed a major seed distribution by the end of March 1999, the beginning of the primary planting season of 1999. On 6 July 1999, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the
Somalia Aid Coordination Body concurrently issued a donor alert for
southern and central Somalia, requesting for US$ 17.5 million and covering
the period from 1 July to 31 December 1999. Over 1,700 tons of seeds were
distributed to farmers of Bay and Bakool regions in southern Somalia. In
the North, successive failures of rains resulted in diminished pasture and
lack of groundwater. Up to 50 per cent of livestock died in hard-hit areas.
An inter-agency response was established by March 1999 to support
communities through targeted food relief, water trucking, and
rehabilitation of water sources. The arrival of rains in May 1999 and the
lifting of the ban on imports of livestock from the Horn by some Gulf
States helped the situation in the North, though there is still a very
large need for rehabilitation work and disaster preparedness in this stable
area.

51. Geographically, the areas experiencing recovery are mostly in the
northern part of Somalia, where approximately one third of the total
population lives. The economy in the North has demonstrated surprising
resilience, with expanding interregional and export-oriented trade. The ban
imposed on the importation of Somali livestock from the Horn to some Gulf
countries had a very negative impact on the economy. Consequently, the
emerging local administrations in the North-West ("Somaliland") and
North-East ("Puntland") suffered from lack of export tax revenues.
Nevertheless, trade has continued to develop. The port of Berbera has
become the most active Somali seaport and the second most important seaport for Ethiopia after Djibouti. Similarly, such airports as those at Hargeisa, Berbera and Bossaso provide an important source of revenue for local authorities and also encourage economic development. Nevertheless, the stability of these areas is fragile. Regions of recovery still need much
support to build their capacities in order to sustain and improve upon
their achievements since the end of the civil war.

52. United Nations projects in the North have been designed to give
essential support towards improving administrative capacities and private
economic expansion. Training programmes have been provided for local
administrative structures, assistance given to urban planning and
management as well as to road repair and sanitation. United Nations
agencies, working closely with international NGOs and local partners, have
succeeded with numerous small, self-sustaining projects, particularly in
the urban centres.

53. The security of humanitarian activities continues to be a grave cause
for concern. On 26 January 1999, Dr. Manmohan Singh Boghal, a Kenyan
citizen working for Terra Nuova, was murdered in a remote village between
Bardera and Garbahare towns in Gedo region by men believed to be working
with him. Dr. Boghal had been involved in vaccination programmes against
the rinderpest disease. The killers stole project money and equipment. The
Somalia Aid Coordination Body recommended the suspension of all
rehabilitation and development activities in Gedo region as local
authorities, who apparently know the culprits, have been unable to bring
them to justice.

54. On 20 March 1999, Deena Umbarger, a United States citizen employed by a non-governmental organization, United Methodist Committee on Relief, was killed close to the Kenya-Somali border. Ms. Umbarger had planned to
conduct a humanitarian assessment mission in Somalia.

55. An Italian national, Dr. Stefano Sotgia, employed as a veterinarian by
the Italian organization Terra Nuova, was kidnapped on 16 April 1999 at
Hagar, about 180 kilometres West of Kismayo. The kidnapping was understood to be linked to accusations that Terra Nuova had not been providing enough services and operations in the area. The kidnappers demanded $100,000 in ransom for the release of the aid worker. The Somalia Aid Coordination Body condemned this kidnapping and called for his immediate release. He was finally released on 9 May 1999.

56. On 18 April 1999, firing was reported in and around the compound of the
non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim at Merka. In March
1999, a death threat letter in the form of a Fatwa had been issued against
the former WHO country director on the basis of a number of unsubstantiated allegations. The United Nations designated official, as a precautionary measure, relocated United Nations international staff members from Merka on 21 April 1999. The attempt by the dominant political clan in the area to revamp the local administration has yet to bear fruit.

 

V. OBSERVATIONS

57. Despite persistent security threats and rising distribution costs
caused by clan conflict, mines and other problems, the United Nations
agencies and their humanitarian partners continue to deliver food aid to a
high proportion of the most affected areas and to most settlements known to have incorporated displaced families. However, in areas threatened by
sporadic armed conflict, including several major urban areas (Mogadishu,
Kismayo and Baidoa), and in parts of the Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions,
aid delivery could not be maintained at requisite levels.

58. Greater investment is needed to strengthen local community capacities
and resilience to meet the demands of man-made and natural emergencies. In the more stable areas in the north, where aid agencies have a more
permanent presence, emphasis should continue to be placed on
capacity-building, in close collaboration with local administrations. The
need for international humanitarian relief aid is demonstrably less where
such rehabilitation investments have been made.

59. "Loud" emergencies in Somalia have been met by substantial short-term
responses from the donor community. However, the operational capacity of
humanitarian agencies has gradually been eroded, primarily owing to
inadequate donor support for medium-term rehabilitation measures. For
United Nations agencies, this is shown by the weak donor response to the
1999 Consolidated Appeal, which was severely prioritized and focused in
response to donor wishes. As a result, the capacity of the agencies to
provide efficient, effective humanitarian relief has been weakened, making
response to future crises ever more difficult. Moreover, inadequate
medium-term funding reduces the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide
crucial, if more mundane, activities related to disaster prevention and the
building of social resilience.

60. Such longer-term support is a prerequisite for any agency to be able to
maintain its staff and its presence. For example, after the extreme floods
of 1997 and 1998, it was clear that humanitarian agencies had not been able
to do nearly enough to help rehabilitate the water sources and irrigation
infrastructure fundamental to improving water access and strengthening
disaster prevention. Another direct effect of inadequate medium-term
funding has been the decline in coverage by non-governmental organizations
in central and southern Somalia, which in turn has led to insufficient
actors in the field able to work with communities in crisis. Even in the
north, the decline in funds has hindered United Nations assistance in
building local capacity to, in turn, respond to natural disasters such as
drought. In addition, the absence of major rehabilitation work hampers
efforts to encourage the return of refugees into the stable areas of
Somalia.

 

61. Little or no development has taken place in Somalia for 10 years.
Indeed, the country's development process has gone into reverse. Most
children receive no health care or education; two generations have had no
access to formal education. Life expectancy at birth is surely lower than
the sub-Saharan average of 51 years. On almost all development indicators,
Somalia ranks among the poorest and most deprived countries in the world.
Virtually all the infrastructure of government - from buildings and
communications facilities to furniture and office equipment - has been
looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums
have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police,
judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite
and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is
not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford
generators. There is no postal service. The economy is in dire straits.
Exports of agricultural products, such as bananas, have plummeted. The ban
imposed by some countries in the Gulf region on the import of live animals
from the Horn of Africa as a result of last year's epidemic of Rift Valley
Fever has now been lifted. However, while it remained in force, it caused
economic hardship, deprived local administrations in the north of
much-needed export tax income and led, through over-grazing, to serious
environmental damage. Some natural resources, such as fish, are being
exploited, mainly by foreigners, without regulation or monitoring.

 

62. In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member
States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the
lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen
as a "black hole" where the absence of law and order is attracting
criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my
Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from
Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point
for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists.
President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali
refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing
Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country. To worsen the
situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999
and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the
Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A
batch of fake Somali shillings, with an estimated value and $4 million,
arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch,
worth about $5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the
Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000
shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in
circulation in Somalia.

 

63. As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The
functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services,
including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the
movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and
coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in
intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding the
fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in
north-western Somalia ("Somaliland") and north-east Somalia ("Puntland"),
have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

 

64. Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its
fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide,
ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from
natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on
clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The
violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature.
The crucial missing ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no
peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be
re-established.

 

65. While a negotiated settlement of Somalia's crisis has continued to be
elusive, some important steps forward have been made. Two years ago, my
then Special Envoy, Ismat Kittani, concluded that an essential
pre-condition for political progress in Somalia was the development of a
greater uniformity of approach on the part of the international community.
Here, important progress has been made. In addition to the ambassadorial
meeting, which meets in New York, the Standing Committee, which meets in
the region, is already proving its worth as a forum for the exchange of
information and assessments on the situation in Somalia. I believe that, as
a result, the danger of a proliferation of initiatives, previously deplored
by a number of Governments, has now been minimized. In particular, the
ideas submitted by Djibouti, in its capacity as Chairman of IGAD, to the
Standing Committee, on 29 July 1999, with the aim of speeding up the IGAD
process, are in my view worthy of serious consideration.

 66. Within Somalia itself, there is increasing evidence that ordinary
Somalis are tired of violence and are pressuring their leaders to opt for
peace. In the absence of any externally sponsored peace process since the
Cairo meeting, Somalis are increasingly taking political initiatives
themselves, through regional conferences, often organized by traditional
leaders and informal cross-clan contacts. Civil society is beginning to
make itself heard. Women's groups, in particular, have become much more
active. At the same time, there has been increased criticism of the role of
the Somali faction leaders.

 67. Approximately half of Somali territory is peaceful. While struggles
continue over control of some key southern towns, much of the day-to-day
violence in Somalia is now criminal rather than political in origin.
Indeed, a new challenge has presented itself: increasingly, the militias do
not respond to the orders of clan leaders, but of local commanders only. 

68. Many Somali leaders have informed the United Nations Political Office
for Somalia that they would join a national meeting. Many Somalis have in
mind the type of national reconciliation conference agreed upon in both the
Sodere and Cairo agreements, i.e., a meeting of representatives of the
major clan groups, plus minorities, to discuss future constitutional
arrangements and the allocation of posts in a future national government.
However, several Somali leaders have said that they believe that no
progress is possible while Eritrea and Ethiopia continue to be at war and,
in the view of such leaders, to involve Somali faction leaders in that war.
The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is clearly having a highly
adverse effect on the situation in Somalia. Reports of arms flows into
Somalia, in contravention of the embargo established by Security Council
resolutions 733 (1992), are deeply worrying. The United Nations Political
Office for Somalia lacks the requisite mandate and capacity to verify these
reports.

 69. The task of re-establishing a functioning state in Somalia will
require, then, not only an enormous effort of political will on the part of
the Somali people and their leaders, a massive rebuilding operation will
also be a necessary accompaniment of any peace process in Somalia. The two
processes will need to be carefully coordinated, with international support
being carefully calibrated to reinforce those tendencies in Somali society
that are working constructively together.

 70. I believe that the stage has now been reached at which it may be
appropriate for the United Nations to play an enhanced role in Somalia. I
would propose that consideration should be given to action on two fronts.
First, the United Nations, working impartially and objectively with
interested member States, especially within the IGAD process, should do
more to help bring about national unity and the restoration of a national
government in Somalia. In this connection, the following steps could be
considered: (a) as foreseen in my previous report, a general review of the
role of the United Nations in Somalia, including the possible re-location
of some United Nations programmes and agencies, as well as the Political
Office, to Somalia; and, (b) the establishment of a trust fund for Somalia
to provide financial support for the emerging process, for example for
meetings by Somalia.

 71. In addition, consideration might be given to whether, in advance of
political agreements on the formation of a national government, action
could be taken by the international community to assist Somalia to recover
its sovereignty in certain limited fields, for example the protection of
offshore natural resources. Efforts could also be made to limit the
introduction of illegal arms and weapons into the country.

 72. Other possibilities may exist in the area of developmental assistance.
Although some development funds are reaching local administrations in
Somalia, many international and national financial and donor institutions
are required by their statutes to cooperate only with established state
institutions, such as ministries of finance or central banks. It would be a
challenge to the ingenuity of the international community to establish
mechanisms which would allow financial assistance to flow into Somalia even
before a formal central government and other institutions were
re-established. I urge international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and the European Development Fund, in administering the Lomé IV
Convention, to exercise flexibility in this regard, re-examining as
necessary their legal and financial arrangements to take this unique case
into account.

 Annex I

 

[Original: Arabic]

 

EFFORTS MADE BY THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA 

1. At its last session, the one hundred and eleventh, the Council of the
League of Arab States adopted its resolution 111/5846, in which it called
upon the Somali parties to honour their agreements, to cooperate with the
pan-Arab, regional and international efforts for national reconciliation,
and to establish a national authority to restore the State of Somalia to
its place in the international community, in the Arab family and in its
regional setting as an effective State. Between the one hundred and
eleventh and one hundred and twelfth sessions of the Council, the
Secretary-General of the League received numerous Somali leaders, charged
them with responsibility for the deteriorating situation in Somalia and
urged them to place the interest of Somalia above all other considerations,
to spare the Somali people further afflictions from war and divisiveness,
to make the utmost effort to achieve the security, stability and national
reconciliation that are critical to respect for and the maintenance of
Somalia's sovereignty, and to avoid giving any pretexts for the violation
of the country's territorial integrity by any outside forces.

 

2. Whether through its membership in the international standing committee
on Somalia or through its direct contacts in the Somali arena and its
regional and international relations, the secretariat of the League is
endeavouring to achieve the following:

 

   * The compliance of all countries, and particularly the countries
     geographically contiguous to Somalia, with Security Council resolution
     733 (1992) concerning the embargo on deliveries of weapons to Somalia;
     respect for Somali sovereignty; commitment to the territorial
     integrity of Somalia and its inviolability; the basic responsibility
     of the Somali leaders to keep their country aloof from conflicts
     between neighbouring States and, in particular, from the ongoing
     conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea;
   * Close cooperation with international and regional organizations and
     with the countries interested in the situation in Somalia with a view
     to reaching a consensus on modalities for helping the Somalis to
     resolve their dilemma and restore the institutions of the State so as
     to preserve Somalia's unity and territorial integrity;
   * A greater role for the United Nations in the Somali context and the
     assumption of its basic responsibilities for national reconciliation;
     the relocation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia
     (UNPOS) from Nairobi to Mogadishu for this purpose; and the provision
     of technical and humanitarian assistance to the Somali people by the
     United Nations through its specialized agencies;
   * The endeavour, in coordination with various international, regional
     and other organizations and with neighbouring States, to help the
     Somalis to convene a national reconciliation conference for the
     purpose of forming a unified Somali authority.