19 May 2007 04:14

SOMALIA WATCH

 
Editorial
  • Title: [SW Editorial] Somali Crises and the Foreign Proxy Activities
  • From:[]
  • Date :[] 22 Nov 1999

Release - SW/AAJ 31/99,  22 Nov 1999 

Somali Crises and the Foreign Proxy Activities

To:

member states of the United Nations

the Secretary-General of the United Nations

International Organizations Operating in Somalia

References are made to Somalia Watch releases recorded in www.somaliawatch.org and the attached report on the subject matter. It is unfortunate that at a time when much genuine efforts are being made to find solution to the SOMALI CRISES, some neighboring countries are fighting proxy wars in Somalia, and some others are using the Somali Crises to advance their national interests.

Somalia Watch Organization hopes that the on-going efforts to find solution to the SOMALI CRISES does not get derailed by host  of proxy activities in Somalia.

Somalia Watch


Attach 1.

Somali Crises and the Egyptian Nile Water Politics

Garowe - Puntland - Somalia Nov 20, 1999 (Warside). This is the story of the Egyptian plan to settle millions of its exploding population in Somalia. It is a story of intricate web that links Egyptian strategic interest in the Horn of Africa, to the source of Blue Nile in Ethiopia, to the waters of the Nile River and to the current political situation in Somalia. It is a closed loop that, if successful, is supposed to ensure that Egypt got the control of both the source and the mouth of Nile River. The underlying strategic imperative is that Egypt must gain as much control of the Nile Water as it can for its very existence. After all, they say in Egypt that Egypt is Nile and Nile is Egypt. Egypt is serious on the Blue Nile Water issue. As the Economist magazine's Africa editor Richard Downed (World: Africa - Africa's potential water wars) says," part of Egypt's motivation for supporting Eritrea in its conflict with Ethiopia is its mistrust of Addis Ababa's plans for the Blue Nile, and the Egyptian President Hosanna Mubarak has already threatened to bomb Ethiopia if they build any dams on it ". Many observers of the current Somali political situation and the Somali political leaders have been trying to reason Egypt's consist support of the faction leader Hussein Aideed, a boy who came to Somali political scene, only recently and by accident, when his late father Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed was assassinated in 1996. These are the reasons as told by a one time friend and ally of late General Aideed. Securing Egypt's water needs was a subject of discussion and agreement in 1978 between Egypt and the late dictator of Somalia Mohamed siyad Barre. After the end of the Ogaden War of 1977-78 the political and military power of Siyad Barre had been considerably weakened as a result of the humiliating defeat by the Ethiopian forces and their Cuban and Russian allies. The war efforts left Somalia economically broke. Siyad Barre faced internal dissent and external isolation. His mentors for almost a decade - the Russians- had switched sides to the Ethiopians. The Americans were not willing to fill in the vacuum left. Egypt saw special opportunity to realize a dream dear in the hearts and minds of all Egyptians - control the source of the Nile River. Egypt took advantage of the weakness of Siyad Barre and struck a deal with him that involves the settling down of 500,000 Egyptian families along the banks of the two Somali rivers - Shabelle and Juba. At that time the average size of the Egyptian family was estimated at five persons, and thus 500,000 families would have amounted to approximately 2.5 million Egyptian farmers in Somalia. After a decade of turmoil in Somalia, Siyad Barre was overthrown in 1991 before the accord was implemented. In early 1994 the Egyptians resumed the contacts on the population settlements issue with Ali Mahdi Mohamed, one of the warlords of Mogadishu. Later that year further contacts were made with Ali Mahdi when he was in Cairo for Reconciliation's talks, heading the so-called Group of Twelve. Discussions on the implementation details of the accord were made between the Group of Twelve and Egyptian officials. General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who was then in Nairobi, Kenya, was invited to by the Egyptians to attend the settlement discussions. An envoy from the Group of Twelve was sent to extend the Egyptian invitation, but Aideed refused the invitation on the grounds that any agreement or discussions have to be on his terms and not on the terms of this Group of Twelve. Again the settlement discussions were put off when UNOSOM operations in Somalia spun out of control late 1994. After the failure of UNOSOM operations the Egyptian officials started to negotiate with General Aideed. Two rounds of secret talks were held between General Aideed and the Egyptians, but both were inconclusive, and the General himself was killed in 1996. Then came to the political scene Hussein Aideed who inherited his late father's job. The Egyptians tried to persuade Hussein Aideed to work with Egypt to implement the population settlement accord. Again two rounds of inconclusive meetings were held. General Alla who was then second in command of the Egyptian Intelligence Service and responsible only to the Office of the President, made contact with Mohamed Qanyare, who is a key adviser of Hussein Aideed. Mohamed Qanyare was to bring Hussein Aideed in line with the Egyptian thinking for a handsome payment. It was reported that Qanyare was paid 120, 000 US$ to carry out the mission. In early 1997, he had succeeded persuading Hussein M.F. Aideed to accept the Egyptian population settlement in return for Egyptian full support of his faction in any Reconciliation Talks. Egyptian officials and Hussein Aideed revised the numbers of the proposed Egyptian settlement population to 20-25 million. Hussein Aideed was handsomely rewarded when Egypt put its full weight behind his faction in the ill-fated Egyptian-sponsored Cairo Talks of Dec1997. In the Cairo Talks of 1997 Egypt also succeeded in dismantling the National Salvation Council (NSC), formed in Sodere Ethiopia in 1997, by recruiting Ali Mahdi Mohamed, one of the key leaders of the Council. The Egyptian plan was to follow up the Cairo talks with a National Reconciliation Conference in Baidoa (Somalia) and produce their favorite leaders - Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi as the Head and Deputy Head in any Somali Government. Egypt created special fund, the so-called Arab World Security Fund for its reconciliation efforts in Somalia.The main Egyptian reasoning and explanation to Arab states for the creation of this "Special Fund" was that after the capture of the Hannish Islands by Eritrea from Yemen, there is a possibility that Ethiopia might be installing a puppet regime in Somalia and that Arab interests in the Red Sea and Bab Al Mandab Strait might fall into the influence and hands of Israel, therefore, it was necessary to protect Arab interests in the region by the creation of such a Fund to prop up a new pro Arab administration in Somalia. Several Arab states supported the Egyptian line and contributed to the Fund. The proposed National Reconciliation Conference in Baidoa was never held, and once again the Egyptian scheme collapsed. Egypt is not giving up though. As reported in I.O.N of October 16, 1999 - Puntland in the firing line, in a meeting in Cairo on October 5, Egyptian and Libyan diplomats worked out with the partisans of Mohamed Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi a strategy aimed at torpedoing the Djibouti diplomatic initiative on Somalia tabled in the United Nations General Assembly at end-September by Djibouti head of state Ismail Omar Gelleh and supported by Ethiopia. Egypt is to mobilize the international community and Arab states on a rival proposals intended to dilute and frustrate any International efforts to find solution to the SOMALI CRISES. The International community should be aware that the SOMALI CRISES has become a tool Egypt is using to achieve dual strategic objectives - population settlement in Somalia and influencing the Water Politics of the Nile by getting closer to the source of the Blue Nile. The desire of the Somali people and the well-meaning international communities on the one hand and the strategic interests of Egypt in Somalia on the other are diametrically opposed and cannot be reconciled.

Copyright © 1999, Warside - Garowe, all rights reserved.


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