Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I.  Introduction

1.        Members of the Security Council, in their statement of 27 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/16), requested me to submit periodic reports on the situation in Somalia. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and covers events since my last report, submitted on 16 August 1999 (S/1999/882).

II.  Political developments

  A.  Peacemaking efforts

2.        In the interval between the publication of my previous report and the initiative launched by President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti in September 1999, Somali leaders and interested Governments continued their efforts to find a solution to the problem of Somalia. On 23 August 1999, a group of Somali leaders who had formed the “Somali Peace Alliance” (SPA) travelled to Djibouti to brief President Guelleh and also travelled to Addis Ababa for similar meetings with Ethiopian authorities. The leaders forming SPA included those of “Puntland”, the “Somali Consultative Body”, the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and the Somali National Front (SNF).

3.        Another group of faction leaders, including Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid and Osman Hassan Ali “Atto”, assembled in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in early September 1999 in an attempt to resolve differences. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf of “Puntland” also arrived in the country several days later. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of “Somaliland” declined to attend. Colonel Yusuf refused to meet the other leaders and returned to Somalia through Addis Ababa and Djibouti, where he met President Guelleh. The Aidid group also travelled to Addis Ababa in late October 1999, and Mr. Aidid reportedly agreed to withdraw support from groups considered to be a security threat to Ethiopia. Soon thereafter, Mr. Aidid announced that he had disarmed elements of the Oromo Liberation Front who were in Somalia.

4.        President Guelleh, in his address to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, on 22 September 1999, said that he was prepared to lead a new attempt to bring peace and reconciliation to Somalia and establish structures of governance. Lamenting the failure of the Somali warlords to live up to the promises they had made in previous negotiations, President Guelleh stressed that any future process should be linked to Somali civil society. He also declared that warlords should be charged with crimes against humanity, and international sanctions should be imposed on those obstructing the peace process.

5.        President Guelleh’s address received positive reactions from Somalis both within and outside the country. There were demonstrations in a number of Somali towns and cities in support of his initiative. Initial responses from Somali leaders were also positive. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of “Somaliland” welcomed the initiative. However, the subsequent deterioration in the relationship between his administration and Djibouti led to the former closing the border at the end of the year. The dispute was resolved in January 2000. Mr. Egal subsequently paid a visit to Djibouti and reaffirmed his support for the Djibouti peace initiative.

6.        In January 2000, my Special Representative for Somalia visited Baidoa, Hargeisa and Garowe to consult Somali leaders on the Djibouti initiative. David Stephen met the leaders of “Somaliland”, “Puntland” and RRA, among others, who expressed support for the initiative but felt that there was a need for certain concepts and issues to be clarified. A similar position was put forward by a group of leaders in Mogadishu in a statement issued in January. Mr. Egal told my Representative that the Djibouti initiative would provide the “south” of Somalia with a leadership with which he could negotiate.

7.        Even though the initiative remained in outline form, it received support from external actors. The Standing Committee on Somalia of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) endorsed the Djibouti proposal on 30 September 1999 and the IGAD Partners Forum did likewise on 19 October. IGAD itself, at its summit meeting in Djibouti on 26 November, welcomed and endorsed the Djibouti initiative in principle. Formal endorsement was given by an IGAD ministerial meeting in Djibouti on 27 March 2000. At the meeting of the Partners Forum Liaison Group on Somalia in Djibouti on 7 February, the Djibouti authorities presented a plan of action for a Somali national peace conference. On the whole, the Liaison Group reacted positively to the plan.

8.        The first formal move to implement the Djibouti initiative was the holding of the Technical Consultative Symposium, hosted by the Government of Djibouti in March 2000. President Guelleh emphasized that the Symposium was not a decision-making body but a means of providing advice to the Government of Djibouti in its preparations for the conference. The Symposium was attended by about 60 Somalis, invited in their individual capacities, from all parts of the country and from the diaspora. My Special Adviser, Mohamed Sahnoun, represented the United Nations.

9.        The Symposium recommended, inter alia, that the process should be made as inclusive as possible by allowing the participation of faction leaders who desired peace and by enhancing the role of civil society within Somalia and in the diaspora. On the future structure of government, the Symposium recommended a decentralized arrangement as well as consolidation of peace in areas in which peace had been restored; the establishment of a human rights commission to monitor violations of the peace process; the departure of Somalis occupying the lands and properties of others; the reaffirmation of Mogadishu as the capital of Somalia, with the possibility of establishing a temporary capital for a future provisional government; and the rehabilitation of militia members, with the conversion of some of them into a national army. If necessary, the transitional government could call for an international force to assist in matters of security. The delegates also recommended stricter enforcement of the Security Council arms embargo on Somalia, stressed the need for international support for a future agreement by Somalis and called upon Djibouti to send delegations to Somalia to prepare for the Somali National Peace Conference.

10.      During March and April 2000, the Government of Djibouti consulted further with Somalis from all clans and walks of life. A delegation of representatives of the Islamic courts from Mogadishu told my Representative that their organizations fully supported the Djibouti peace proposal. A group of influential Somali businessmen visited Djibouti in March 2000 and pledged moral and material support for the Conference.

11.      On 2 May 2000, the first phase of the Somali National Peace Conference, a meeting of traditional and clan leaders, was formally opened in the town of Arta, which is located approximately 40 kilometres north of Djibouti. Participants included elders from most of Somalia’s clans and from all parts of the country. The first phase of the Conference concluded on 13 June. In addition to working on reconciliation issues among the clans, the Conference prepared for the second phase by drawing up an agenda and lists of delegates representing clans. The delegates included political, business and religious leaders, as well as representatives of civil society. President Guelleh formally inaugurated the second phase on 15 June. The total number of delegates was 810, made up of four delegations of 180, each including 20 women, representing the four main clan families, plus 90 minority alliance representatives, including 10 women. The elders who had participated in the first phase of the Conference were allowed to attend as members of delegations, but without a vote. On 17 June, delegates and traditional leaders unanimously elected as co-chairmen a former mayor of Mogadishu and the then Secretary-General of RRA. Four vice-chairpersons, including one woman, were also appointed.

12.      After deliberating in committee and plenary sessions for a month, the delegates approved the Transitional National Charter for governance in a transition phase of three years, culminating in elections. The Charter provides for regional autonomy, based on the 18 regions that existed at the end of the Siad Barre regime. It also sets out structures for executive, legislative and judicial powers, as well as the rights of individuals. These include, for the first time in Somali history, a specific requirement that 25 seats in parliament be set aside for women. A representation of 24 seats for minority clans was also agreed upon. The Charter will be the supreme law until a definitive federal constitution for Somalia is adopted at the end of the transition period. It also provides for the election of a 225-person Transitional National Assembly.

13.      In early August, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and on the basis of nominations from clans, delegates selected the 225 members of the Assembly. This proved to be an arduous process, since serious differences emerged about the number of seats to be allotted to each clan. The Somali National Peace Conference later gave President Guelleh the right to use his own discretion to select a further 20 parliamentarians. This was seen as a way of defusing tensions.

14.      The Transitional National Assembly convened for the first time on 13 August and a few days later elected Abdalla Deerow Issaq as its Speaker. When nominations for the presidential elections closed, there were 45 candidates, 16 of whom entered the electoral contest on 25 August. The election was won by Abdikassim Salad Hassan on 26 August, and the next day he was inaugurated as President at a ceremony held at Arta. Those present included the Presidents of Djibouti, Eritrea, the Sudan and Yemen and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. In addition to the diplomatic community accredited in Djibouti, senior officials from France, Italy, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Saudi Arabia, as well as senior representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and IGAD witnessed the inauguration. My Representative read a message on my behalf.

  B.  Activities of the Transitional National Assembly and the Transitional National Government

15.      In an address to the delegates to the Somali National Peace Conference on 28 August, Mr. Hassan called upon those with weapons to surrender them and stated that his Government would provide rehabilitation for former militiamen, some of whom would be incorporated into the new Somali army. On 30 August, Mr. Hassan visited Mogadishu and Baidoa together with members of the Transitional National Assembly and was welcomed by large crowds.

16.      Mr. Hassan proceeded to Cairo, where he addressed the ministerial meeting of the League of Arab States and met with Egyptian officials. He then flew to New York and participated in both the Millennium Summit and the general debate of the General Assembly. Mr. Hassan, or his Prime Minister, has since visited the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Mr. Hassan also participated in the summit meeting of the League of Arab States, held at Cairo on 21 and 22 October, and the summit conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, held at Doha from 12 to 14 November 2000.

17.      At the IGAD summit meeting, held at Khartoum on 23 and 24 November, Mr. Hassan was the first Somali leader since 1991 to be re-admitted to the seat of Somalia in the organization. The acceptance of the Transitional National Government by Somalia’s immediate neighbours represents an important development in the country’s return to the community of nations.

18.      On 8 October, Mr. Hassan announced the appointment of Ali Khalif Galaydh as Prime Minister. Soon thereafter, Mr. Galaydh named Ismail Mohamed Hurreh “Buba” as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Members of the Transitional National Assembly returned to Mogadishu during the first two weeks of October and the President and Prime Minister returned on 14 October. The following week, Mr. Galaydh announced the appointment of a deputy prime minister and 22 ministers. The appointees, all of them men, included representatives of all major clans, and one from an ethnic minority group. A week later, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of 45 assistant ministers, 5 ministers of state and the Governor of the Benadir region (Greater Mogadishu). Of these, 4 were women.

19.      Mr. Hassan is giving priority to the security situation in Mogadishu. A security committee has been established. Demobilization and disarmament of the various militias is reportedly taking place. A police force is being established and is being financed, for the time being, by contributions from Somali businessmen. On 17 October, Mr. Hassan appointed the Chairman of the National Demobilization Authority, who was killed the next day by gunmen allegedly associated with one of the warlords opposed to the Transitional National Government.

20.      Following the call by Mr. Hassan for interested entities to assist in reconciling the Transitional National Government with those who had stayed away from the peace process, the Government of Italy sent envoys to consult with the leaders of “Somaliland” and “Puntland”. They have reported their findings to Mr. Hassan in Mogadishu. President Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen has twice received some of the faction leaders from Mogadishu. From 18 to 22 November, Mr. Hassan was in Yemen. In late November, Mr. Hassan visited the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Reports indicated that the Libyan leader offered to assist in the reconciliation process.

  C.  Reactions of Somali leaders to the Djibouti initiative

21.      In early February, subsequent to Mohamed Ibrahim Egal’s endorsement of the Djibouti initiative (subsequently known as the Arta peace process) and after he had visited President Guelleh on 28 January, 60 “Somaliland” parliamentarians denounced the initiative and reportedly passed a law declaring that any “Somalilander” attending the Conference would be considered a traitor and liable to the death penalty. Two “Somalilanders” were imprisoned in Hargeisa after visiting Djibouti. On 28 August, the Egal administration issued a decree giving sweeping powers to a “national” security committee empowered, inter alia, to suspend habeas corpus and ban public demonstrations. On 17 September, a court in Berbera sentenced a senior traditional leader of the Dulbahante clan from the Sool region to seven years in prison for attending the Arta Conference. The leader was subsequently pardoned by Mr. Egal. A representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was present at the trial. In similar fashion, Mr. Egal detained Sultan Abdul Kadir and five others who had participated in the Arta Conference and, on 19 November, pardoned them as well.

22.      Djibouti sent a delegation to “Somaliland” on 14 April to brief Mr. Egal and seek his participation, but the delegation was not allowed to disembark at Hargeisa airport. Reacting to the election of Mr. Hassan as President, Mr. Egal stated that he would enter into negotiations only with someone who could claim legitimacy over the southern regions of Somalia. After the adjournment of the Somali National Peace Conference, a delegation led by the “foreign minister” of “Somaliland”, travelled abroad, including to New York, to explain the position of “Somaliland”.

23.      On 23 March, Colonel Yusuf stated that “Puntland” was withdrawing its support for the Arta peace process. Among other things, he objected to what he claimed was the hand-picking of delegates to the Technical Consultative Symposium; unwillingness on the part of Djibouti to accept advice on the legitimacy of a building blocks approach; the holding of meetings in secret; and the imposition of decisions. Following the statement by Colonel Yusuf, there were demonstrations in a number of major towns in “Puntland” in favour of the peace process. The Government of Djibouti denied the claims of the “Puntland” authorities and reiterated that the process belonged to all Somalis.

24.      On 18 April, the Government of Djibouti dispatched a delegation to Garowe to brief “Puntland” elders and the administration. Eventually, Colonel Yusuf agreed that the elders could proceed to Djibouti to attend the first phase of the Conference. Some of the “Puntland” elders returned to Garowe, ostensibly to brief their constituencies, but did not return to Arta. On 17 June, Colonel Yusuf announced that the “Puntland” delegation had withdrawn from the Somali National Peace Conference and stated that those remaining did not have the mandate of the people. After the Arta Conference, he maintained that “Puntland” had not participated in it and that it would not recognize its outcome. However, he assured the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) that he would not resort to force unless Mr. Hassan’s forces attacked him.

25.      Although representatives of various sub-clans took full part in the Arta Conference, a number of the faction leaders from Mogadishu stayed out of it. On several occasions the Government of Djibouti sent delegations to Mogadishu. Subsequently, Mogadishu faction leaders, including Hussein Aidid and Ali “Atto”, rejected the outcome of the Arta Conference. Some threatened that Mr. Hassan would be prevented from entering Mogadishu. In a statement issued on 30 October, six Mogadishu faction leaders accused Mr. Hassan of taking steps that could provoke catastrophic war. The signatories of the statement claimed that they were people of peace who did not intend to fight in Mogadishu unless they were forced to do so. They deplored the importation of banknotes by Mogadishu businessmen and said that only an all-inclusive government could open the Mogadishu seaport.

26.      On 25 and 26 October, at a meeting in Garowe, the leaders of “Puntland”, RRA and the Somali Patriotic Movement declared that Somalia should be a federal state made up of “Puntland” state, Northwestern state (“Somaliland”), Central state and Southwestern state, the latter consisting of the Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Lower and Middle Juba regions. The group called for a national reconciliation conference and for a technical committee to draft a charter. They also called on interested countries and organizations to assist both existing “regional states” and those to be set up.

  D.  Role of the United Nations

27.      On 1 September and 3 December 1999 and 24 April 2000, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs convened ambassadorial meetings of external actors on Somalia in New York. The representative of the Government of Djibouti briefed the meetings on the Somali National Peace Conference. The ambassadors who spoke at the meeting generally supported the efforts of Djibouti and called upon others to do the same.

28.      UNPOS has continued to monitor the political situation in Somalia and to encourage Somali leaders and the international community to work together to restore peace in the country. At my request, my Representative travelled to Djibouti on 1 February 2000 to assist and support the Djibouti efforts. He remained there until the conclusion of the process. Colleagues from the United Nations Somalia team, including the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the Human Rights Officer, joined the UNPOS team from time to time throughout the process.

29.      Prior to the launching of the Djibouti plan of action, UNPOS convened in Nairobi on 16 November 1999 a forum that brought together over 500 Somalis of different backgrounds, including faction leaders and representatives of civil society and minority groups. Members of the diplomatic community and the Government of Djibouti were also represented. The forum provided an opportunity for Somalis to express their views in the presence of representatives of the international community. Although some of the Somali speakers were critical of certain aspects of the Djibouti proposal, the vast majority welcomed the new initiative.

30.      The specialized agencies of the United Nations system contributed to the peace process by offering technical support in their areas of competence, thus also fostering regional confidence-building. The Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) supported a Djibouti non-governmental organization, l’Association pour le développement et l’animation culturelle, which staged the first Regional Musical Festival for the Horn of Africa (FEST’HORN) in Djibouti from 5 to 10 May 2000 as part of a celebration of the culture of peace, dedicated to Somalia. Artists from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan performed at the Palais du peuple in Djibouti and also for the conference delegates at Arta. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical assistance for various aspects of the Conference itself.

31.      In the course of the Djibouti process, my Representative made several attempts to engage the “Somaliland” administration. He visited Hargeisa on 8 March 2000 for talks with senior ministers, which were inconclusive. In July, he was successful in establishing direct talks between President Guelleh and Mr. Egal. Unfortunately, the talks did not lead to the participation of the Egal administration in the Arta Conference. In September, he tried to encourage dialogue between Messrs Egal and Hassan. Mr. Egal told my Representative that he would not talk to Mr. Hassan as long as the latter claimed to be the President of all of Somalia.

32.      Concern has been expressed by the independent expert appointed by the Secretary-General in connection with the question of human rights in Somalia about threats of punishment by the administrations of “Somaliland” and “Puntland” against individuals from the two regions attending the Arta Conference. In a press release issued on 10 July, the independent expert drew attention to the action of the “Somaliland” authorities in arresting and seeking to deport back to “Puntland” 25 persons on their way to Djibouti to take part in the Conference. The independent expert has also raised the question of the killing in “Somaliland” of an army officer, allegedly for opposing the forcible deportation of Majerten leaders who had wished to travel to Arta.

33.      I have been in touch with President Guelleh during the course of the Somali National Peace Conference and he has shared with me his assessment of the progress achieved at Arta. He has asked me to garner support for the peace effort, including financial assistance. I would like to express my gratitude to Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which have responded positively to my appeal, as of the date of the present report.

III. Security situation

34.      The security situation in north-western and north-eastern Somalia remains relatively calm, with occasional incidents of banditry and other criminal acts. In the central and southern parts of the country, the security situation continues to be uncertain and sometimes extremely tense. Extended parts of coastal areas, such as the area between Galcayo and Adado, are not under the control of any effective regional authority. They continue to be dominated by pirates and the risk for the personal safety of international staff is very high. Some parts of the country, including the area around Kismayo, can be described as anarchic. There have also been sporadic local skirmishes in other areas. They involved intra-Marehan clan fights in the Gedo region, conflicts between RRA and the Digil Salvation Army and Habr-Gedir militia in the Lower Shabelle region.

35.      Banditry is rampant in Mogadishu. There is no single authority for the maintenance of law and order. Significant parts of the city continue to be under the control of the different militias, including the seaport and the airport, which remain closed, the former government blocks and the main city market. The Transitional National Government has only limited control of the Greater Mogadishu area. A member of the Transitional National Assembly was killed on 12 November at his residence in Mogadishu, in what was apparently a political assassination.

36.      Several Somali aid workers have lost their lives during the period under review. On 19 August 1999, Qasim Aden Egal, an employee of the World Health Organization (WHO), was killed in Hargeisa Yarey Village in Middle Juba. On 13 September, the Somali administrator of the Dutch non-governmental organization Memisa, Farah Ali Gurhan, was shot and killed in his office at Garbaharey by SNF gunmen (a total of 10 people were killed during the fighting). On 15 September, Somali bandits ambushed a vehicle of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) being used to transport senior health officials and local staff members, killing Dr. Ayub Sheikh Yarrow Abdiyow and wounding five others, one of whom subsequently died in hospital. The incident took place near Jowhar in Middle Shabelle. On 18 October, two national officers of the World Food Programme (WFP) were fired upon at El Bur, in the Galgadud region. They were withdrawn safely from the area.

37.      On 11 September 1999, a British citizen, Alan MacLean, was killed, allegedly by pirates, while sailing off the north-east coast of Somalia. On 6 June 2000, Dieter Krasemann, a German national working for the German Technical Cooperation Agency was killed at Burao, “Somaliland”. On 8 June, an aircraft used by the humanitarian programmes of the European Commission was fired upon and struck in the wing as it landed at Merka. On 15 June, a grenade was tossed into the Merka compound of an Italian non-governmental organization, Cooperazione Iternazionale per lo Sviluppo. According to some reports, this was an attempt by Islamic “fundamentalist” elements to prevent the celebration of the Day of the African Child. No one was hurt.

38.      On 26 July, a French national, Françoise Deutsch, and a British national, John Ward, both staff members of the Paris-based international non-governmental organization Action contre la faim, were kidnapped and held hostage in Mogadishu. They were released on 18 September after negotiations that reportedly involved Mr. Hassan and his security advisers. Although it was reported that no ransom had been paid, reports reaching UNPOS indicated that the release was negotiated and financed by local businessmen.

39.      In August 1999, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, announced a ban on all air travel between Kenya and Somalia. The land borders had been sealed previously. Although President Moi eventually lifted the bans, he suggested that they had been put in place in reaction to an increased flow of arms from Somalia into Kenya. On 4 October, Mr. Hassan expressed concern about the flow of arms into Somalia from an unnamed neighbouring country.

IV.  Humanitarian conditions

40.      Following the severe drought that lasted from the end of 1999 through the first quarter of 2000, humanitarian needs have decreased significantly across most of Somalia. This change has occurred since June, primarily owing to favourable environmental conditions. As a result, the estimated number of Somalis facing food insecurity has declined from 750,000 to below 400,000. In response, United Nations agencies are now developing assistance strategies to promote the mid-term recovery of the livelihood of poor and displaced populations. While it is still too soon to declare an end to the cycle of crises rendering the lives of millions of Somalis vulnerable to uncertain climatic, economic and security conditions, the lull in relief requirements enables aid agencies to focus on emergency prevention and support for local, community-based emergency preparedness and coping initiatives.

41.      During the long dry season from December 1999 to April 2000, the Gedo, Bakool and northern Hiran regions were considered the most drought-affected areas of Somalia. Numerous nutritional surveys conducted in southern Somalia reported global malnutrition rates of over 20 per cent, whereas 15 per cent global malnutrition is generally accepted as the threshold for declaring an emergency. In response, WFP has succeeded in improving the quantity and timing of distributions to match better the district-level food-need estimates provided by the Food Security Assessment Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the UNICEF nutrition assessments. Similarly, FAO has successfully distributed seeds and tools to assist in building the productive capacity of rain-fed and irrigated farming. Further, given that malnutrition in Somalia is not caused simply by lack of food, intersectoral assistance to address related factors, in particular sanitary conditions, access to water and the availability of medical care, became the focus of United Nations coordination activities and UNICEF supplementary feeding programmes.

42.      Three weeks of heavy rainfall from the end of April through the second week of May led to good crop establishment, improved access to water and pasture regeneration in most areas. In August, field reports confirmed these generally positive results. Seasonal crop production (estimated at 214,000 metric tonnes) was good when compared to the average post-war production (175,000 metric tonnes) but remains poor when compared to pre-war production (350,000 metric tonnes). By September, the harvest had lowered market food prices in most areas. Nonetheless, concern remained about some areas that had received less than average rainfall, particularly the Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions. The future status of populations resident in these areas depends heavily on the success of the short rainy season in November 2000. The reported flooding in Middle and Lower Shabelle since late November could be a precursor to a major emergency.

43.      While humanitarian concerns may have lessened on the national level, pockets of vulnerability remain. As of October, field reports indicated that the bumper harvest might provide only temporary respite for many communities in southern Somalia. Without further improvements in their livelihood, many communities will face more food and water insecurity in the coming months. Long-term processes of destitution, including land alienation, internal displacement, economic collapse and the destruction of productive infrastructure, have not affected all households equally. These processes have stratified livelihood conditions between rich and poor households within Somali communities and generated grave disparities in the distribution of humanitarian need. The dispersion of displaced persons and other destitute groups amid populations with more assets and higher living standards renders their plight less visible to the international community and decreases the perceived urgency of humanitarian responses.

44.      An example of varying humanitarian conditions even within the same geographical location was illustrated in June by Action contre la faim, which conducted a nutritional survey of the internally displaced populations in Mogadishu. The survey accessed 60 per cent of the internally displaced population on all sides of the “green lines”. A total of 12.9 per cent global malnutrition, including 2 per cent severe malnutrition, was observed. This is a significant reduction since the last survey in 1995, which identified a global rate of 26 per cent. Casual observation indicates that the situation in south Mogadishu is worse than on the north side of the city. It is expected that conditions are generally better for the city’s non-internally displaced resident population but worse for those internally displaced populations that the survey (and hence aid agency activities) could not reach.

45.      Following the first-ever recorded outbreak of Rift Valley fever in the Middle East, the imposition of an embargo on the importation of livestock from the Horn of Africa was announced by the Government of Saudi Arabia on 19 September. All other countries on the Arabian peninsula followed the Saudi initiative, banning the importation of both live animals and processed meat. To date, no cases of Rift Valley fever have been identified in either livestock or human populations in Somalia. Since this ban on the importation of livestock from the Horn area is more comprehensive than the previous ban in 1998, involving more countries and all livestock species, the implications for food security and economic development are very grave. As of October, reports indicated sharp declines in livestock prices in northern and central regions. By restricting trade opportunities, the ban will inevitably reduce employment opportunities and affect access to other important income sources throughout the economy.

46.      Cholera, which is endemic in Somalia, with outbreaks occurring annually since 1994, returned to Somalia in December 1999. The epidemic peaked between 15 and 21 April 2000, when 1,022 cases and 145 deaths were recorded. Case fatality rates were high this year, particularly in the Bay region, where the Dinsoor district reported a rate of 25.8 per cent. Following the heavy rains in April and May, morbidity decreased across central and southern Somalia, until all cholera treatment centres were closed by June. During the 1999-2000 cholera epidemic, 9 of Somalia’s 18 regions reported outbreaks. In the areas where international non-governmental organizations with strong medical expertise are located, the strength of cholera preparedness and response measures were evidenced by low case fatality rates. Fortunately, the most populous regions that are regularly affected by cholera (e.g. Mogadishu and Kismayo) were covered by these agencies. In areas with either non-medical international non-governmental organizations or no non-governmental organizations at all, preparedness was minimal and case fatality rates were high. This was the case in rural areas, where cholera outbreaks have been explosive but short-lived. In response to future cholera outbreaks, agreement was reached within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body to provide training for key international and national staff from less experienced agencies and to form a team of health-care professionals to assist in initiating control measures in areas without any aid presence. WHO and UNICEF undertook such initiatives in the Gedo and Bay regions in 2000, although conflict in some areas impeded access.

47.      Health surveillance by United Nations agencies and partners of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body confirmed in July that a Kala Azar epidemic was affecting much of southern Somalia. Kala Azar, an immuno-suppressant disease, proves fatal in 95 per cent of cases within six months. Owing to the vague clinical presentation of the disease, Kala Azar symptoms are often confused with tuberculosis, AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Although the extent of the epidemic cannot be confirmed given the limited resources and access conditions, dozens of cases have been detected from Lower Juba and Gedo to Bakool. Médecins sans frontières has taken the lead in conducting evaluations and laboratory tests and supplying drugs. Treatments have been provided by the “Gedo group” of international non-governmental organizations and Médecins sans frontières in Bakol. UNICEF and WHO are supporting these efforts through the procurement of new testing materials and the training of field health staff.

48.      Other than the annual outbreak of cholera and the onset of the Kala Azar epidemic, no new diseases were reported in Somalia over the past year. Nonetheless, there is continuing concern over the prevalence of tuberculosis and measles. In response, UNICEF and WHO immunization programming has been increased. In addition to preventing outbreaks, these agencies are targeting health assistance to support household resource bases by increasing access to public services, such as water, education and health, and reducing essential household expenditures. Among other activities in the water and environmental sector, UNICEF has continued to increase community access to clean water and improved sanitation by rehabilitating urban water systems, repairing boreholes and hand-dug wells, constructing latrines for primary schools and working with water and sanitation committees across the country to undertake sanitation and hygiene control.

49.      Long-term development efforts have remained concentrated in the north-west (“Somaliland”) and north-east (“Puntland”). Through various projects, United Nations agencies have helped the two northern administrations to promote good governance and strengthen their capacity for planning, public administration, economic management, law enforcement, demining and urban planning. The efficient management of Somalia’s important trade infrastructure — airports, seaports and telecommunications — is an important element of economic recovery, as well as the primary revenue source for the local administrations. United Nations agencies have provided technical assistance to increase the efficiency of these key facilities and to identify the specific development needs for bilateral donor consideration. In this respect, the United Nations has worked closely with the local authorities and with other international actors to provide an enabling environment for business growth, thereby seeking to reduce unemployment and supporting continued peace and stability. United Nations agencies have helped the private and public sectors to promote the expansion of trade and transportation links to regional markets.

50.      In addition, United Nations agencies have strengthened participatory approaches and preliminary rehabilitation in southern Somalia. On average, only 1 in 10 children of primary school age is enrolled in school. During the past year, UNICEF rehabilitated 70 schools, thus expanding access to education for over 12,000 children. In addition, UNICEF, UNESCO and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have been instrumental in organizing and supporting local resources for peace, with special emphasis on women’s organizations.

51.      Alongside the improved food security conditions, Somali populations are looking to benefit from the establishment of the Transitional National Government following the conclusion of the Somali National Peace Conference at Arta. United Nations agencies have initiated a planning process through the consolidated appeal for 2001 and intensive consultations with partners of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body to develop strategies to support both immediate livelihood needs and the continuing transition towards peace, stability and respect for human rights. Although the security situation remains fragile, there have so far been no developments that affect the general humanitarian situation in Somalia. Nevertheless, security conditions do continue to hinder aid agency access in many parts of southern Somalia.

52.      In view of Somalia’s long-standing conflict, economic collapse, lack of media coverage and donor fatigue, the response to previous appeals for humanitarian assistance has been limited. The consolidated appeal for 2000 to date has received contributions covering some 60 per cent of the requested funding. Mid- and long-term programmes needed to sustain and rehabilitate livelihoods remain poorly funded. The aid assistance required to act as a buffer against future emergencies, such as rehabilitation of water sources, repair of river embankments, education programmes, eradication of female genital mutilation, prevention of HIV/AIDS infection and protection of assets for pastoral communities, has not been forthcoming.

  V.  Observations

53.      The Djibouti initiative for peace in Somalia was a welcome development that was launched in the absence of any other viable peace process in the country and that President Guelleh took forward with a mandate from and the support of IGAD member Governments. The United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union also supported the initiative.

54.      The Djibouti process was intended to have a broader basis and greater legitimacy than previous peacemaking efforts. Somali elders from all parts of the country, representatives of clans and, for the first time, Somali women were involved actively in discussions on how to embark on the road to peace in Somalia. This is the major asset for the Transitional National Government as it moves to the next stage of the process.

55.      The Transitional National Government is now located in Mogadishu. It has begun the process of establishing itself on Somali soil and expanding the areas under its influence. It has three years, until 2003, in which to prepare for the installation of permanent governance arrangements. During that period, basic political, economic and development challenges will have to be addressed by the new authorities. They will have to complete the task of creating a government of unity and reconciliation. They will also have to prepare for democratic elections.

56.      At the same time, massive challenges of reconstruction and development confront Somalia. No country has ever been so long without central authority. According to the UNDP Special Human Development Report on Somalia, 1998, socio-economic indicators for 1997 and 1998 place Somalia at the very bottom of the human development index rankings worldwide. The destruction caused by the cycle of civil war, state collapse and anarchy is total. To recover from a decade of statelessness and conflict will involve not only the remaking of political society but also the total reconstruction of the country’s basic infrastructure.

57.      The absence of some Somali politicians and leaders from the Djibouti process has posed two immediate challenges for the new authorities: how to incorporate into the peace process those who are opposed to it and to its outcome, some of whom are heavily armed; and how to work out relations with the authorities in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” without jeopardizing the relative peace and stability in those two regions. As regards the latter, the basic challenge is to work out, in a spirit of mutual respect, practical arrangements between the Transitional National Government and those authorities.

58.      I welcome Mr. Hassan’s commitment to achieving progress by peaceful means. I hope that Somalis on all sides will do everything possible to solve the remaining issues in a peaceful and constructive way and in the interest of the common good. The United Nations and the international community in general should be prepared to assist the people of Somalia in the realization of this goal.

59.      It will clearly take time for the Transitional National Government to prepare a comprehensive development plan and seek international financial support for it at an international pledging conference. However, even in advance of such a conference, there is an immediate need for urgent assistance, especially in the areas of demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. The repatriation of Somali refugees — hundreds of thousands of whom are in neighbouring countries — will be both a challenge and an opportunity.

60.      United Nations agencies are working on plans to assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia in their respective areas of responsibility. “First steps”, an operational plan to support governance and peace-building in Somalia for the period from September to December 2000, was launched in Nairobi in the autumn. It was prepared by all the United Nations agencies resident in Nairobi under the auspices of the United Nations Regional and Humanitarian Coordinator, in full consultation with the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, an umbrella partnership of donor Governments, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental organizations concerned about the situation in Somalia. I appeal to the potential donors to contribute without delay the resources needed for implementation of the plan.

61.      As I stated in my previous reports on Somalia (S/1997/135 and S/1999/882), the establishment of a trust fund for Somalia could be an important indicator of the commitment of the international community to support the search for peace in Somalia. It is my intention, therefore, in anticipation that political and financial support will be forthcoming from Member States, to put in place a trust fund for peace-building in Somalia.

62.      In my last report (S/1999/882), I urged the international and national financial institutions as well as donor Governments to propose creative mechanisms to engage Somalia. Then, there were no established state institutions. Today, the situation is changing. The Transitional National Government provides the Bretton Woods institutions with the opportunity of forging partnerships in the rebuilding of state and private institutions. It is my hope that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will take up the challenge.

63.      In the light of the request made by President Guelleh on 14 September 2000, the Security Council may wish to consider what action might be appropriate to enhance the success of the Djibouti peace process by consolidating its achievements. I stand ready to prepare a proposal for a peace-building mission for Somalia. A key function of such a mission, which I expect to be based inside Somalia, would be to assist in the completion of the peace process. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator would be closely involved in the elaboration of options on the relocation of the United Nations in Somalia.

64.      Given the current security situation, locating United Nations staff in the capital would be possible only after a single — and effective — authority for security in the city has been established. It would be a good sign if full operations for all traffic were restored in both the seaport and airport and if free and safe access to all districts of the city were guaranteed, with no “green lines” to cross.

65.      As the people of Somalia tackle the challenges I have outlined, they will need the sympathetic understanding and support of the international community. The search for peace and prosperity in Somalia will not be smooth; nor will peace be achieved quickly. As a result of the Djibouti process, a major step forward has been taken in the search for peace in Somalia. The priority now, for Somalis and for the international community, is to ensure that the process continues and advances.

66.      I wish to recognize and pay warm tribute to the enormous efforts and sacrifice of the Government and people of Djibouti in helping to bring peace and reconciliation to Somalia. It has placed a heavy burden on a small State — one that has been carried willingly and with great distinction. I also wish to acknowledge the sustained efforts of my Representative for Somalia, David Stephen, to support the Djibouti initiative and indeed the positive role played by the whole of UNPOS and the United Nations team in Somalia.