| 19 May 2007 04:23 SOMALIA WATCH |
Analysis |
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Understanding Arta
Factor Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe London, UK binsalwe@aol.com
1.
The 'Ideals' In theory, Arta was expected to stand for a movement that was born from the Djibouti sponsored Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in mid 2000. Although this definition may seem mockery for Arta’s opponents, the principal guidance of the peace proposal included a ‘Convoy of Peace’ (Geeddi Socodka Nabadda), which was to involve a process to transform the Somali conflict into peace by sending the traditional leaders to all Somali regions. This approach was not only searching for a solution but hopefully a process within the society affected by conflict, with the aim of empowering actors within the affected society. Convoy of peace describes the progression of the process to peace movement. President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti who proposed the initiative at the 54th General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 September 1999 triggered the proceedings of the SNPC. This novel proposal that was meant to open a new dawn and solution to the Somali crisis stimulated two factors. First the peace talks were to be shifted to the civil society. In other words, the victims of the civil war were to lead the peace process. Secondly, in reaction to the first factor, a popular interest by the Somali society was generated. The period marked the tenth year since the central authority collapsed following the breakdown of the state institutions. The civil strife was reaching at the stage of abating and war fatigue. The poplar support for the solution to the Somali problem was expected to receive a positive response. Despite that the objectives of the initiatives of the peace process were directed towards a noble end and many of its participants were honest, what the outcome damaged was the approach of the resolutions. This has laid the ground for a typical leadership. What has sealed the outcome, if I can borrow Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar’s expression, is the “poverty of leadership’s imagination” (Samatar, 1992), and it is dubbed as the Arta Group, was as soon as the SNPC had finished, the leading actors began to compete for its manipulation. 1.1. Setting the Stage for the Civil Society Generally,
a common understanding of civil society is a partnership between the
family and the state, which exists to pursue collective goals. This is
usually taken to include civic, professional, trade union and other
voluntary organisations. Civil society is also often referred as a
'third sector' alongside the state and the market. This definition
perceives civil society as a form of organised individuals that strive
to achieve an end for the good of the community. In this case the
civil society should be organised to make sense of their aim and
concern. When any part of civil society coalesces around a shared
concern, the individuals involved start with voluntary action. To
function and probably grow, civil society needs an environment of
relative peace to develop. For example, during the peace building
stage, one of the elements required to be revived. Here peace building
refers to the post-conflict social construction in a period of
sustainable peace. It is during this period that restoration of civil
society takes place. It also aims at “reviving a country’s
economy, establishing participatory system of governance and
accountable administrations” (Heinrich,
1997). Other important characteristics
during this stage include disarmament and demobilisation of militia,
and their sustainable social, psychological and economic
rehabilitation. Undertaking
such as shifting from the warlords, it was theorised that the civil
society is to take a major role. Setting the stage for the civil
society at the theoretical platform seemed working well until the
stage of implementation had arrived. In previous peace talks, the
warlords were the leading figures of the peace talks that were to
blame for spoiling the Somali peace attempts. 1.2 The Question of Representation
The controversy over the civil society case opened again another important front, that of the representation. In previously held peace-meetings the faction leaders dominated the conference and as soon as they were concluded, they were prone to failure, as many of these leaders were not really representative of any constituents. The
SNPC was proceeded by two symposiums: the Technical Consultative
Somali Peace Process Symposium attended by Somali intellectuals and
the Traditional Peace Symposium attended by Somali traditional elders.
The first symposium was to advise on the technical side of the
proposed conference, while the latter was to decide on representation. Since this question had been of the most contentious issue in Somalia, the Djibouti authority was very cautious about this matter. This is carefully expounded in Annex IV of “Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process, [1999]” as it uses extremely guarded words about the matter. At the heart of the representation stands the issue of legitimacy and who represents whom. It explains it as follows, “In a such situation as the massive population displacement and the occupation of lands by force there is no easy answer to what may or may not constitute legitimate representation in a country such as Somalia, that has undergone a drastic breakdown… and where basic information on population is lacking, and where major population displacement as well as movement has occurred” (Annex IV, 2000). In spite of the contrary advice the Traditional Peace Symposium decided that representation was to be based on clan. The plan took a sharp twist when the delegates of Puntland elders went back to Garowe, the capital of Puntland, and rejected the proceeding of the Traditional Peace Symposium. For fear that the proceeding conference was about to collapse, the plan was changed and delegates were asked to represent their own locals. The action of asking people to represent themselves called for consultation was a complete infringement of the logic of representation. The resolution also ignored the developments, which had taken place during the previous ten years as a mood of centralisation of Somalia was shaped. 2.
The Outcome Initially, the scheme of Convoy of Peace (Geeddi Socodka Nabadda) was to advocate and lead to a peace process and not just one event, e.g. peace conference. Process defines a means to an end and not an end in itself. However, the initial plan had been diverted to be used as an end. The conference just concentrated on one of the thorniest issues which made the previous conference fail: a vision for rebuilding the Somali state from the rubble of the shattered statehood and country, before considering the rehabilitation of social fabrics. This also contradicted UNESCO’s approach to civil war solutions is first to rebuild the society. Rehabilitation of the state was supposed to be seen as a project, which needed to lay down first suitable foundations. The
approach of considering the state prior to the civil rehabilitation
made the SNPC glad to see things evolve with the motto: “a bad
government is better than no government”.
At Arta, after six months the SNPC ended up with the formation
of a Transitional National Government (TNG) and a Transitional
Constitution. Similarly, the principle of conference was supposed to be based on lessons learned from previous peace failures. The idea of giving priority to the formation of the central authority without first creates its essential components advocates a top-down approach. This perspective may also contradict the natural trend into which Somali regions have been moving since the collapse. The task of recreating the Somali state leads to the need to establish a body, which could represent the central authority of the Somali nation. The logical conclusion is that such a body could stem out from the sum of its parts. Instead, the SNPC has agreed to form an 'externally driven body' without parts or limbs. This 'bubble body' depicted as the central government is at odds with itself, let alone functioning with its 'would-be-component' (the regions). The
Djibouti initiative was set at a time when the Somali regions and
towns where passing through a different organisational level after a
decade of lack of national government. Since the outbreak of the civil
war, Somali regions developed apart in different directions. Some
parts have made considerable progress towards institution building and
provision of basic services to their communities. This situation let
Somalia be distinguished by three different zones: recovery zones,
transitional zones and crisis zones. Similarly, Mr Kofi Anan, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, also uses the same
classification. In his report to the Security Council of 16 August
1999, Mr Anan urged that this classification be considered for
assistance in humanitarian and rehabilitation strategic aid (see
S/1999/882, 16 August 1999). The Secretary-General’s concluding
recommendations ranged from emphasis on providing basic and
life-saving service in the zones of crisis, to the provision of the
technical support for good governance and capacity building in the
recovery zones. From
Mr Anan’s observations, the most realistic approach for the Somali
peace process in Djibouti was to agree on a means or mechanism which
could bring each of the three zones to a stage of effective local
governance. This mechanism could stand as a national committee or a
national operational body. For instance, this mechanism could help
those regions in the crisis zones to move into the recovery stage. So
each may develop its own unique institutions according to local need,
within the overall framework of a federal Somali state. 2.1 Approaches to Reconciliation
Many
have doubted the viability of the Arta Outcome, particularly the
formation of the central authority (TNG), which by now was to stand
for the 'bubble body'. What they hoped from at most, however, was that
the ‘spirit of Arta’ could open new paths towards the
reconciliation process. However, what few could not anticipate was
that the fate of the future reconciliation was sealed by the very
outcome. For the TNG, the end of the process of the formation of the
central authority has been reached. This principle seen as the
solution to the Somali problem could be non-negotiable because as they
see it, it would put in jeopardy the existence of the very
‘state’. According to them, what remained was to invite its rivals
to be in a position of ‘either on board or die out’. A
policy of assimilation was set, and as a proof of its ‘success’,
this was measured by the absorption of a few waning Mogadishu
warlords. Its failure disguised as scapegoat, is what made the former
TNG Premier Ali Khalif Galeyr a victim. This policy is what makes the
Arta Outcome -
now dubbed as ‘Arta Group -
unable to be seen as the solution, but as an obstacle to the very
principles, which was supposed to stand for. As one of the main
purposes of the ‘Arta spirit’, the national reconciliation became
a mockery of the peace process. The
dead-end policy opened another important issue: Legitimacy and social
mistrust, which is seen as central to the failure of the state. For
the TNG this option became a way to gain legitimacy by force and
money. To this end it began to build the ‘national army’ (which is
made of only one militia group) and import arms and ammunition on an
unprecedented scale. Looking from the Arta perspective, while the TNG
contravenes its own enchanted 'Arta spirit', the prospect of its
policy looks bleak as its initial action signals that the myth of
militarism is yet to die in Somali politics. This policy also ran alongside another priority by the TNG which was to gain international recognition rather than getting the confidence of its people. Whilst this move has to do a lot with globalisation, it is also aimed at the resuscitation of an externally driven state structure where the local people’s involvement is rarely sought. Similar approaches have been applied many times since the breakdown of the Somali state in early 1991. Not only were they all unsuccessful but they were also counter-productive. 3.
Conclusion Shifting
the focus of the peace process to the victims of the civil war is a
great achievement, which should help any future talks. Although
the SNPC has failed to come up with a resolution to a viable Somali
central authority, many hoped that its outcome (Arta Outcome) would
pave the way for a phased reconciliation process. This did not
materialise, as the outcome itself sealed the fate of the future
reconciliation to a dead-end. This in turn has determined that the
Arta Outcome is not the solution to Somali problem. However, at best
what the outcome could be is a lesson of a failed peace opportunity to
the future peace talks. This, however, should be realised before Arta group degenerates into what one observer described as “mindi aan daab lahayn” (a loose gun). Whatever a group or clan takes it over may use it as means to any end. This way may usher the Somali nation to another era of warlordism. 5.
References Heinrich,
Wolfgang, Building the Peace:
Experience of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993-1996,
Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, November 1997. Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, S/1999/882, 16 August 1999. Samatar, Abdi Ismail, “Social Decay and Public Institutions: the Road to Reconstruction in Somalia” in Beyond Conflict in the Horn, Eds. Martin Doorbnos, Lionel Cliff, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, in association with James Gurrey, London, 1992. Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process, [1999]. |
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