Chairman Feingold, Members of the Committee,
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on an issue that the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, thrust into bold relief: the
characteristics of weak states that make them attractive to
terrorists and international criminals.
Leo Tolstoy did not have successful and unsuccessful states in
mind when he wrote, in Anna Karenina, that "all happy
families resemble one another; every unhappy family is unhappy in
its own way." Nevertheless, his words apply to our discussion
today. For all their differences, successful states resemble each
other because they all have found ways to function as polities; they
have cohesive national identities and social compacts that bind them
together. Unsuccessful states, however, fail as polities for a wide
variety of reasons. Some so-called "failed states" have
been torn asunder by civil war, others by external aggression. Some
have foundered on unresolved conflicts based on clan or ethnicity;
drought and grinding poverty have claimed still more. All have
potential for destabilizing their neighbors.
Africa is far from being immune to the illness of nation-state
failure. Recognizing that fact, and being aware that it is far
easier to prevent failure than to cope with its consequences, the
State Department has adopted five goals that guide policy efforts to
confront the conditions leading to nation-state failure in Africa.
- Increase democracy, good governance, and respect for the rule
of law.
- Combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases
that threaten to cost Africa a generation of its most productive
citizens.
- Expand United States trade and investment with Africa to spur
economic development and improve the well being of Africans.
- Conserve Africa’s environment because people and the
institutions they create to govern themselves cannot prosper
when the air is not fit to breathe, water is unavailable, and
forests and farmlands have turned to dust.
- End Africa’s wars. Doing so is an absolute necessity, and
you really can’t pursue the other four policy goals without
it.
Regrettably, some African states have suffered so much for so
long that they cannot be helped by a prevention strategy of the type
I’ve outlined above Like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, these
countries’ unique problems must be addressed individually.
Today, Mr. Chairman, you and your Subcommittee are focusing on
one such country, Somalia, a place to which, quite frankly, the
United States has not paid a great deal of policy-level attention
since 1994. Civil war, external intervention, clan conflict and
poverty have combined to turn Somalia into a "failed
state." Somalia has no central government. Three principal
factions (none of which is recognized by the United States as
Somalia’s legitimate government) hold sway in separate parts of
the country. In addition, numerous warlords continue to vie for
dominance at the local level. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis live
as refugees in neighboring countries, and many others are internally
displaced. The economy is underdeveloped, with drought seriously
affecting the country’s pastoral and agricultural base.
Somalia’s primary sources of income are foreign assistance and
remittance income from overseas. One of its principal exports –
livestock - is banned from what should be Somalia’s major regional
market. There is little infrastructure, and even less in the way of
civil services such as schools. Where there should be a
nation-state, there is a vacuum filled by warlords. What better
place for the seeds of international terrorism and lawlessness to
take root?
Al-Ittihad al-Islami, a Somali organization dedicated to creating
a radical Islamist state in Somalia, has filled the vacuum in some
parts of Somalia by opening its own schools and providing other
services normally associated with government. We consider that
development profoundly disturbing because Al-Ittihad has conducted
terrorist operations in neighboring Ethiopia and was named in the
President’s September 23, 2001 executive order blocking property
of and prohibiting transactions with terrorist groups.
The United States has three policy goals related to Somalia:
- removing the terrorist threat extant in Somalia and ensuring
against Somalia’s use as a terrorist base;
- preventing developments in Somalia from threatening regional
peace and stability; and
- overcoming the long-term governance challenges that terrorists
exploit to make Somalia a base.
In accordance with your request that my testimony focus on
long-term issues, I would like to spend a moment outlining several
steps that already are in motion, both bilaterally and
multilaterally, to address the last goal, overcoming the governance
challenges Somalia faces. Then I will describe an effort that the
USG has just begun to identify and develop additional ways to
overcome those challenges and thereby prevent Somalia becoming a
base for international terrorism.
At the bilateral level, we are providing some assistance to the
Somali people to mitigate the impact of and prevent future disasters
through infrastructure development. USAID’s Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is working to rehabilitate Somalia’s
war-ravaged potable water system, rebuild its primary health care
facilities, and improve cargo ports and airports. In addition, we
are working with Somalis through CARE to create civil society
organizations, and encourage the further development of those
already in existence. In this way, we hope to strengthen the
governance and management capacity of Somali groups and communities,
thereby creating a grass-roots demand for good government.
These initiatives are modest; USAID’s entire budget for Somalia
(including a substantial sum for food-aid) was $17.9 million in FY
2001, to which we could add $4 million allocated for refugee
resettlement to Somaliland. These are, however, vital; if Al-Ittihad
is the only source of services people need for their survival, it
– and not a legitimate, terrorist-free government – will gain
their allegiance. But while these small, vital United States-funded
programs provide a foundation upon which to build, they do not
tackle directly the core problem facing Somalia: developing a polity
that can command the respect and voluntary allegiance of all the
Somali people.
Tackling that problem, of course, is something that the Somali
people themselves must want to do if it is to be accomplished
successfully. If the United States and the international community
want good governance for Somalia more than the Somalis do
themselves, the effort is doomed to fail. We saw this situation in
1993 to 1994, when peace agreements among the principal warlords
that the United States had brokered along with Ethiopia and Kenya
soon fell apart. Only then did we close our mission and decide to
wait until the Somalis were ready for another effort. Assuming that
the Somali people themselves want peace and reconciliation, however,
there are multilateral initiatives underway that can help. They also
come at a good time, since the Somali people in general have so far
refused to support the political program of Al-Ittihad, despite the
services and funding it provides.
The government of Djibouti, for example, has shepherded, under
the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development
(IGAD), the so-called Arta process. This process began in May 2000,
when Djibouti convened a Somalia reconciliation conference attended
by over 2000 delegates. On July 16, 2000, conference leaders
announced the formation of a three-year Transitional National
Government (TNG) with a 245-seat Transitional National Assembly
intended to govern all of Somalia. Thus far, however, the TNG has
not succeeded in overcoming opposition from local warlords to
expanding its scope of control significantly beyond several parts of
Mogadishu and a small portion of the Somali coastline. Nor has the
TNG crafted working arrangements with other principal Somali
factions, including Puntland State and the self-styled
"Republic of Somaliland." Finally, the TNG has not yet
purged itself of ties to Al-Ittihad that are problematic from a
counterterrorism perspective. Nevertheless, the United States stands
ready to work with Djibouti in the Arta process should all the
principal Somali factions choose to use that vehicle to accomplish
national reconciliation.
Late last year, Kenyan President Moi began a new initiative to
bring the Somali factions, some of the main warlords, and
Somalia’s neighbors together to pursue Somali national
reconciliation. That effort was brought under IGAD auspices at the
January, 2002 IGAD summit in Khartoum. There, Ethiopia agreed to
participate in the Kenya-led initiative. This is a particularly
hopeful development because one of the main warlord groups resisting
the reconciliation process, the Somali Reconciliation and
Restoration Council (SRRC), has close ties to Ethiopia. The United
States attended the IGAD summit as an observer We have pledged our
cooperation to the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia in this new
effort to help bring peace to Somalia.
Our own government has begun the process of marshalling ideas and
resources to confront Somalia's long-term governance challenges. A
sub-group of the Policy Coordinating Committee for Africa created
specifically to examine this question met for the first time
yesterday (February 5). It discussed topics such as working with
Gulf states to lift the ban on importing livestock from Somalia,
developing alternatives to schools financed by Al-Ittihad, creating
new financial institutions to replace those, such as Al-Barakaat,
that are tainted with connections to terrorism, and increasing
support for Somali civil society.
I also wish to take this opportunity to support a position often
made by Secretary Powell in his discussions with Congress. Precisely
because the factors that cause states to become weak or fail vary
from state to state, it is crucial to know which factors are in play
in order to address them. Knowing such nuances from afar is
difficult, and that means we have to have the right people in the
right places—which means having the resources to put those people
in place and sustain them. We appreciate the steps being made to
meet this need, and I look forward to working with you to ensure
that as our activities in relation to Somalia and other weak states
develop, we are able to meet the demands imposed.
Mr. Chairman, Somalia did not become a "failed state"
in a day. Similarly, solving the governance problems that make
Somalia an attractive potential home for terrorists will not happen
overnight. We have made a start. I am cautiously optimistic that the
United States, Somalia’s neighbors and the international community
can make a significant contribution to helping the Somali people
regain functional government, and that the conditions that make
Somalia attractive to terrorists can be overcome.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.