Analysis |
|
- Title: [SW Analysis](WriteNet) REPORT FROM PROF. K. MENKHAUS
- Posted by/on:[AAJ][AMJ][Monday, March 19, 2001]
*Associate Professor K.
Menkhaus:
Department of Political Science, Davidson College
November 2000
WriteNet is a Network of Researchers and Writers on
Human Rights, Forced Migration, Ethnic and Political Conflict
WriteNet is a Subsidiary of Practical Management (UK)
E-mail: writenet@gn.apc.org
| THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED MAINLY ON THE BASIS
OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL
SOURCES ARE CITED. THE PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO
BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY
SURVEYED, OR CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY PARTICULAR
CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE
PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF
WRITENET. |
ISSN 1020-8429
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
Since the fall of the Siyad Barre regime in
January 1991, Somalia has been a decade without a central
government. In 1991-1992, the country was beset by state collapse,
inter-clan warfare, banditry, and widespread famine, which claimed
the lives of between 240,000 and 280,000 Somalis.1
The fighting destroyed much of the capital, Mogadishu, laid
waste to the agricultural communities in southern Somalia, and
generated enormous refugee flows and internal dsplacement - an
estimated one to two million Somalis were displaced either
internally or across borders.2 This complex emergency
eventually promted a UN peace enforcement operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)
in 1993-1995.
The UNOSOM intervention succeeded in ending the
famine and in some regions facilitated the return of refugees and
displaced persons. But the peace operation was drawn into
inconclusive, bloody armed conflict with the Somali National
Alliance (SNA), failed to bring about a comprehensive national
reconciliation in the country, and generated only modest support for
the massive task of reconstruction. When UNOSOM forces departed from
Somalia in March 1995, it left the country still divided, without a
central government, and with an economic infrastructure mostly still
in ruins.
In the years since the UNOSOM departure, Somalia
has remained vulnerable to chronic armed clashes, poor food
security, and lawlessness. The once relatively cohesive factions
have splintered into quarrelling sub-clan militias, so that most
armed conflict since 1995 has been within, rather than between,
major clans. This has meant that the country is less vulnerable to
major armed clashes, but more prone to smaller, localized, and less
predictable armed hostilities in neighbourhoods and towns.3
In parts of southern Somalia, localized polities
have emerged, typically drawing on a combination of traditional,
clan-based authority and Islamic courts, often supported by local
businesspeople. These polities have provided variable levels of
legal protection and law and order to residents, but they have
proved to be relatively weak and prone to collapse in the face of
warlordism and clan conflict.4 Only the
northwest and northeast regions of the country (Somaliland and
Puntland, respectively) have remained stable recovery areas with
relatively legitimate and functional administrations. Efforts to
assist Somali refugees to return home have been slowed by severe
economic pressures inside the country and by sporadic security
concerns generated by chronic political tensions. Economically,
Somalia continues to rank as one of the poorest countries in the
world, reducing local capacity to absorb returnees. According to the
1998 UNDP Somalia Human Development Report, Somalia's
"Human Development Index" is the lowest of any country in
the world. Average life expectancy is 41-43 years; the mortality
rate for children under five exceeds 25%; adult literacy rates are
14-17%; and portions of southern Somalia are periodically prone to
severe food shortages.5 Since 1995, Mogadishu and other
major towns have gradually become more accessible to former
residents, but internal displacement remains widespread. About a
quarter of a million (256,000) Somali refugees remain in camps in
Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, and other neighbouring countries;6
many more resides in these countries illegally and hence elude
documentation. In addition, hundreds of thousands - perhaps over a
million - resettled Somali refugees are scattered across the globe,
from North America and Europe to the Middle East and Australia. This
diaspora has assumed a very important role as a source of
remittances to family members in the country or refugee camps.7
1.2. Recent Political Developments
A political development of potentially great
significance - the declaration and creation of a transitional
national government - is now occurring in Somalia and merits careful
monitoring.
After years of failed national peace conferences,
in 1998 and 1999 the regional authority IGAD (Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development) and the government of Djibouti proposed a
Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC), to be based not on
factional representation but rather on representation by Somali
civil society. The "Djibouti initiative" was endorsed by
the UN Security Council in December 1999. After months of
preparatory work, the SNPC officially opened on 2 May 2000 at Arta,
Djibouti. The conference was organized on the basis of clan, with an
agreed upon formula for numerical representation by clan (Daarood,
175; Hawiye 175; Digle Milifle 175; Dir 205 [of which 100 were Isaaq];
and minorities 90. In addition, a cross-clan delegation of 100 women
was invited.8 Clans were free to choose
their representatives. Participants were mainly a combination of
clan elders, civil society leaders, intellectuals, ex-civil
servants, and in some cases faction leaders. Key players missing
from the conference included most of the Mogadishu-based warlords,
the Puntland administration, and the Somaliland administration. The
Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) leadership initially rejected the
conference but later joined it. The Arta conference enjoyed explicit
backing of most major external actors, including the UN Security
Council and Secretary-General, the Arab League, the OAU, and the EU,
and nearly all neighbouring states.
On 13 August conference delegates selected a new
245-member Parliament, apportioned along clan lines. That
Parliament-in-exile then elected a President, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan,
a 58-year old former deputy prime minister and interior minister in
the Barre government. After a brief appearance in Mogadishu and
Baidoa, where the public demonstrated strong support for the new
government, Abdiqasim Hassan devoted much of his time to travel
abroad to seek recognition and support. In October 2000, the
President and Parliament completed the politically delicate process
of selecting a Prime Minister and Cabinet, and returned to Mogadishu
to prepare to establish a national government. As of late October
2000, the administration had yet to begin operating as a functional
government.
2. The Current Political and Economic
Situation in Somalia
The Abdiqasim administration inherits a political
and economic situation inside Somalia that has not measurably
improved since 1995, and which poses a daunting challenge. Endemic
political instability is the main problem; the administration will
have to reassert public security and law and order if it is to
establish legitimacy. Asserting its authority will be even more
difficult because of the number of strongmen, warlords, and
autonomous polities, which reject the transitional national
government. At this writing, the collection of groups opposing the
new administration includes the Somaliland administration; leaders
of the Puntland administration; five of the largest remaining
factional militias in the Mogadishu area (the milias of Hussein
Aideed, Osman Atto, Musa Sude, Hussein Bod, and Qanyare Afrah); much
or most of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, led by Colonel Hassan
Mohamed Nur "Shatigudud"; the Southern Somali National
Movement (the Bimaal Clan); and followers of General Adan Abdullahi
Nur "Gabio" of the Aulihan clan.9 Collectively,
that constitutes a significant bloc of clans, regions, and militia
which the administration will either have to co-opt or defeat.
Making matters worse, the administration will be
attempting to govern on the basis of very minimal financial
resources. The fledgling administration currently relies on support
from the business community in Mogadishu, which is unlikely to
continue indefinitely if the merchants perceive that their
investment is not yielding expected results. Poor economic prospects
highlight the single greatest obstacle to a central state = the
absence of a viable economy from which to generate tax revenues. The
recent ban on livestock imported from Somalia imposed by Gulf
states, in response to outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever, only
exacerbates the economic crisis.10 The
administration's immediate strategy - importation of large
quantities of Somali shillings printed abroad-
touched off social protest in Mogadishu because of the
hyperinflation it triggered, and is not a viable option in the
future. The only alternative source of revenue for the Abdiqasim
administration - generous and sustained external assistance - is
probably unlikely to materialize.
The implication is that the administration will
necessarily have to be very minimalist in nature, focusing on only
the most essential aspects of governance. The danger is that this
will collide with inflated public expectations of a windfall of
jobs, contracts, and social services emanating from the public
sector. The administration currently enjoys widespread popular
support, but public disenchantment will be inevitable if jobs and
services are not forthcoming.
2.1. Regional Assesments
Even in a best-case scenario, the Abdiqasim
administration will not be in a position to exercise any influence
over most of the country in the near future. Initially, the key
regions for the administration will be Benadir (Mogadishu) and
surrounding areas from Merka through Baidoa to Jowhar. For the rest
of the country, external actors should presume that they will need
to continue to work mainly with and through local polities.
North Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle
Establishing basic governance over the greater Mogadishu area will
be an immediate litmus test of the new administration. In North
Mogadishu, the Abgal clan remains as politically fragmented as ever,
and the area from North Mogadishu to Jowhar remains one of the most
dangerous, bandit-infested zones of Somalia. Armed clashes between
neighbouring clans in the region have worsened recently, with over
20 killed near Jowhar in disputes between Hawadle and Gaaljaal.
Armed confrontations have also recently occurred at the natural
beach port of El Ma'an due to disputes over pay between the company
which runs the port and their armed guards. This part of the greater
Mogadishu area may prove to be a greater challenge to the new
administration than the threat posed by rejectionist warlords in
south Mogadishu. North Mogadishu's anarchy, and the mixed reaction
the Abgal will have to Haber Gedir-dominated government, could prove
to be an intractable problem. It is not out of the question that the
Abdiqasim administration's response will be to ignore the north and
try to operate out of the south of the city; the danger of that
tactic is that it would only reinforce the perception of the
government as a Haber Gedir, not national, administration.
South Mogadishu and Merka
Since last year, the politics of south Mogadishu has been
significantly altered by the coalition of businesspeople who have
broken with the factions and have underwritten a new security
arrangement in alliance with Islamic courts and militia (which are
paid by the merchants and controlled by the courts). This coalition
forms the main source of support for the Abdiqasim administration.
Importantly, for the moment the shari'a courts and their
militias are the main providers of policing and formal judicial
system, but do not answer directly to the administration. Instead,
the judicial system in south Mogadishu and Merka appears to be a
government function that has been "sub-contracted" out to
the shari'a courts via financing by the business
community.11 The business community is
trying to get out of the business of funding militias and courts and
hoping to "sub-contract" the task back to the
administration, but that has not yet occurred. 12
The uneasy stand-off between the factions on the
one hand and the alliance of merchants, Islamic courts, and the
Abdiqasim administration on the other will probably not degenerate
into armed conflict in south Mogadishu in the short term; that would
serve neither side's interests. Both sides have long-term strategies
that do not gradually melt the power base of the faction leaders;
for the faction leaders, their strategy is to wait until inevitable
tensions occur in the new administration and then exploit those
divisions to bring it to a crashing end. This scenario could change,
however, if the administration cannot persuade the faction leaders
to relinquish control over key sites in the city, especially the
airport and seaport; those two pieces of real estate are clearly the
most dangerous flashpoints for armed conflict in Mogadishu between
the factions and the administration.13
The security situation has not improved in Merka,
where a complex poer struggle pits the Haber Gedir-dominated shari'a
administration against the Bimaal clan and a new front, the Bimaal
Resistance Movement. The Bimaal regard the Haber Gedir as occupiers,
and as part of their effort to discredit the shari'a
administration attacked international agency compounds earlier this
summer. They were also believed to have shot at an ECHO (European
Community Humanitarian Organization) flight, in order to shut down
use of the Merka airport as a transfer and refuelling stop by
international agencies. The Haber Gedir have responded by allegedly
inciting local interclan fights in a divide and rule tactic.
Meanwhile, a radical Islamist wing is said to have emerged which, in
contrast to the shari'a administration, strongly opposes the
presence of western aid organizations. It is this group which
conducted a grenade attack on the COSV (Coordinating committee of
the Organization for Voluntary Service) compound and which attacked
two UN security officers visiting Merka last month. Merka, once an
island of stability I southern Somalia, is increasingly politically
unstable, though commercial port traffic is largely unaffected at
this time.
Inter-riverine and Jubba Regions
In Kismayo, the city is controlled loosely by the "Lower Jubba
Alliance" comprising Haber Gedir and Marehan militia leaders.
Reliable information is extremely difficult to get out of this area,
but rumours exist of tensions between the top Marehan military
leaders. If the past history of this city is any guide, we can
expect the situation to be characterized by shifting military
occupation, mainly by clans not indigenous to the region. The city
of Kismayo, long seen as having enormous commercial potential, is
increasingly dead as a result of ten years of armed conflict,
stand-offs, and blocked commerce. It is very likely that General
Morgan will eventually reappear in the city; he is currently biding
his time is Wajid, Bakool Region, waiting for the right division to
exploit in Kismayo. Kismayo has been consistently the most unstable
and dangerous city for international agencies, a fact which is
unlikely to change in the near future.
Upriver in Gedo region, the Marehan
reconciliation is holding, despite ongoing tensions between
indigenous and central region Marehan. All sides have supported the
Djibouti process, which is understandable, since the Marehan
constitute one of the clans most eager to return to Mogadishu and to
a place in a central government. In Bay and Bakool region, the Rra
is constantly under strain of possible splits along sub-clan lines,
along leadership lines, and between eastern and western Rahanweyn,
with the western Rahaweyn more supportive of regional autonomy.
These splits have weakened the RRA leadership, leading to loss of
control of some militia in the area. RRA military commander Hassan
"Shatigudud" was only reluctantly drawn into the Djibouti
initiative and has recently rejected the new administration after
being passed over for a major leadership role in the government. The
Abdiqasim administration thus faces a divided population in the Bay
and Bakool regions, and cannot count on reliable support from the
Rahanweyn clan. Meanwhile, Ethiopia continues to exercise strong
influence over RRA policy. Ethiopia's own ambivalence toward the new
administration -an ambivalence which is quickly shifting toward
opposition, due to Abdiqasim Hassan's strong tilt toward Arab donor
states - could translate into more overt rejectionism coming from
the RRA.
Central Somalia
IN Hiran Region, the Hawadle clan has long resented the dominance of
Hwiye factions in Mogadishu and was the first to call for
explicitly-clan based representation in political fora, so it came
as no surprise that they were strong supporters of the Arte process.
In retaliation, Hussein Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA)
appears to be inciting the Gaaljaal clan to attack the Hawadle,
leaving the entire riverine valley from Beled Weyn to Jowhar in a
state of insecurity even more chronic than usual. More surprising
are reports that the Haber Gedir clans in south Muduq region all
embraced the Arte process - even Hussein Aideed's own Sa'ad
sub-clan. This appears to be a reflection of their own frustration
with the weakness of factions which have monopolized their
representation for years.
Puntland
At one point there was concern that this region, which has avoided
direct armed clashes since 1991, would be brought into conflict as a
result of the Arte process. That appears to be less of a threat now,
but tensions remain high as the Puntland authorities accuse citizens
who attended the Arte talks of treason (including some who had been
high-ranking officials in the Puntland administration, such as
Hassan Abshir Farah, until recently the Interior Minister).
Divisions for and against the Arte accord have some sub-clan logic,
with Omar Mahamud tending to be against it and Osman Mahamud for it,
but within each clan there are high-level figures split over the
SNPC. Individuals close to this region express a popular fear that
the Abdiqasim administration will try to rally support in Mogadishu
by mounting an armed campaign against Puntland, but this seems
far-fetched. In the short term, Puntland will be preoccupied with
the enormous economic problems generated by the livestock import ban
in the Gulf.
Somaliland
What little support the Arte process could have culled from
Somaliland dissidents was undercut by the low level of
representation accorded the Isaaq clan. The Egal administration has
effectively planted deep suspicions about the economic motives of
Djibouti in hosting the Arte conference, arguing that Djibouti was
hoping to undermine a rival port in Somaliland. The fact that the
Puntland President, Abdullahi Yusuf, seems to have backed down on
the dispute over the regions of Sanaag and Sool, and that some local
non-Isaaq clans (the Gadabursi, Warsengali) were lukewarm about the
Arte process, was a victory for President Egal. Only one sub-clan of
the Dolbahante, the Farah Garaad, was strongly pro-Arte, and two of
their leaders, Ali Khalif Galydh and Garaad Abshir were arrested at
Berbera on charges of treason after participating in the meeting.
Somaliland, like Puntland, will no doubt be wishing for the quick
demise of the Abdiqasim administration, but will not immediately
threatened by it. Like in Puntland, the coming year will mainly be a
crisis in Somaliland for economic reasons, due to the livestock ban.
2.2 Economic Trends
The economy in Somalia establishes the parameters
of what is and is not possible for the transitional national
government. Unless the administration coaxes a windfall of foreign
aid from an external patron or patrons, which at this time does not
appear likely, it will have to generate its own revenues mainly from
taxes. The only methods through which Somalis have ever been able to
effectively tax themselves have been customs duties at major ports,
and in some cases road tolls. Taxes on imports and exports will
necessarily need to be kept low, given the number of natural ports
in the south (where smuggling would not be difficult) and the
competition that the ports of Berbera (Somaliland) and Bosaso (Putland)
pose to north. When one factors into this equation the depressed
local economy, the revenue base for the administration begins to
look impossibly low.
General household income levels, remittance
flows, and imports of commodities have not changed appreciably in
the past three years. But several new trends could threaten to pull
the slow southern Somali economy down still further. First, and most
dramatic, is the livestock import ban which Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf states imposed in September 1000. The ban, issued because of a
fatal outbreak of Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia and Yemen,
targets livestock from Horn of Africa and East Africa, including
Somalia. The last time the Saudis issues such a ban, in 1998, it was
only partially enforced, du to widespread smuggling through Yemen.
This time, however, Yemen appears to be clamping down as well,
making this episode potentially much more disruptive. If the last
ban is any guide, it will be at least a year or more before the ban
is lifted. A recent World Food Programme report concludes that the
2000 livestock ban will have a much more negative impact on Somalia
and surrounding states "due to the lack of alternative markets,
general poor condition of livestock, and the fact that the ban came
into effect before the peak period of Ramadan livestock sales."14
The livestock ban deprives Somalia of its chief
source of hard currency just as the new administration takes over.
It is predicted to have an especially devastating impact on the
northern polities of Somaliland (which rely on taxes on livestock
exports for half its budget) and Puntland. Southern Somalia is
expected to feel the impact more slowly, as only a small portion of
its livestock is exported to the Gulf (due to closure of Mogadishu
port). The inter-riverine and Jubba regions will not be affected
much if at all, as their main livestock market is in Kenya. But the
entire country will feel the ripple effect of the ban. Purchasing
power will drop, so demand for consumer imports will drop as well.
Worse, without a commercial outlet for surplus livestock, herders
will build up their herds anticipation of the reopening of the Gulf
markets, causing still more environmental degradation on overgrazed
pasture.
Agricultural production, meanwhile, enjoyed a
solid harvest in August, with one of the best yields since the war
began (though still about 40 per cent less than pre-war harvests).15
Localized drought has severely effected some border areas, however,
most notably in Gedo, Bakool and Hiran, as well as much of northwest
Somalia. That, combined with insecurity, has led to a serious
problem of food insecurity and rising malnutrition in Bay and Bakool
regions, according to latest UNICEF alerts.16 Still, the
generally satisfactory harvest means that the interim administration
will not find itself in the middle of a major relief effort, which
would have put tremendous pressure on it. But these yields are
mostly from subsistence production, and will not generate much if
any tax revenue for the administration.
The economic dilemma for the Abdiqasim
administration is thus clear-high public expectations of the
government dwarf the meagre revenues the government can expect to
generate locally. The natural reaction of the administration has
been to seek a solution externally, hoping for high levels of
foreign aid. Aid from Western and multilateral sources is clearly
going to be modest in scope, so the only alternatives are Gulf
states and Arab and Islamic donors. Accordingly, Abdiqasim has been
actively wooing those potential patrons. The added dilemma for the
administration, however, is that by tilting so overtly toward the
Arab world for assistance in alienates Ethiopia, which has powerful
security interests in minimizing Arab and Islamic influence in the
Horn of Africa. Thus, the potential solution to the administration's
financial crisis only provokes an even greater crisis with Ethiopia.
The past decade suggests that no Somali polity, regional or
national, can survive if it provokes strong Ethiopian opposition.
2.3. Local Governance and Rule of Law
Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia
as "anarchic," basic law and order is in fact the norm in
most locations. Though hard data is not available, anecdotal
evidence suggests that much of the Somali countryside - especially
Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia - is safer for
local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There
are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and
criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts
of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and
foreigners associated with an international organization or a
profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom,
especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the
security problems of international aid agencies with security
problems for average residents.
Public order, rule of law, and personal security
throughout the country continue to be based on a combination of
traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations
within blood-payment groups (diya); clan-based customary law
(xeer) and mediation structures provided by elders or
respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the
practice of shegad, or adoption into a stronger clan. These
traditional mechanisms have fared relatively well throughout most of
the country, and are the primary pillars of "rule of law"
and conflict mediation for day-to-day matters at the local level. In
addition, in many local areas in southern and central Somalia, at
the local shari's courts have been established to handle
penal law as well. The courts are typically established and overseen
by elders and local merchants, to provide a more effective and
formal judiciary. They are usually explicitly identified by clan.
These courts usually oversee a shari'a police force as well.
In most instances, plaintiffs in a dispute first have the right of
recourse to customary law or blood payments to resolve a grievance;
imposition of shari'a law is usually only an option. Rarely
have the courts tried to exercise autonomous power from the clans
and merchants, and rarely have they tried to impose a strict shari'a
law. One major human rights concern is that when the option of shari'a
law is chosen by families of victims, punishments have included
amputations and stoning. The number of such cases of mutilation and
capital punishment is low, and the Islamic courts are monitored by
local human rights groups and pressured not to impose such
punishments.18
Finally, two regional administrations of the
country, Somaliland and Puntland, have re-established civil judicial
systems, which also complement traditional mechanisms. Of the two,
Somaliland's is considerably more developed. But in both Somaliland
and strong police and judiciary than a manifestation of strong civil
and traditional practices. It also reflects the fact that both
administrations have devoted most of their tax revenues to
expenditures on "security forces" - a way to demobilize
and control young armed militiamen who would otherwise constitute a
major public security problem.
In practice, rule of law, guarantees of personal
security, and protection of human rights in Somalia vary from
location to location and according to the social standing of the
individual. Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing
in the "home areas" of their clan, where they are assured
full status and protection by their kin group. Ironically, for many
Somali urbanites, this arrangement can lead to a situation in which
they are simultaneously "at home" in their clan's
territory, but "internally displaced", in that they are
forced to live in areas far from their actual homes in the capital
city. Somalis are increasingly able to both visit and live in cities
outside their clan's traditional domain, but typically as a guest of
more dominant clans, an arrangement which requires time and
sometimes protection money to ensure. Politically weak social
groups, such as the Bantu and Bajuni, are least able to secure
protection from extortion, rape, and other abuses by criminal
elements of more powerful clans; they remain somewhat vulnerable no
matter where they reside.
3. Prognosis for the Transistional National Government
3.1. Assesment of the Somali National Peace Conference
The SNPC has inspired considerable debate and
commentary inside and outside of Somalia. Debates have tended to
focus on one of a number of issues: the nature and quality of
representation at the conference; the nature and quality of the
conference deliberations; the legitimacy of the agenda of the
conference; and the legitimacy of the new administration that
emerged from the SNPC. These debates are very important in the
battle for public opinion inside Somalia, and hence important for
external actors to understand. At this point in time, the debate is
fairly evenly divided.
Representation
This is a perennial debate in Somali politics-who may represent
whom? In the case of the SNPC, the meeting was, after protracted
debate, explicitly based on proportional clan representation, and,
while open to all (depending on the choice of each clan), the core
organizers were from "civil society" - intellectuals, clan
elders, and NGO leaders. This aspect of the SNPC earned it many
sympathetic supporters, who blamed past failures in national
reconciliation on the fact that representation was invariably
factional-and that factions/warlords were the source of, not the
solution to, the Somali impasse. No doubt the appeal of bypassing
the warlords helped to earn this conference the ample goodwill and
support it enjoyed from key international players. It also helped
partially to offset criticism that the SNPC was just another
"top-down" reconciliation exercise.
Criticism of representation at the SNPC has been
ample, however. First, some stress that the absence of Somaliland
and Puntland authorities, as well as Mogadishu faction leaders,
dooms the conference to irrelevance. Second, it is argued that the
principle of clan-based representation is flawed. Even Djibouti
President Guellah called for regional representation. These critics
fear the longer-term impact of institutionalizing clannism in Somali
national politics. Third, many Somalis are displeased with the
proportional representation by clan. The Isaaq who broke ranks with
Somaliland to attend the meeting were dismayed that they were folded
into a broader "Dir" clan category, that they were not
treated on equal footing with the Hawiye and Darood, as was past
practice (they were allocated only 100 seats to 175 apiece for
Hawiye Darood), and that the Isaaq were out-numbered by non-Isaaq
clans in Somaliland. That was only one of several decisions which
solidified Isaaq opposition to the Arta process, even among Isaaq
who oppose to Somaliland and Egal.
Fourth, some contend that the conference was
controlled by a clique of Mogadishu based Haber Gedir Ayr
businessmen, and that it was erroneous to pass the proceedings off
as broadly representative and democratic. This was evidenced in the
selection of Abdiqasim as President. Abdiqasim is himself Ayr; he
receives strong support from the business community in Mogadishu,
which is dominated by Ayr; and he has the backing of the shari'a
courts and the militia, the leadership of which is significantly Ayr.
The ascendancy to leadership of Ayr is irritating for the Sa'ad and
Abgal, who have aspirations for top leadership. But it is also
disturbing to many other Somalis, who see it as a reward for Ayr
armed conquest of parts of southern Somalia.
Fifth, many argue that the Arte process included too many
warlords, including the notorious generals Gani and Morgan. The
Parliament includes a half dozen former generals from the Barre
regime as well. A sixth complaint is that the conference was
hijacked by former Barre regime officials, who assumed many of the
positions in Parliament (about 60 per cent of the Parliament are
ex-parliamentarians from the Barre era), and whose credentials for
nation-building, given their past record, are poor. A related
concern is that 30 to 40 per cent of the Parliament is said to be
composed of diaspora Somalis. Inside Somalia, the conventional view
throughout the 1990s has been the Somalis who did not live through
the war and state collapse has limited claims on political roles.
There are some exceptions to this rule, Hussein Aideed being the
most obvious. But in general Somali attitudes towards their diaspora
kin are marked by deep ambiguity - gratitude for the remittances
sent back, envy for the better life they are perceived to be
enjoying, and sharp rejection of any disapora initiative which
smacks of an externally-imposed solution and/or a power-grab by
exiled politicos. If this still holds true, the new Parliament is
going to face severe legitimacy problems inside Somalia.
Much of this criticism is painfully accurate, and
will provide useful ammunition for critics seeking to undermine the
credibility of the transitional administration. Yet it is also the
case that the SNPC was probably the most representative assembly yet
convened for Somali national reconciliation. While very imperfect,
it was adequately representative, and should be treated by external
actors as more-or-less legitimate reflection of the desires of the
Somali people. The fact that clan elders were able to agree to
fixed, proportional representation by clan is a major accomplishment
in itself, and will serve as a benchmark for any and all future
negotiations over national-level representation. The exceptions to
this assessment are Puntland and Somaliland. Therefore, the
Abdiqasim administration cannot speak for those regions and should
not be given any encouragement to claim that right. Separate
negotiations will almost certainly need to be held with those
polities at a future date.
Nature and Quality of the Deliberations
Advocates of the Djibouti initiative stress that the proceedings
were of a high quality. They blended traditional assembly customs
with modern committee techniques; ample time (nearly four months)
was given to the actual conference, in keeping with Somali custom;
and the SNPC addressed all of the main issues (division of power,
electoral procedures, etc.) in a deliberate and thoughtful way.
Critics felt otherwise. They claim that the
quality of the SNPC was poor, and undermined its legitimacy. They
argue that it was a major error to hold such meetings outside of
Somalia (a common criticism of old UNOSOM practices); this prevented
the delegates from vetting proposals with their constituents and
hence weakened the accord. Critics also note that the process was
rushed, due to Djibouti financial pressures (again, a common
criticism of UNOSOM practices); that most discussion and negotiation
was not over substantive issues but simply over the division of the
spoils between and within clans; and that much participation was
driven not by real concern for the nation but by the perception that
the conference might lead to "UNOSOM III" - i.e.,
international recognition of a government, which would in turn open
the floodgate of foreign aid. In such an eventuality, it was only
prudent to ensure a good place at the table.
Some of these criticisms have merit. In
particular, it may be that the UN allowed itself to appear too close
to the proceedings, and in so doing triggered the speculative
behaviour of ex-politicians "banking" a seat in
expectation of access to future foreign aid. But collectively these
criticisms do not invalidate the results of the proceedings
themselves.
Agenda of the Conference
Here, critics address a much more serious concern; namely, the right
of the conference conveners and their international backers to lay
claim to a national-level agenda. Advocates of the conference point
to the broad popular support the SNPC enjoyed within Somalia as
clear evidence that such a national-level agenda was justified. But
critics note that the conference constituted a complete reversal of
the "building block" approach which external actors (the
SACB - Somalia Aid Coordination Body, the EU, the UN, the
Ethiopians) had pressed hard for Somalia to embrace over the past
three years. Why, some critics charged, was the building block
strategy, which had enjoyed at least some modicum of success in
Somaliland and Puntland, abandoned (and possibly destroyed) by the
very actors who advocated it? For observers like I.M. Lewis, it
represented the worst instincts of the UN, EU, and others who
"imagine that state political organization can be dropped from
UN parachutes." Instead, he argues that parts of Africa are
experiencing "the withering away of colonial states and the
rise of new political formation"-which he sees occurring in
Puntland and Somaliland, and which he believes ought to be
supported, not undermined.19
There is a danger that some international actors,
in their zeal to promote the peace deal that finally resurrects a
central state in Somalia, were too casual in their silent
abandonment of the building block approach, which, while slow and
prone to setbacks, had numerous virtues. The great strength of the
building block approach is that it insisted on a grass-roots
rebuilding process, and that leaders claiming the right to national
leadership had to first demonstrate their ability to govern at the
local or regional level. That message may now have been lost by the
abrupt shift toward materialize, Djibouti and its international
friends may have left Somalia worse off than before.
Another nettlesome problem related to the
national agenda of the Djibouti process has been recognition of and
support for the new administration. Some external actors were so
enthused about the SNPC that they conferred legitimacy and even
recognition on the new administration on procedural, rather than
empirical grounds. That is to say, the international community
reviewed the process of representation and deliberation at Arte,
judged it vastly superior to past efforts, and, to paraphrase the
language of election monitors, judged the new Parliament and
President to have been chosen in a "free and fair" manner.
But the Arte conference was not about an election, contend critics;
it was about establishing a government. The legitimacy of a
government is earned empirically, not just procedurally. From this
point of view, the entire international community should have taken
a "wait and see" position until the new administration
demonstrated a capacity to govern. By contrast, those who argue for
direct support to the administration dispute this interpretation,
contending that reluctance to support the new administration runs
the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. "Now is the
time for Somalia's international friends to support Somalis'
struggle for peace in tangible ways", stated UN Resident
Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator Randolph Kent, in
announcing a plan to support the transitional national government in
early November.20
The result has been a split in the international
community, with some embassies and agencies adopting a "wait
and see" approach, while others have more overtly embraced the
administration. This is likely to remain an undercurrent of tension
within the donor and aid community in the near future. It will be
resolved in one of two ways. If the transitional national government
becomes operational and shows signs of at least being able to
administer Mogadishu, that will convince the "wait and
see" actors to recognize the administration. Alternatively, if
the administration fails to become operational, that creates a very
difficult problem for agencies and states which have de facto
recognized it; at some point those external patrons will have to
extricate themselves from their support of a failing or defunct
administration, a process which would not only be embarrassing but
which could trigger accusations and political tensions inside
Mogadishu.
The prospect of failure of the transitional
administration has to be considered carefully for two reasons -
first, because it is not at all unlikely, given the enormous
challenges facing the administration
(see below); and second, because the costs of failure would be high.
Failure would discredit the idea of allowing Somali civil society to
lead; it would discredit a number of talented and well-intentioned
Somali leaders who are risking their political future in this gable;
it would be likely to empower Islamists as the group which can
actually deliver, as opposed to promise, basic governance; and, in a
worst-case scenario, it could drag down the relatively stable areas
of Puntland and Somaliland with it.
3.2. Challenges Facing the
Abdiqasim Administration
There are some reasons for
cautious optimism that the current transitional administration
will succeed where past efforts failed. First, the procedure and
quality of representation at Arte was superior to past efforts;
this was the first such national accord brokered by civil society
representatives. Second, the international community has been
sympathetic if not actively in support of the new administration -
at a minimum, no external actor actively sought to sabotage the
accord. Third, the new Parliament and cabinet appear to be
genuinely committed to implementing the national accord, in
contrast to many past peace conferences. Fourth, there is
widespread public support for the process in Mogadishu, due in
part to a warweariness which might suggest that the Somali impasse
is "ripe for resolution." Fifth, the very evident
weakness of the warlords in Mogadishu reduces (though by no means
eliminates) the problem of armed "spoilers" which so
effectively destroyed past efforts. Finally, the important role of
the business community offers the hope of a "pax commerciale"
transcending clan and factional lines. The powerful interests of
commerce in a more predictable and stable operating environment
could, some argue, prove to be decisive. The question is whether
these changes are significant enough to warrant optimism that ths
transitinal national government will succeed where past efforts
have failed. This analysis concludes that while these new factors
give some basis for optimism, the obstacles facing the new
administration are still overwhelming. Odds are greater that this
new administration will fail than succeed. The most daunting
obstacle remains the absence of any viable economic base on which
tax revenues can be generated to support all but the most
minimalist of state structures.
Recent reports suggest that the
administration may succeed in attracting some short term external
aid from Arab states. Few observers believe this external aid will
be sustained in the long term, but it may at least allow the
administration to take some first steps towards establishing a
working government. What, then, are the main challenges it will
face in the next half year?
The administration's main test
will be Mogadishu. Abdiqasim's administration does not need to
establish control over the entire country to enjoy credibility; it
only needs to tame Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, average citizens are
generally very supportive of the bid to establish a government,
and this buys the transitional administration a certain grace
period and public goodwill. Mogadishu is also Abdiqasim Hassan's
power base, where his commercial patrons and the Islamic courts
are strong. Much of the administration's credibility will thus
rise or fall on their ability to govern in Mogadishu. The key
litmus tests will be: (1) establishing control of and reopening
the main airport and seaport; (2) eliminating militia roadblocks;
(3) establishing a paid and responsive police/security force (4)
successfully demobilizing the militia (5) attracting at least some
international diplomatic/UN/NGO/ presence, which will be a sign of
external confidence; (6) providing adequate security for those
internationals. These are basic threshold accomplishments which,
if achieved, will generate the level of public confidence the
administration needs to begin to bring the city back into a sense
of normalcy. That in turn would lead to a second, curcial phase,
namely teh return of Mogadishu residents from other regions back
to the city. For a number of years since 1994, non-Hawiye Somalis
have gradually been able to return to the city and in some cases
reclaim or repurchase their homes. But they are treated as
"guests", as subordinate clans in an essentially Hawiye
city, and with limited political and commercial opportunities. A
key indicator to watch will be the degree to which Mogadishu
becomes again a cosmopolitan city, where all can reside and pursue
business with full status as a citizen. This will involve
monitoring both changes in patterns of residency and patterns of
investment (e.g. are Mijerteen building new homes in Mogadishu?).
Clans with large populations of professionals stranded in remote
rural homelands of somalia0the Marehan in Gedo region, the
Mijerteen in Puntland, the Hawadle in Hiran region-are likely to
be the first to return.
Taming Mogadishu will not be
easy, even with the help of the merchants and Islamic courts. The
first problem will be handling the various militia groups and
warlords, who control key real estate. They will fiercely resist
handing over assets like the airport or seaport, which they view
as "theirs" and which they know will be a major source
of income if reopened. The administration's choices are to
confront them with force (a losing proposition, as it would
polarize the city on sub-clan lines); try to buy off the
militiamen from beneath the warlords; or try to buy off the
warlords themselves. The most likely tactic is a combination of
co-optation of both the warlords and their militia, but that is an
expensive proposition.
A second, larger problem is
recruitment. For the administration to manage the minimal
functions listed above, it will need a large and armed police
force; a court system; a port and airport management team, from
manager to porters; and a small cadre of civil servants charged
with various ministerial duties. At the highest levels of the
government (cabinet and ministries) balancing competing clan
claims will be tricky but feasible. But at lower levels, the
dilemma appears insurmountable. There will be a crush of demands
for employment in the police force and at the port from unskilled,
unemployed citizens. If the administration hopes to defuse
security problems in Mogadishu, the wise choice is to absorb
ex-militiamen into the police and into other jobs at the seaport.
This would also be the policy of choice for Abdiqasim's business
patrons, who are eager to shed the costs of hiring security guards
(or rather to outsource the management of security forces to the
administration). But nearly all the Mogadishu militia are Hawiye.
The administration, to be credible as a national government, must
have an integrated police. Otherwise it will appear to be a Hawiye
municipal government that the world is expected to treat as a
national government, and which other clans will immediately
reject. Yet if the administration begins providing police
positions to Ogadeni, Marehan, Mijerteen, Rahanweyn, and others,
unemployed Hawiye gunmen may react violently. Only the most
skilled negotiator will be able to manage this difficult issue.
To maximize the amount of
services provided at the least cost, the administration will
almost certainly have to "outsource" the judiciary to
neighbourhood shari'a courts. This will raise concerns
about a "fifth column" within the government, about
accountability of the courts, and about the proper place of Islam
in Somalia. The administration may also have to outsource port
management to contractors, as well as a variety of other functions
normally assumed by a government.
The administration will also be
confronted with the problem of security for international
visitors. Part of the return to normalcy is a return of diplomats,
businessmen, and aid workers; but they are increasingly the
targets of kidnapping for ransom. A few high visibility assaults
or kidnappings can lead to wholesale evacuation. As was recently
the case in Merka, this gives any disgruntled group the power to
play "spoiler."
Eventually, the administration
will also be expected to extend its presence into the countryside.
It is hard to imagine that Abdiqasim would be willing to employ
force to do so, even in cases where the resisting clan was weak;
it would discredit the regime and prompt renewed accusations that
the administration was a Trojan horse for the expansion of Hawiye
occupation of southern Somalia. Each region and district would
pose its own set of difficulties, especially in areas where land
rights are contested. On the positive side, the reopening of
Mogadishu would make many conflicts in the countryside easier to
resolve. The interactable conflict over Kismayo, for instance,
would be far easier once the Marehan, Mijerteen, and Ogadeni
urbanites displaced from Mogadishu were able to return to the
capital.
Puntland and Somaliland would
only be problems for the administration if it chooses to make them
problems. The wise tactic would be to give them low priority until
the situtation in Mogadishu and vicinity had been normalized.
Picking a fight with distant autonomous regions would virtually
guarantee the failure of the administration.
3.3. Possible Scenarios
It is impossible to predict at
this time what direction Somali political developments will take
in the next year, but it is also the case that some scenarios are
more plausible than others. Prudence requires that international
humanitarian and development agencies be prepared for a number of
different outcomes, each of which has distinct implications for
refugees, IDPs, food security, and rehabilitation efforts.
The scenarios presented below
are listed as separate possibilities, but they are not necessarily
mutually exclusive - that is, we could see two or more of these
scenarios develop sequentially.
The Government-in-Exile Scenario
This is, unfortunately, one of the more likely outcomes. In this
scenario, the Abdiqasim administration will run into trouble
forming a cabinet to everyone's liking, and the first defections
by clan or faction will occur (this has already taken place with
the RRA leader Hassan "Shatigudud"). Overwhelmed by the
prospects of establishing a government from scratch in a destroyed
city with few funds, blocked by a veto coalition of warlords, and
confronted by very high expectations on the part of the
population, Abdiqasim Hassan and his top aides will understandably
gravitate to the international fund-raising circuit, where
pressures are less and respect is accorded. There they will remain
in orbit until the administration's legitimacy dwindles. In this scenario,
within a year the Arte accord and the transitional administration
will be as distant a memory as the 1996 Benadir authority.
Ineffective Government-in-Mogadishu
In this outcome, Abdiqasim Hassan and his administration bravely
attempt to stay in Mogadishu despite the pressures and dangers, in
the hope that a continued presence in the capital will legitimize
their claims to be a government. The business community and
foreign donors which provide them with initial backing eventually
decide not to throw good money after bad, and the administration
is left with virtually no funds. But even as a shell of a
government, it continues to exercise sovereignty over the one
group of actors which must respect that sovereignty - the external
aid agencies. This is the scenario which already exists to some
degree in Puntland, where a government is physically in place but
does not govern, and devotes most of its energies to trying to
capture aid agency funding. Eventually, this outcome could produce
real operating problems for international agencies.
Armed Conflict Scenario
What Abdiqasim Hassan and his associates are purporting to do is
fraught with danger, and there is a possibility that if they begin
to succeed in bringing the city under control that they will
become targets of a threatened warlord, militia or clan, or the
disgruntled unemployed. If the administration is reliant on
business support, and if it is drawn into armed conflict with one
of the militias, there is the real danger that the business people
will not be able or willing to provide adequate support, and that
the Abdiqasim administration will be left vulnerable. It is worth
emphasizing that the business community is hoping to achieve
political stability at the lowest price possible, and each
merchant will be trying to minimize financial obligations to the
administration in hopes another will pick up the tab. If things
start to go sour, these businesspeople are unlikely to gamble all
they have - they are much more likely to withdraw their support.
In a worst-case scenario, armed clashes between the administration
and a militia could conceivably degenerate into widespread
inter-clan conflict in Mogadishu, leaving the city worse off than
before the Djibouti process.
The Proxy War Scenario
If the transitional national administration continues to woo Arab
and Islamic patrons without reassuring Ethiopia, it is almost
inevitable that Ethiopia will come to view the Mogadishu-based
administration as a threat, and will actively support Somali
groups opposed to it. This is the "proxy war" scenario
which plagued Somalia over the period from 1995 to 1999 - pitting
Somali factions backed by Arab and Islamic patrons against
Ethiopian - backed Somali factions.21 The result would
be continued division inside Somalia, the possibility of direct
intervention by Ethiopian forces, and the eventual collapse of the
administration.
There are a few plausible scenarios which will
yield a "successful" outcome - success being defined
here as a functioning administration .
The "Marshall
Plan" Scenario
In this outcome, an external patron or patrons provide an enormous
amount of assistance, enough to enable the transitional national
administration to co-opt armed rivals, employ militiamen, and
provide enough basic services that the local population is won
over and control over tax revenue-generating real estate (seaport
and airport) is secured. Here foreign aid serves to "jump
start" the administration, to buy it time and public
confidence and a chance to set up its own revenue sources.
Improved public confidence would almost certainly produce a flow
of private investment funds into Mogadishu from the diploma, in
much the same manner as has been witnessed in Somaliland and
Puntland. With Mogadishu under control and broad international
support, the administration would then be in a position gradually
to expand its presence in other regions of the country,
culminating in negotiations with Puntland and perhaps even
Somaliland to reunify the country. Abdiqasim Hassan is clearly
seeking out this option, and has correctly surmised that Arab and
Islamic states are, for a variety of reasons, the most likely
source of funding for such a "Marshall Plan". It is
worth noting here that even if such a plan materializes, it would
merely constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for a
successful administration. Misuse of the funds by elements within
the administration could squander the opportunity this scenario
would provide. Given the high proportion of ex-Barre officials in
the transitional government, corruption is likely to be chronic
problem.
The Islamist Scenario
Some observers contend that the Shari'a courts, supported
by some patrons in the business community, will use Abdiqasim's
administration as a vehicle for gaining control over key
portfolios - education, justice, etc. Eventually, they will assume
de facto control over the administration, much as Hassan al-Turabi
and the Islamists did in Sudan. At that point, they can draw not
only on a committed corps of supporters from the business
community, but also on external Islamist backers. It is certainly
true that the business community, the moderate members of the shari'a
courts and Al-Islah, the more radical Islamists, and the new
administration are playing a multi-level game in which each
aspires to use the other to its own advantage, and one possible
outcome could be the Sudan scenario. But this seems unlikely, if
only because of the strength of pragmatic Somali culture (and
clannism) which tolerates Islamic courts but which would
vigorously oppose imposition of strict Islamic law. This scenario
would also bring Ethiopia directly into internal Somali politics,
to the immediate disadvantage of Islamist groups. Islamist groups
in Somalia are not united, but appear to share a common strategy
of avoiding direct political control of cities and territories
(which would make them fixed and easy targets) in favour of
long-term work to prepare Somali society for eventual Islamic
government. If this holds true, then Islamists will continue to
prefer to work under the cover of secular administrations rather
than challenging them outright.
The "Minimalist
State" Scenario
Could a viable state be established and sustained in Somalia
without extensive external patronage? It is worth considering the
possibility, however remote, of the institutionalization of a
minimalist central authority, sustained only by modest customs
revenues and modest levels of foreign assistance. In this
scenario, the government would have o focus on only a few of the
most essential tasks-diplomatic relations, passports, basic
security, and convening of parliament - leaving all other
functions either to local (municipal or regional) governments, or
to the private sector or international agencies. This would
constitute a very loose confederal system. Since the only
subnational polities that have really worked effectively in
Somalia in the 1990s are municipalities, this scenario would be
roughly akin to a league of commercial city-states. This scenario
would in some ways be more "organic" in the Somali
context. Such a polity would develop very gradually, over years
and even decades. Given Somalia's weak tax revenue, this scenario
is the only economically viable one, but this vision of a
minimalist state runs deeply counter to the political instincts
and habits of the current political class in Somalia, whose
formative years were spent in large civil services supported by
foreign aid and expensive government mandates. This minimalist
vision of governance is occasionally articulated by Mogadishu
businesspeople however; if it evolved, it would constitute an
entirely new and in some ways revolutionary innovation in
post-colonial, post-cold War governance.
4. Conclusion
The transitional national
administration faces considerable challenges, and even in the most
optimistic of scenarios will only gradually be able to expand its
control over Mogadishu and surrounding regions. Its presence will
be largely undetected in most of the southern Somali countryside,
and will have no impact in Puntland and Somaliland. In the short
to medium term, international agencies working outside the
Mogadishu area will necessarily need to continue to operate
through and liaise with local authorities in matters of
rehabilitation work and refugee repatriation.
No areas of Somalia appear to be
facing imminent threats of armed conflict or human flight, though
some regions-the Kismayo area, parts of Middle Shabelle, and Merka
will remain tense and prone to sporadic instability. The most
dangerous flash points of conflict in Mogadishu are over control
of the seaport and airport. Meanwhile, the entire country, and
especially central and northern regions, will be facing severe
economic pressures due to the livestock import ban in the Gulf
states. These economic constraints will reduce the capacity of
local communities to sustain their own rebuilding efforts;
dramatically erode the tax revenues for local authorities in
Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu; worsen household food
security; exacerbate degradation of overgrazed pastures; reduce
local capacity to absorb returnees; and could possibly trigger
significant population movements within or across Somali borders
due to economic duress. This bleak economic backdrop constitutes
inhospitable conditions for the nascent Abdiqasim administration,
and will put considerable strains on Puntland and Somaliland
administration as well.
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17 This section of the paper draws
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20 United Nations
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J. Prendergast, Conflict and Crisis in the Greater Horn of Africa,
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________
*Associate
Professor K. Menkhaus served as political officer under Admiral
Howe of UNOSOM
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