- [SW Country] ( By Federico Battera )
REMARKS ON THE 1998 CHARTER OF PUNTLAND STATE OF
SOMALIA :Posted on 7 July 2002
REMARKS ON THE
1998 CHARTER OF PUNTLAND STATE OF
SOMALIA
UNDOS Working Papers Series
By Federico Battera* - UNDOS Research
Specialist
Professor Development Studies – University of Trieste, Italy
Summary
and purposes
The crisis of
the State in Africa goes back to the early 80s: postcolonial African
state
has been
neither able ‘to rule’ economy, nor territorial policy. Ethnicity
has spread all
over the
continent. However, after the failure of the consociative policies
channeled
through
one-party systems, the most evident factor has been its territorial
dimension.
Since the
middle of the 80s, as the State machine has been evidently unable to
expand,
politicization
has taken over territory, giving ethnicity a new relevance as to
contrast
territorial
legitimacy, which had been acquired by the State through the
decolonization
process.
Somalia has
not escaped the trend, sliding into a civil war since the beginning of
the 80s.
By early 90s
it has become the paradigmatic example of the failure of the state.
Centralization,
as conceived by the collapsed regime, turned into a non-state
existence,
distinguished
by independent areas controlled by different 'fronts' or 'movements'
drawn
up along clan
lines. By mid 90s the situation improved in certain areas and
stabilized in
others. A de
facto regionalization has gone out: since then, some areas has
progressed
to a
'recovery' condition, other has been classified by UN as 'transition'
zones or 'crisis'
zones, the
latter characterized by a steadfast state of ravage and insecurity.
The crisis of
the State in Africa has generated in major cases conditions of
democratic
change.
Constitutional processes has been the consequence of the change.
Almost
everywhere, it
has been the output of a widely expressed need of strengthening
democratic
procedures. Only in few cases, the issue of territorial dimension of
ethnicity
has been
addressed through strict federalist guidelines (as tried to do
Ethiopia), but
decentralization
and devolution has remained the major question on the ground, together
with
democracy.
'Recovery'
areas in Somalia (mainly Northwest and Northeast Somalia) around mid
90s
gained
momentum, as the situation in the rest of the country remained
critical. Since
then, new
local conditions in the North have granted security and a certain
stability,
besides their
differences. In 1991, the liberation struggle from Barre's regime in
Northwest
Somalia ended with the declaration of independence of Somaliland. The
constitutional
process was the unavoidable following step. In 1993, a National
transitional
Charter were approved and accepted by all the communities in the
region,
giving full
legitimization at the process. In 1997, a new (interim) Constitution
were
passed out,
after a new Constitutional Conference that ended a two-years crisis.
After
that,
Somaliland is waiting its international recognition.
The
constitutional process in Northeast Somalia has started later. As has
been rightly
stated by
Farah, better conditions of peace and recovery do not necessarily lead
to a
climate
favorable to a new institutional framework. Besides, Northeast Somalia
did not
share the same
eagerness of Somaliland to acquire independence. Nevertheless, a
constitutional
process has started since the end of 1997. The aim of this paper is to
outline the
constitutional process and the main characteristics of the Charter
approved
and secondly
to draw up the political effects of the new process on Somalia. After
all, a
new political
entity has been originated from Somali disorder.
As what
concern the first point, the Charter, comparing to the Draft, stresses
the
Islamic
identity of the new entity and its presidential biases. Regarding the
political
effects of the
birth of the new regional state, it is personal opinion of the author
that it
will affect
the entire reconciliation process in Somalia and, in a certain extent,
the
stability of
Somaliland. Comparing to Somaliland, the territorial dimension of the
new
entity is
openly averted. One reason is that a request for an international
recognition is
not on the
agenda. However, an alternative explanation resides on the clan
structure of
the new state.
Contrary to Somaliland, clan agreement has preceded any territorial
definition. So
far, Puntland has yet to be clearly defined on the map, a part the
vague
identification
with Northeast Somalia. As we will see, important issues like that of
decentralization
of the state have not been avoided only with the intent of endorsing
with more
power the new political leadership (as trying to avoid the same fate
of the
country) but
because of the naturally decentralized structure of Somali society.
Seems
like that the
manifest ambiguities of the Charter has been provided in order to
leave the
door open for
different future solutions. Indeed, the Charter is only provisional.
Further
alterations
have not to be excluded, depending on internal and international
conditions.
As Somaliland,
seven years later the first National Charter still in the middle of
its
constitutional
process, Puntland might not easily finalized its one. The process, the
participation
degree and the informal institutional constraints that has been
settled
during the
whole period more than its final document is the mirror of the
vitality of the
involved
society. Focusing on it is not a vain academic exercise.
The author had
the opportunity to follow the meetings of the Preparatory Committee,
which with the
assistance of foreign consultants drafted the Charter that was later
submitted to
the Constitutional Conference. Comparing the Draft with the final
Charter
has been the
main source of the paper. Such a method elucidates the needs and the
expectations
of the members of the Constitutional Conference in charged with its
approval. Such
a source has been compared to local sources as well as previous
reports.
Background
Following the
pattern of the Booroma National Charter, which formalized the birth of
Somaliland
during 1993, a new entity - the Puntland State of Somalia - was
established
in July 1998
out of a long Constitutional process that lasted more than two months.
As in
Boorama, the
Constitutional Conference produced a three-year provisional Charter
and
elected a
political leadership, i. e. a President and an Executive Council
(called Council of Ministers
in the Boorama Charter).
Boorama paved
the way, but it is a fact that the Puntland Constitutional Conference
has
been the
product of a longer process, which officially started during 1997 but
went back
to the second
National Reconciliation Conference of Addis Ababa of 1993. Indeed,
during
the National
Reconciliation Conference, the SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic
Front)
leadership
anticipated its ‘federalist’ view of the future of Somalia,
unofficially disclosed
during 1994 in
a statement by the Somali Community Information Centre in London.
During the
last five years, the federalist position has gradually acquired
substance,
recognizing
the de facto situation on the ground: a clan-divided Somalia. Finally,
the
failure of
several national reconciliation processes, from Sodere (1996) to Cairo
(1997),
created the
condition for an autonomous regional process, pending the formation of
other regional
entities and the establishment of a new Federal Somalia.
The
Features of the Charter
The Charter,
however transitory, defines a presidential system with a President
able to
dismiss the
unicameral Parliament or House of Representatives (see Art. 12.5 of
attached
Charter). The
House of Representatives consists of 69 members, representing of all
constituent
regions (Art. 8). However, an other chamber (of elders) has been
proposed,
called the
Isimada (Art. 30) whose constitutional powers are not clear but would
ostensibly
need to be defined by the future Constitution.
Even though,
the Isimada could play a significant role, since the Charter formally
recognizes to
it a role of mediation between institutions (both State and regions
and
districts), in
case of stalemate or disputes among "the community" (i. e.
Puntland
community as
well a single clan) (see Art. 30.2): power that, together with that of
selecting the
members of the House of Representatives (30.3), gives it potentially
an
important
role. The selection of the members has been carried out thanks to a
careful
balance
between the numerical relevance of all communities and their number,
to avert
the exclusion
of any political minority. Hence, this was an indirect election,
without
direct
competition between parties and candidates. This required long debates
among
the
communities involved; debates characterized by opposing vetoes between
and
among the
communities followed by the selection of suitable candidates. Being
the local
community the
natural constituency, it has been a consequence that only the elders
played a role,
as stated by the Charter itself (see, Art. 8.6).
Although the
selection seems to have relied on territorial criteria, it closely
follows more
an
'a-territorial' and consociative model. Such a criteria has already
settled on the issue
of the
ministerial posts as well of the departments, agencies, judiciary
agencies etc. So
far, these are
the de facto base of the forthcoming decentralization of the State
(Art.
1.8), waiting
for the matter to be regulated by law (Art. 18.1). Meanwhile, the
State,
and the
Executive in particular, will nominate the governors of the regions
and the
mayors of
districts, but always after direct consultation with district elders
(Art. 18.3).
The matter of
decentralization is particularly delicate because one of the reasons
for the
collapse of
Somalia was the unbalanced relation between the political center and
periphery. In
this sense, the Charter is still unclear and vague. What is evident is
that
the Charter
does not recognize any formal function to the District Councils (DCs)
and
definitely
removes any pre-exisiting regional community council (Art. 9.5). The
matter
shall be
resolved in the future by the Executive.
Besides the
legislative one, the House of Representatives has other important
responsabilities
(see Art. 10.3): the approval and the rejection of ministerial
nominees
proposed by
the President, the ratification or rejection of agreements and
negotiations
to achieve a
federal national solution with other regional entities, and of all the
future
proposals
submitted by the Executive concerning decentralization. Moreover, the
Charter
bestows the
power to remove the immunity of the President on the House of
Representatives
(the so-called impeachment; Art. 14.1) upon a two-thirds majority
vote. The
procedure must be submitted to the House by the Executive-nominated
(but
House-approved)
Attorney General.
The Judiciary
must be independent of both the Executive and the Legislative (Art.
19.1).
Three levels
of proceedings have been put in force (Primary Courts, Courts of
Appeal
and Supreme
Court) (Art. 19.2), but the Charter recognizes, encourages and
supports
"alternative
dispute resolution" (Art. 25.4) in keeping with the traditional
culture of
Puntland.
Therefore, the State directly recognizes the force of the xeer (the
customary
law), that so
far has held more sway than penal codes in the region.
Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh) is the "basis" of law (Arts. 2 and
19.1). An implicit recognition
of the
superiority of Šari‘a law exists, even though the lawmakers have
preferred to
avoid the more
mandatory "the only source" of law, as in other juridical
contexts. This is
an ambiguous
formula aiming to both recognize the ongoing regional process of
re-Islamization
as well as defuse its excessive aspects. Therefore, the Charter
continually
emphasizes the values of Islam, the State religion (Art. 2). The
President
himself must
be a practicing Muslim (Art. 12.3) , a quality not required for the
members
of the House
(Art. 9). The Constitutional Court, which shall come into force with
the
future
Constitution, is entrusted with all the issues and conflicts that
might arise
between
Islamic jurisprudence and the law of the State and the Constitution
itself (Art.
21.5). This
conformity to Islamic values and the general reference of the Charter
to the
Islamic
identity of Puntland is, moreover, stressed by the good relations
that, pending
the creation
of Federal Somalia, Puntland is willing to maintain with the
Organization of
Islamic
Conference (OIC) (Art. 5.3), which the original Draft did not mention.
The general
stress on the Islamic identity is confirmed in the chapter on the
fundamental
rights and
freedom (Art. 6). On this point, the Charter introduces the widest
changes in
respect to the
Draft. The Charter recognizes the freedom of thought and conscience,
but forbids
any religious propaganda other than Islam (Art. 6.2). This was one of
the
more discussed
issues, during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee, which
introduced the
Draft to the Conference. In its approved version, the Draft made no
reference to
such a prohibition. In Article 6.2.1, the Draft explicitly recognized
other
religious
denominations without the limitations introduced later by the Charter,
which
prefers to
consider other creeds as "freedom of thought and
conscience". So clarified,
the
prohibition of other religious propaganda is not intended to limit a
fundamental right
of thought,
which is per se unlimitable. It is a fact, that almost all the future
Puntland
citizens are,
practicing or not, Muslims. Such statements are probably intended to
define
more precisely
the religious identity of the State, especially in respect to the
outside
Islamic world,
in particular after allegations that Ethiopia stand behind the
constitutional
process had
been spread in the country.
Contrary to
the Draft, the Charter necessitates the adoption of regulation of
freedom of
expression.
Article 6.3 contains the prohibition of torture unless the person is
sentenced
by courts in
accordance with Islamic law. This is an indirect admission of the
legality of
corporal
punishments. Such punishment is admitted by Islamic law (as hudud) but
not by
Somali
customary law (xeer). Defining this punishment as "torture"
contradicts the new
State's (not
the Charter) acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Art.
5.2). This
evident contradiction has been obviously only a problem of lack of
understanding
between different linguistic versions. The Draft, originally written
in
English,
strongly forbids torture (Art. 6.3) and any other degrading treatment
– "no one
shall be
subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment…".
The English
version of the approved Charter cuts the sentence relating to the
degrading
treatment,
introducing a misleading distinction between torture and Islamic
(corporal)
punishments
– "no one shall be subjected to torture unless sentenced by the
Islamic
Courts".
This distinction is more evident in the Somali version of the Charter,
with the
word jir-dil
(lit. "body-beaten") replacing "torture" openly
referring to corporal
punishments.
It is worth
noticing that the Charter explicitly introduces a specific citizenship
(Art.
1.11),
regulated by law, but recognizing from now on the right of every
Somali citizen,
who respects
the Charter and the law, to reside in Puntland and conduct any
economic
activity (Art.
1.5). The issue of citizenship was intentionally avoided by the Draft
which
preferred
formulas as "the people of Puntland will accept only those
limitations on their
sovereignty
that may arise from their obligations as citizens of a democratic
Federal
Somalia"
(Art. 1.5 of the Draft)". Moreover, the Charter, at the Article
1.9, cut the word
"Democratic"
from that of the Draft, preferring to label Somalia simply
"Federal" (Art.
1.9). This
thought-provoking omission (almost all present constitutional systems
define
themselves as
‘democratic’) probably should be understood as the product of the
strong
will to adhere
to a re-established Somalia only at particular conditions leaving open
other
options, but
saving the federal formula. In other words the present Charter is
intended
to give
precise limitations to those who should participate in the name of
Puntland in a
constitutional
process at the national level, affecting the agenda of future
reconciliation
processes.
As far as this
delicate point of the cession of sovereignty is concerned, the Draft
introduced as
Annex 1 (Powers and Functions that Puntland is willing to transfer to
or
share with the
Federal Government of a democratic Federal Somalia) a fine distinction
between
transferable functions and shareable functions. The former is defined
as
functions
exclusively belonging to the Federal Government, (mainly, the
regulation of
currency and
Foreign affairs), and the latter as those belonging to the states,
(the
regulation of
the seas and the airspace of Somalia, national defense, the
determination
of customs
fees and the management of the Federal Bank). Of all these regulations
remains scant
in the final Charter apart from a reference in Article 1.6. This
article
leaves, in a
very vague way, to the dialogue between states or between Puntland
state
and the
Central government, after the approval of the House of Representatives
(Art.
10.3), what
will be transferred to the future Central Federal Government. Hence,
Puntland is
part of Somalia, and it is striving to recreate the unity of Somali
people (Art.
1.4), but the
modalities of realization remain only an option still to be
negotiated. So far,
in fact,
Puntland has not advanced any international recognition.
The effects of
the birth of Puntland on the process of reconciliation and
fragmentation
in Somalia
At a first
glance, the Charter outlines the structure of the government as the
Draft
does, but more
unbalanced to the presidency. First, the President has the power to
dismiss the
House of Representatives (Art. 12.5, h), a power the Draft did not
grant.
Second, the
State of Emergency (Art. 12.5, l), limited by the Draft to six months,
is
totally
unlimited in the Charter. The choice of the name of the chief of the
Executive
itself
(President) instead of Chief Minister, as proposed in the Draft, comes
from the
need to ensure
a stronger Executive, as was so clear during the long discussions
within
the
Preparatory Committee. Most likely, the Preparatory Committee intended
to reserve
this title for
the Federal Executive. Therefore, the House has no way to dismiss the
Executive -
but the same occurred in the Draft - except for the impeachment
(requiring
upon a
two-thirds majority) and the rejection of other ministerial nominees
(Art. 10.3, d).
The
Constitutional Conference itself empowered the President for a
three-year
transitional
period. Cabdullahi Yuusuf, a prominent military and political leader
of the now
dissolved SSDF,
was elected with more than 80% of the votes (377) cast out of the 469
members of the
Community Constitutional Conference. This gives him a free hand for
his
three-year
term of office, as is the case for other Arab and African presidential
systems.
Nevertheless,
without any formal strong check and balance, the Executive does face
an
"informal"
balance in the strong political autonomy of the traditional
leaderships (isimo).
Indeed, the
Charter recognizes their crucial mediation functions (Arts. 30, 8 and
18);
among the most
important of them is the role of selecting the representatives.
Differently
from the Guurti of Somaliland, in this case the Isimo have preferred
to
renounce more
defined roles that would have restricted their exercise of authority,
preferring to
maintain an uninstitutionalized ‘gray zone’ where they could
intervene
without any
defined restriction and with much more flexibility in order to achieve
a more
widespread
political consensus. It remains to be seen whether those recognized
powers
will remain in
place in the more complex and complete Constitution to come, at the
end
of the
transitional process.
This unceasing
search for the widest political consensus over issues and this concern
about
unanimity, manifested during the Constitutional Conference (which went
far
beyond the
scheduled fifteen days) show how a political tradition both resists
and
adapts itself
to modern politics. Freedom of association, including the right to
form
political
parties, however admitted (Art. 6.2, b), is de facto bypassed by a
non-party
system, where
different positions over issues are channeled through clan networks
and
interest
groups (economic, regional, religious and family groups). That does
not mean
that
opposition and disputes are definitively overcome, but that these are
rather voiced
through
interest groups.
The formation
of Puntland itself is the result of an intercommunity agreement
between all
Harti (Majeerteen
+ Dhulbahante + Warsangeli) communities of the North. Is a matter of
concern that
this agreement should start a border conflict with the neighboring
countries
or the others
de facto entities. Indeed, the Article 1. of the Charter establishes
the
borders along
the former regions and districts which comprise a Harti majority: Bari,
Nugaal, Sool,
southern Togdheer (Buuhoodle district), Mudug (with the exception of
Hobyo and
Xarardheere districts) and Southern, Eastern and North-Eastern Sanaag.
So
defined, the
Puntland State of Somalia claims sovereignty over territories that
constitute
part of
Somaliland (Sanaag, Sool and Togdheer).
That these
regions and districts constitute parts of Somaliland may be matter of
future
conflicts
between the two states. The communities of these districts did not
completely
take part in
the first constituent congress (shir beeleed) of 1991 in Burco which
declared
independence,
but did participate in the 1993 congress in Boorama which drew up the
first Charter
of Somaliland. Moreover, Somaliland, since the 1991 declaration, is in
search
of an
international recognition relying on the legal basis of its previous
short
independence
(only five days) before it merged with the former Italian Trusteeship
Territory of
Somalia in 1960.
The creation
of Puntland State of Somalia has, indeed, created a stalemate between
the
two entities.
Fortunately, it has not so far deteriorated to a military conflict,
maybe
thanks to the
Ethiopian political mediation between the two. The geographical
proximity
and the
economic dependence on Ethiopia, together with the open hostility of
Egypt and
the Arab
League towards the independence process in Somaliland lead to
unalignment of
the political
position of Somaliland to that of Ethiopia.
At the
present, the government of Somaliland is, indeed, unable to exert a
direct rule
over its
eastern part, which has largely joined Puntland. Maxmuud Fagadheh, a
Dhulbahante
from Eastern Somaliland, Foreign Affairs minister of the Cigaal
government,
is still in
the government of Somaliland. In the meantime, 213 delegates out of
the 469
to be present
at the Constitutional Conference of Puntland came from Eastern
Somaliland.
Sool and Sanaag sent 27 of the 69 representatives to the Parliament of
Puntland.
Maxamed Cabdi Xaashi, the former leader of dismissed USP, the leading
political
and military
faction in Eastern Somaliland, has been elected to the Vice-Presidency
of
Puntland, and
three of the nine cabinet ministers of Puntland come from the
contested
regions.
Moreover, an official statement of Harti traditional leaders (Isimo)
of Eastern
Somaliland
associated themselves with the process of formation of Puntland and,
so
doing,
legitimized this process, although the Isimo themselves are fully
entitled to be
part of the
Guurti (the Senate of elders of Somaliland). In other words, Eastern
Somaliland
might become a buffer zone between the two entities, without clearly
defined
sovereignty.
One of the
first effects of the formation of Puntland might be that Somaliland
government
gives up its claim of independence. In this perspective, the recent
declaration of
President Cigaal in favor of a confederation system for a united
Somalia,
after his
February journey in Egypt makes sense. A more long-term effect should
be the
proliferation
of other new regional entities as the product of intercommunity (interclan)
agreements.
Besides, Puntland itself, as it appears today, could be easily named
Hartiland. The
Charter itself, in Article 1.2, leaves the door open to further
additions to
Puntland
State, first of all "The community that participated in the
Garowe consultancy
meeting on
February 1998", the meeting which started the final phase of the
constitutional
process. This is a clear reference to the Marreexaan of Northern
Galgaduud,
which withdrew in the last stages of the process. Their further
participation
could
transform Puntland from a Northern Hartiland to a Northern Daaroodland.
In this
perspective, Somalia should take the form on the ground, which was
outlined by
the SSDF
network document in London 1994: a Federal Somalia founded on five
entities
corresponding
to the five large clan confederations - Dir (Isaaq + Ciise +
Gadabuursi) in
the northwest,
Northern Daarood in the north-east, Hawiye in the middle, Digil and
Mirifle
in the
interiverine area (Bakool e Baay), Southern Daarood in the TransJuba
area. A
similar
process is, indeed, restarting in the interiverine area after the push
out of SNA
from Baaydhaba
by the RRA, with the support of Ethiopian troops. On the contrary, one
in Hiiraan,
the other in TransJuba had different experiences. In Hiiraan the
process
started in May
1998. It was led by five ex USC (United Somali Congress)-SNA factions
(representing
five different Hawiye clans of the region), after their successful
‘secession’
from Caydiid's
movement. This process is still incomplete because it tried to embrace
the
whole Hawiye
clan family. A similar process in the TransJuba region has never
started
because of the
internal conflict between factions, among different Daarood movements
and the guri/galti
(indigenous/newcomers) conflict. Finally, it was definitively halted
by
the recent
seizure of Kismaayo by the combined forces of SNA and SNF.
Among the main
hindrances in the spreading of the pattern of regional reconstruction
processes are:
the pursuit of a centralist and anti-federalist approach by the joint
administration
of Mogadishu, and in particular by the SNA-Caydiid faction, and the
anti-clan and
unitary approach of the militant wing of the Islamist movement, based
mainly in the
Upper Juba region (Gedo) (but now threatened by the Ethiopian army),
but
with a strong
political presence in both Banaadir and Mogadishu. These two factors
are,
in a certain
way, bound together, even if the Islamist movement seems to have
dropped
its
‘taliban’ strategy of military conquest, after its failures at
Boosaaso in 1992 and in the
Ogaadeen
between 1996 and 1997. This movement now prefer to affect local
administrations
through its social and juridical programs.
Concluding remarks and options for the future
Both northern
regions, Somaliland and Puntland, were largely spared the civil
conflict
following the
dramatic collapse of Barre regime. This fact gives them an undeniable
asset
in respect to
the southern regions for a true implementation of reconciliation
process.
Even if they
have not been completely free of clan strife, the northern regions
still
preserve
strong societal ties. The institutional recognition of the role played
by the
traditional
leadership in Puntland in the seven-year period of peaceful
self-government in
a stateless
situation, has come only at the end of this process. However, the
mediation
role of the
elders has not been so successful in other regions of Somalia for
several
reasons.
Generally speaking, outside the Majeerteen context, Somali society
lacks a
stable
hierarchy of paramount chiefs, and it follows that mediation can
achieve only a
local
dimension. Nevertheless, in the northwestern regions (Somaliland) a
regionalist
feeling has
widely spread in the last thirty years. In this part of Somalia, after
the
collapse of
the State, the elders have collectively expressed this feeling better
than the
SNM,
frequently paralyzed by leadership competition. Such regional
affinities may be
reached in the
interiverine region, which has developed similar regionalist feelings
after
years of
ravaging war and exploitation by the former regime, even if the civil
conflict has
left room for
a confrontation between groups. Similar results are more hard to find
in the
Shabelle and
Juba regions because of the confused societal situation complicated by
the
civil war and
migrations.
What is going
on in Somalia from a political and constitutional point of view
represents a
defiance of
the territorial principle and roots of international law. There is no
doubt that
international
law is still playing and will play an important role in affecting the
future
juridical and
constitutional framework of local governments, but what we are seeing
throughout
Somalia (and in other part of Africa) is a re-appropriation of
imported
institutional
formulas by local political (and juridical) tradition. This involved
the issue of
the transplant
of western institutions and their encounter with the so-called
‘informal’
sector, which
as a concept has been by now enlarged to embrace not only the economic
but the
political and juridical dimensions. This issue is beyond the purpose
of this paper,
but has deep
influence on contemporary Somalia.
From a
territorial point of view, the birth of Puntland not only reopens the
whole question
of internal
borders in Somalia but also weakens the meaning of internal and
external
borders. They
remain (in accordance with international law) and even produce a
schizophrenic
proliferation of district and sub-district boundaries defining
community
homelands but,
in the meantime, generating the search for alternative and
‘informal’
solutions.
This is one of the reasons for the failure or the incomplete success
of the
formal
district governments and the better performances of the more flexible
and
a territorial
institutions such the Guurti and Isimo.
From this
point of view, the problem of sovereignty between Somaliland and
Puntland
that arises
from the participation of Sool and Sanaag in the latter's
constitutional
process is
simply eluded by the participation of Harti in the parliamentary
process and in
the government
of Somaliland. A similar process is smoothly developing between
Puntland
and the Somali
region of Ethiopia: though not widely known, some Ethiopian Harti
representatives
sit in the Puntland House of Representatives.
Similar
problems between regional entities may arise and similar solutions may
be found
when other
regional processes reach a more advanced stage. Hence, the formation
of
new entities
will not necessarily mean conflict, but contested territories should
play in
the future a
buffer role. The local concept of State sovereignty does not naturally
match
with the rigid
concept of State territory. Instead, it should expand in the
‘official’
territory of
other countries in a flexible way and wherever members of its
community are
found. This is
exactly one of the options offered to end the conflict and to
reconstruct
Somalia by the
LSE consultant to the European Union during 1995. Today, is
effectively
put into
effect in all Somali regions without respect of internal and external
borders.
From another
point of view, it is a slide back to a legal status of the community
group,
confirmed by a
citizenship which corresponds to kinship. These are new elements of
extreme
importance to those who are directly or indirectly committed to
developing
alternative
solutions in the African context, split up between State sovereignty
and
ethnic
allegiance. What is advancing in Somalia is a more flexible and a more
restricted
idea of what
the State is and means in Africa (and elsewhere).
[Country] |