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Opinions expressed in this column are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of SW. Somalia: the World Stampedes to renew its Commitment for Restoration of Unity, or, is it for Dismemberment? By Fatun Mohamed Hassan [Former Charge d’affaires of the Somalia Mission to the United Nations] And Abdalla Hirad Wednesday, October 09, 2002
The Stampede: During the first week of October 2000, several Somalia geared media outlets carried the news that there was reportedly a renewed interest in Somalia’s political situation as indicated by diplomats including Western diplomats who wanted their names and nationalities anonymous. On October 1, 2002, the Nairobi correspondent to the BBC, Somali Section, dispatched a report starting with the following (roughly translated) statement. “It has been reported that the International Community is watching Somalia with [renewed][1] interest and is playing an important role in the preparations towards the Reconciliation Conference to be held shortly in Kenya.” As if to back up words with action, other diplomatic efforts immediately followed the Press Conference. The Mogadishu Correspondent to the BBC, Somali Section, reported on October 2, 2002, that two, two-person delegations—one American and the other of the UN—arrived in Mogadishu that day. He further reported that Ambassador Winston Tubman (the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN) led the UN delegation to Mogadishu, while the American delegation was led by Mr. Glenn Warren from the American Embassy in Nairobi. The report added that the two delegations went their separate ways to meet various faction leaders in Mogadishu. Also, the Integrated Regional News Network (IRIN), the mouthpiece for the UN in the East Africa Region, reported earlier, on 26 Sep 2002, from Nairobi, about a UN Security Council call “… on Somalis to participate "constructively" in next month's national reconciliation conference”. By the same token, the Presidency of the European Union issued a declaration to back up the earlier Press Release of its Council of Ministers, reading as follows in its first sentence: “The EU unequivocally supports the IGAD sponsored peace and reconciliation process for Somalia, in line with the European Union Council Conclusions of 22 July 2002.” At a minimum, these diplomatic efforts have been seeking to drum up support for the Eldoret process for national reconciliation in Somalia. But the efforts also seemed concerted enough to suggest—indeed confirm—that there has been some renewed interest on the Somali question in general. However, only history will tell whether this will finally bring about the much needed peace and stability in Somalia, or whether the efforts will shrink into a diplomatic twaddle of sorts, as did the preceding thirteen attempts! In the meantime, the scramble for power, on the eve of the Conference, continues in Somalia. Power grabbing before the Conference has been the motivation behind the recent fighting over Baidowa and its environs, when the city changed hands from Colonel Nur’s to his rivals’. There is a rebut lurking in the horizon, in this regard. The fighting in Galkayo, of last week, although considered local, “apolitical” and “only clannish” could escalate, under the current scrabble for power, at this juncture. The Message to the Somalis: Just how far the World was willing to go to assist in resolving the Somali political crisis seems to have been first broken to the Somalis in the above mentioned Press Conference, reportedly held in Nairobi. According to the Somali Media members who were, apparently, specifically invited for the occasion of the Press Conference, the gist of the message has been as follows: 1. The international community has shown support for the Eldoret Conference, listing pledges of financial assistance to the Conference from the European, the United States, Germany, Italy, UK and the Arab League. 2. The international community will exert equal pressure on all parties to the conflict in Somalia to come to an agreement, further emphasizing that there is consensus [at the international level] that the Eldoret Conference must produce a framework for a future system of government for Somalia. 3. The Eldoret [initiative] is not a [cursory] reconciliation conference. Rather it is a process in search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia, consisting of several sequential components (phases). The first component involves a preparatory phase to explore the level of readiness for and possibilities and approaches for restoring government in Somalia. The second involves a follow-up and consolidation phase in which technical committees shall further examine and improve on the agreements reached during phase I. The third phase will be used for the ratification of the agreements reached on the framework for the future system of government in Somalia. A fourth phase, and the last, will involve discussions on a formula for sharing power in government. 4. “Somaliland” has refused to participate in Eldoret Conference, that they [the diplomats] respect its position and that no representation shall be allowed from “Somaliland”, unless accredited by the “Somaliland” administration. 5. The process will continue into next year, 2003, since all its phases could not be completed within the remaining few months of 2002. The Main Issues before the start of the Conference: Many of the above points are fine as general principles, which could potentially make a difference to the past 13 reconciliation conferences. However, ‘the devil is in the details’, as is commonly acknowledged. Despite the rush to action and the concerted diplomatic efforts, on the part of the international community to convene the Conference, some faction leaders in Somalia have publicly stated that they would not participate. They argued, among other things, that the work of the Technical Committee has not been all that transparent. In this regard, some faction leaders have argued that the representation scheme leaves out much to be desired in terms of fairness and balance between the various clans and regions in the country. Some have openly disagreed with the participation of the “civil society” groups, arguing that they have no dominion of their own. They also argued that individual faction leaders should select delegates representing the civil society groups. According to one report, some faction leaders “… resent the fact that delegates from civil society far outnumber backers of the faction leaders.” Yet, others have disagreed with the so-called “4.5-formula”[2], which, they feel, leaves out the “Jareer Weyn”, as a major clan in Somalia. Speaking of the so-called “4.5-formula”, we find it troubling in so far as the objective of the process, in the end, is the formation of a system of government. The goal of clan politics does not transcend the quest for mutual recognition; and it is not definitely a smart approach to running the affairs of a State. It is our strong belief that “clanism”—which is the value that the so-called “4.5-formula” could only, and would definitely, encourage—is almost always counterproductive. The recent past of the Transitional National Government (TNG) is only but an example. President Barre’s failed government is another case in point. Technically speaking, a clan entity—in the manner and the level conceived in the “formula”—does not constitute a community with a defined boundary within the State of Somalia. There is not one single clan among the so-called “4.5” that inhabits within the borders of Somalia in its entirety. Each of those clans—conceived within the so-called “formula”—is divided between the boundaries of the four countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. The clansman or woman inhabiting in, for example, the North of the country does not necessarily feel any closer to his or her kinsman or woman in the South than he or she would be to any other Somali in the same area. Even worse, clan entities do not necessarily guarantee the principles of civil and individual rights within the confines of the clan, if at all. If, however, the object of the so-called “4.5-formula”, or any scale of the same, is to be used as a token of the principle of “equality” at the initial phases, then it may fit the purpose of mutual recognition between the various sub-entities, at that juncture. In that case, they should be given equal representation for it to meet the psychological need, most effectively. In effect, the “4.5 formula” may only be good for the purpose of reconciliation in the early stages. It could also, if needed, be somehow symbolically reflected in the outcome as a palpable feature in the future system of government, so that it would give a permanent sense of belonging to all. But, the “4.5-formula” should never be used to account for the principle of “equitability”, which is—must be—the basis for the distribution of political power, economic benefits and development resources in the future of Somalia. That is where the “Arta outcomes” were most disconcerting. De-institutionalizing clanism may be difficult, but institutionalizing it afresh is fatally dangerous for the future state of Somalia. In our view, neither the legislative power nor the executive power should be allocated on the basis of any clan-based formula. The practice of the so-called “power-sharing” arrangements, usually superimposed on the constitution or the “charter “of the day, by scurrilous politicians, has remained Somalia’s most corrupting and idiotic trait in its political culture over the decades of its existence. The application of a clan-based formula will only encroach onto and erode the in-built mechanisms for the balance of power and political accountability. That is where the “formula” perhaps helps the position of the politicians, but remains dangerous for the state and its people. However, the single most controversial item that came in the Press Conference, held in Nairobi, related to the position on the question of “Somaliland”. If, indeed, the position of the international community on the question of “Somaliland” is as simple as expressed in the above mentioned Nairobi Press Conference, then Somalia’s future is in great jeopardy. The position as expressed in the Press Conference amounts to a policy of letting-“Somaliland”-loose, which is tantamount to deliberate dismemberment. At best, it makes an oxymoron of the intended message of the Press Conference, if at all. At worse, it bespeaks to a contradiction in policy, on the part of the countries and entities represented in the said Press Conference. Especially, this is true in the light of the fact that those diplomats had, in the same Press Conference, said that drastic actions would be taken against those who disrupt the efforts in search for peaceful solutions for the Somali conflict. The position proposed, as expressed in the Press Conference, is a double-edged sword as far as the principles of Somalia’s national unity and territorial integrity are concerned. In fact, the mere lack of clarity on this issue could be the Achilles’ heel of the Eldoret process. Worse even, the policy immediately poses a recipe for disaster, for the following reasons: 1. Somalia is never complete without the so-called “Somaliland” segment of its land and people; and no agreement excluding this part could, therefore, be considered final and binding; 2. There is no defined boundary of any so-called “Somaliland”; and, its claimed boundary, if at all, is very much overlapping with the boundary claimed by “Puntland” to the east. 3. The people within the claimed “Somaliland” boundary are divided among themselves on the question. For example, the people of Sool and Sanag are divided in their sentiments between Puntland” and “Somaliland”. Indeed, a good proportion of the people of these two regions (Sool and Sanag) considers itself citizens of “Puntland”. In addition, a good percentage of the people of Awdal region, to the west of Hargeisa, are also averted to the secession. There is, even, a significant population with anti-secession sentiments in and around Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera, which are argued to harbor the core of the separatist constituency.
The Conclusion: The rumors that the Conference may yet be postponed once again, have not, therefore, been surprising. Still, Ambassador Mwangale (the special envoy of President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya) has insisted that the meeting will start as planned and that it will not be postponed, according to a BBC correspondent, Somali Section, who had an interview with him recently. In the meantime, and by all indications, the start of the process appears too soon for the date of October 15, 2002. Despite this situation, all parties must arrive for participation in good time, so that “… the conference in Eldoret becomes a firm first step in a peace and reconciliation process that aims at progressively building consensus among the parties”, as the EU Presidency would have it. This can only mean that the Conference will first commence on the planned date of 15 October, 2000, in an open-ended manner, and in the hope that those invitees (groups or individuals), that fail to appear in time, shall be individually tackled through cajoling and arm-twisting. That is considered not so unrealistic, for good or for bad, given the circumstances. This approach may, for starters, easily define the threat of the international community to exert pressure on all the parties of Somalia to encourage all to participate, which, again, is the best the World can do under the prevailing circumstances. The question remains why is “Somaliland” exempted of this pressure? Without sounding apologetic for those who have been entertaining the merits of this ill-advised position, we have considered the possibility that the international community may have something positive up its sleeve. But we have failed to put a finger on it. Or, is the World community finally tired of the squeaks of the people of Somalia for unity, and is finally willing to endorse the disjointed agenda of the various strongmen and oligarchies (“Somaliland” only one among many) that have kept its people apart for more than a decade? Has the World come to accept that dismemberment is one of the options for the future of Somalia? Regardless of the impact on the future of Somalia, the policy of letting-“Somaliland”-loose poses the immediate threat of renewed tensions within “Somaliland”, itself. As two citizens of Somalis, borne and bred in the North of the country, we (the authors of this paper) hope that the renewed international interest does not rekindle disputes and hostilities within the most peaceful oasis of Somalia in the years past. But we are also concerned that such a policy will encourage dismemberment as a direct consequence. It may, also, generally enhance the further fragmentation of the State of Somalia, as we know it, into even smaller bits and pieces. Fortunately, the matter still remains in the hands of the Somali people (in the North and in the South), who must avert this tragedy—God forbid. They must ‘make hay while the sun shines’. In the meantime, the international community owes it to the people of Somalia to explain the mystery behind this pronounced rather myopic policy. Otherwise, the general framework and approach to resolving the crisis looks fine from a process perspective. The solutions to the issues (of who represents where and who?) will remain illusive, in the initial stages. And, with the familiar behavior of Somalia’s faction leaders and demagogues, improvising could sometimes result in situations more dangerous than the current reality. However, there is no substitute to pragmatism and repeated trials, under the murky waters of ‘politics a la Somalia’. In this regard, the pitfalls of the Arta Conference, as one of the last failures, should be used as a lesson.
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