- [SW Analysis]( Abdalla A. Hirad) Reconciliation
in Somalia in the wake of Col. Yusuf's Return to Power in Puntland
:Posted on 17 May 2002
Reconciliation
in Somalia in the wake of Col. Yusuf's Return to Power in Puntland
By: Abdalla A. Hirad, New York, USA
The demise of Colonel Jama A. Jama in losing the power over Puntland to
Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, last week, was a victory, for the
"militarist"
political group in Somalia. By all indications, the power changing hands
in
that region between the two colonels has been a telltale of yet another
cycle
of political impasse and stalemate in the Somali political reality, but
one
in which, once again, the militarists will have supremacy over the
"assemblists", in the upcoming seasons.
For a while-at least, since the doomed Arta Conference, two years ago-it
seemed that the "assemblists", the "Manifesto" to
some, were taking over the
power in Somalia. The militarists had only just begun to see the fruits
of a
decade-long struggle against the "Manifesto" in most of the
regions of
Somalia, when, in 1998-1999, Col. Nur (Shatigaduud) freed the Rahanweyne
captive population from Aideed's grip with the help of Ethiopia. Never
mind
the fact that both Aideed's armed faction of the day and Col.
Shatigaduud's
RRA do, in the final analysis, belong to the same political camp, the
militarists, as would transpire later. At that point, the country was
almost
in the grip of the militarists when, by some act of misfortune for them,
President Gheelle of Djibouti spoiled it all for them by introducing his
(by
now) toothless, anti-warlord, pro-civil society rhetoric, which predated
the
Arta Conference.
Well, the militarists had almost seized the power in the land, before
the
Djibouti intervention, if it was not for Egal's administration, which
has
been the only exception to the above classification. The Late Mr. Egal's
group, by far the most successful assemblist unit, had control under the
banner of "Somaliland" in the Hargeisa-Burao-Berbera
corridor". But, even
within "Somaliland", the Late Mr. Egal and his cohorts
in the Northwest have
been up in constant political struggle against their militarist
opposition,
the SNM, locally known as "Calancas", even when Egal thought
that he had
defeated them militarily in 1995.
The "assemblists" are commonly known as "Manifesto".
The "militarists" and
the "assemblists" have been the only two political forces
contending for
power ever since the start of the ongoing political debacle in 1991, in
earnest. The Islamists have been the only other form of political force
of
any significant influence in Somalia during the decade. Col. Jama's loss
of
power may signify a downhill trend for the assemblists, who essentially
draw
their support from a segment of the population loyal to the civilian
politicians of the sixties-roughly speaking. the core of the so-called
"Manifesto". In addition, the result of the Arta Conference
has also
indicated that the group has forged an alliance with two other groups of
politicians in as far as the TNG's composition can indicate. These
include
the Islamists and the technocrats in Barre's rule; even some military
personalities who
happen to be of little political significance of their own right, as
politicians. This hotchpotch of political groupings makes up the TNG. By
comparison, the militarists draw their support from that segment of the
population which still remain loyal to their clan origins and most of
whom
have been organized around the armed fronts in their struggle against
the
former regime. The RRA, founded under Col. Shatigaduud, is the exception
here, in that their front was founded later to free themselves from
another
front, long after the former regime had collapsed.
There seems to be not much difference between the two groups in either
their
solutions for the Somali question or in their political methods.
Both groups
appeal to clan sentiment for revenge and vengeance. Both groups resort
to
military power when the situation demands it. Both groups have indicated
a
tendency to impose government from the top and have shown little respect
for
public accountability and participation in government. Neither of the
two
groups have a political solution for the Somali crisis beyond their own
motivation to seek political control.
But, in general, the militarists often fare better with military methods
for
gaining power and the assemblists fare better at exploiting the bid for
power
by the clan elite, by promising governmental posts as an incentive for
their
support. Hence, they are 'assemblists' in the sense that they
assemble the
clans' traditional, civil and political leadership by buying support in
exchange for money and governmental posts. Although, even the
militarists
have resorted to this option, when they tried to establish government
under,
for example, Aideed's dictatorship-perhaps, knowing no better-Ali
Mahdi's
governments of the early 90s and, more recently, those of the TNG
provide a
vivid example of this tendency. Each of these governments had a cabinet
of
over eighty members.
The assemblists had their many moments of fame through out the decade
but had
failed to sustain their short-lived spans of euphoria; that is, except
in the
so-called "Somaliland" region of Somalia. One first occasion
was when their
famous "Manifesto"-from which the name was coined-appeared in
1990 only to be
crushed by Barre's, by-then, shaky regime. When they attempted to fill
the
vacuum left by Barre, just after his ouster, their chances for success
were
spoiled by forces loyal to President Barre, General Aideed, General
Gabyo and
Colonel Yusuf (although still detained in Ethiopia, at the time), each
for a
different reason.
They (the Manifesto) had the opportunity once again as a result of the
1991
Djibouti Conference with support from the governments of Djibouti, Egypt
and
Italy. Once again, General Aideed, et al, spoiled it for them. Since
their
failure to establish government after those 1991 "Djibouti
accords", the
"assemblists" have refashioned themselves in so many ways and
under so many
acronyms-the group of 12, the SSA, the TNG-under constantly shifting
alliances. Without a party-like organization or structure, commonly
shared
political value-orientations or a commitment to a political program by
these
political groups, shifting alliance have remained a constant feature of
their
personality composition. The militarist have had their share of shifting
alliances and splitting, too-evolving from SNA through various stages
into
the current SRRC.
Djibouti's intervention in 1999-2000 (actively involved to this day) has
only, perhaps, been a retry of its failed attempt of a decade ago. The
purpose, in hind sight, may have only been to reinstate its old clients,
the
"Manifesto", to power, immediately after President Gheelle
climbed to power
in that country. President Gheelle is a young and an industrious
President,
who had only just inherited a clan-based power-web and the political
legacy
of his uncle, former President Abtidoon. It has not been surprising at
all
that Egypt has also put its weight behind the Djibouti sponsored TNG,
either,
although a late comer into the process of the Arta Conference. Up to
about a
month before the culmination of the Arta Conference, it must be
remembered,
Egypt had been grooming Hussein Aideed in its struggle against the
formation
of an Ethiopian-backed government in Somalia, which it considers very
dangerous for its Nile Water policy interests. Whatever its other
independent
interests, the government of Djibouti-and the TNG for that matter-may
find
itself fighting a dangerous proxy war of words, if not of arms, for
Egypt. It
would be very difficult to explain Djibouti's role in the current
affairs of
Somalia otherwise.
The Djibouti Government should have been the first among all
countries to
understand that the TNG is not representative and that there is a need
for an
open policy approach to reconciliation. So far, the TNG's role in
relation to
the Government of Djibouti has sounded like a puppet government. The
question
is for what? What is the Government of Djibouti trying to achieve here?
If
Gheelle is trying to help Somalia stand on its feet again, and prevent
it
from falling prey to Ethiopia, as he claims, then he has to change his
methods and tactics immediately.
Many Somalis have come to realize the gravity of the pitfalls of the
third
Djibouti sponsored reconciliation Conference. President Gheelle first
waged a
war of words on a group of so-called warlords from the UN General
Assembly
podium of 1999. He held them squarely responsible for the Somali
debacle,
promising that his government would intervene to reestablish government
in
Somalia within 12 months, by empowering the "civil society" in
Somalia.
Gheelle's government had by the next General Assembly session formed
some
form of structure for Somalia in Djibouti. It had called the
Transitional
National Government and dumped it on Mogadishu, a day after it was
formed, by
sending the newly elected puppet President and had even brought him to
the UN
for a show, five days after his "election", if you could call
that an
election.
However, a few things were already amiss. The new structure comprised
members
of the old "Manifesto" political group, only colored by
elements of Barre's
technocrats and loyalists and by some Islamists. The structure had
hardly
anything to do with "civil society". Almost all of those
spearheading the
so-called Arta Process have all, earlier, lost power to the militarists
in
their respective territories of influence and of political control.
Take, as
an example, Abdullahi Boqor Musa, Hassan Abshir, Mohamed Abshir and
others
from Puntland who have lost to Abdullahi Yusuf. Consider Jama Ghalib,
Abdurahman Ahmed Ali "Tur" and Ismail Hurre (Bubba), who had
lost to Egal.
Also, take the example of Ali Mahdi, Hussein Bood and AbdiQassim Salad,
all
of whom have given up on defeating Aideed, Yalahow, Atto and their
company.
But most importantly, the Government of Djibouti had reneged in its
promise
to empower "civil society", and by this, it failed the hopes
of the Somali
people and deceived the rest of the World. In fact, it alienated
"the civil
society" groups, who have attended from all parts of Somalia. Most
significantly, the Government of Djibouti abused the trust of the IGAD
countries by hijacking the process to fulfill its own interests. It put
a lid
on the process as far as its would-be regional and international
partners
were concerned and ran a tight ship as far as the choices for the Somali
participants were concerned. Suffice it to say here that it has been a
shame
that it did that after conveniently obtaining IGAD's mandate and the
blessings of the Somali masses.
President Gheelle, it seems, had laid the foundation for the
non-participation of the so-called warlords in the Arta Conference from
the
start, thereby denying his Conference the benefit of a broad-based
participation. He had accused the so-called warlords for everything that
went
wrong in Somalia and threatened, in no uncertain terms, that he would
strip
them bare of power in favor of what he had called "the civil
society". He
then sent them invitations to participate in his promised game of
political
re-engineering of the Somali political landscape and process. It became
soon
apparent to some-and not the least to the faction leaders-that the
Government
of Djibouti had some ulterior motives.
It has become clear to many, in hind sight, that the Djibouti Government
may
have, all along, had an intention to bring its clients back to power
again,
after its failed attempt, earlier, in 1991. It tackled this task, it
seems,
by initially scaring away their opposition (the so-called warlords) and
by
single-handedly hijacking the process to declare their clients as the
winners
in its self-staged contest of the 'Manifesto' for power, without the
presence
of the opposition. As if to add insult to injury the Government of
Djibouti
continues to claim that it has empowered "civil society". If
honest, in any
sense of the word, the Djibouti Government failed to see the difference
between the process of reconciliation and the act of forming a
government,
which can only come at the end of that process. The fact remains that
they
seemed to hastily emphasize the formation of a government rather than
that
process, which could have brought about a representative government.
The formation of the SRRC in response to the installation of the TNG in
2001
was not, therefore, surprising, politically speaking. Thanks to the
misguided
and ill-fated diplomacy of the Djibouti Government, which had spared
them the
support of a disgruntled Ethiopia within the folds of IGAD-an
opportunity
welcomed by an otherwise ridiculed consortium of faction leaders and
their
disenchanted supporting population. Since then, it meant an uphill
battle for
the TNG, despite its recognition by the United Nations, and some
regional
groups, most significant of which is the League of Arab States-not
surprising
at all, with Egypt at its helm, for that matter.
Given the above, Col. Yusuf's military takeover of Puntland and his
denial of
Col. Jama to preside over Puntland is nothing personal. Col. Yusuf may
have
concerns beyond Puntland. For now, the concerns over the freedoms and
choices
of the peoples of Puntland are not uppermost in the reality of Col.
Yusuf,
who enjoys the support of a significant proportion of the population of
Puntland, for obvious reasons. His motivation appears more related to
other
factors. Col. Yusuf has yet to attend to some unfinished business with
the
Government of Djibouti, who has sought to undermine his authority in
favor of
his political arch-enemies, primarily within Puntland, and the TNG,
which had
helped oust him by financing the movement, which had brought down his
government. Col. Jama has appeared to him as an ally of both.
Another motive may, perhaps, be to continue to lead his flocks in
Puntland in
the march towards a united Somalia, or lead himself to one of the top
seats
of a future Somali government-whichever way one may wish to look at it.
The
Colonel seems to think that no one other than himself has the political
credentials, in Puntland, to merit this honor. While a significant
number of
the population of Puntland agrees with this, only a few other political
personalities could wear his shoes in this regard-Shatigaduud, Yalahow
and
perhaps, the Late General Aideed included.
Puntland's change of hands is a significant blow for the TNG and for the
Government of Djibouti's Somalia related policy. It is also a
triumph for
"Somaliland", the SRRC, and for their disenchanted
populations. The event
envisions the need for a re-evaluation of the process of reconciliation
in
Somalia and, particularly, the Kenyan-led, ongoing, IGAD sponsored
efforts.
Both the United Nations and the League of Arab States must re-examine
their
political stances towards Somalia and, particularly, their views towards
the
status quo. The TNG has neither been a uniting entity nor has it ever
had the
potential of unifying all the contending political forces for that
matter.
But most immediately, countries like Djibouti, Egypt and Ethiopia must
change
their approach to intervention for peace in Somalia and must come out
clean
in their support for the people of Somalia in its entirety, if at all,
rather
than taking sides with individuals or groups of factions. They should
never
use the camouflage of assisting Somalia in the pursuit of their own
selfish
interests. Alternatively, these countries can wash their dirty laundries
elsewhere and must, indeed, conduct their wars within their respective
boundaries. The people of Somalia are sick and tired of fighting proxy
wars.
Pending the settlement of the dust of the latest battles between the two
groups in Puntland, the Southwest of Somalia remains a troubled zone.
Here,
the competition for control is felt most intensely on the eve of the
ever
dragging-on preparations for the IGAD-sponsored Reconciliation efforts
in
Nairobi. The region is slowly bleeding to death and the exodus is at its
highest into Kenya while the government of that country is struggling
very
hard to host a meeting between the men who are causing the havoc in the
same
region from which the refugees are fleeing. It is note-worthy to mention
in
passing, that, for a while-that is, until the installation of the
TNG-all the
regions of Somalia have been experiencing a lull towards stability,
which was
gradually giving way to a cooling off period. No sooner than the
installation
of the TNG, who immediately saw itself as the government de jure, did
the
World see an escalated degree of fighting and political instability in
all
parts of Somalia.
Now that Col. Yusuf has reclaimed his power over Puntland, Somalia will
yearn
for peace and stability more than ever before. Shatigaduud's Southwest
Regional Government claims jurisdiction over the whole southwest of
Somalia,
from Huddur to Buulo-Xaawo to Kismayo. The TNG allied forces are engaged
in
constant skirmishes with SRRC forces in Gedo. Abdullahi Yusuf's
interests in
Kismayo can complicate matters even more. With the passing away of the
Late
Mr. Igal, one could only hope that peace will continue to prevail over
the
communities in the Northwest and the planned elections within the region
can-God forbid--yield to fresh political tensions. With all those
developments in place, the situation is a recipe for escalated
insecurity in
the country, especially on the eve of the upcoming Reconciliation
Conference
in Nairobi. Under the circumstances, and in response to these
developments,
the TNG may even become more motivated to seek power by the use of
violent
methods. Already there is talk of AbdiQassim threatening to open the
Mogadishu seaport by force.
However, there has been perhaps more than a shred of hope that the
people of
Somalia are gradually emancipating from the culture of violence to a
culture
of peace and civility in solving there political problems. The resolve
of the
Puntland people and leadership, on all sides, to exercise restraint and
not
to resort to war as a means for resolving political conflict has been a
very
vivid example. The news that Col. Jama has laid down his arms and
disbanded
his forces out of concern for piece in the region must be welcome and
indeed
be encouraged. In the meantime, however, Col. Yusuf must ensure that
peace
and stability should return to the region. His regime must seek civil
and
democratic methods for re-establishing the rule of law. The opposition
within
must be tolerated and a term of office for his new administration,
beyond
which free and fare elections will be conducted in the region, must be
declared. Towards this end, the traditional leadership, the local groups
of
nationalists and civil libertarians, and all the other forms of
leaderships,
must engage themselves constructively and peacefully in the interest of
stability and the reinstitution of government in the region by engaging
in an
effective dialogue with Col. Yusuf's leadership.
[ Analysis] |
