19 May 2007 04:20

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  • [SW Column] (Abdirizak A. Hassan - Durqun ) The Nature of Warlordism: Insights and Analysis. :Posted on 19 March 2003

Opinions expressed in this column are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of SW.


 

The Nature of Warlordism:Insights and Analysis.

By:Abdirizak Adam Hassan (Durqun)

Ottawa, Ontario. Canada

Email:ceaser24@hotmail.com 

 

 

Warlordism as a paradigm is not a recent phenomenon to the field of factional rivalry and power politics. Many political philosophers wrote extensively on this condition of state absence and lawlessness. Thomas Hobbes, an English political philosopher of 17th-century described such a scenario as "hell on earth", and life becomes " nasty, brutish and short". Others Thought such a condition of life as "unthinkable, natural and barbaric" (John Locke), as "the day of the cannibal, Zero Hour, revealing the real man" ( Fredrick Hegel), and as "the day of the coward and the dread of the brave, cultural suicide and undoing civilization" (Jacques Rousseau). What this means is that the old world has witnessed and grabbled with what can become of the human existence in the absence of overarching conventions of a commonwealth that would indiscriminately uphold and exercise the enforcement of the law for the common survival of the society. To most of us, warlordism appears as a relatively new innovation by Somali warlords just because we are conditioned by, and accustomed to, an orderly peaceful existence provided by the state through the enforcement of law and order. Thus, we didn't know what to think of a situation where there is no state to foster us and provide basic security guarantees for us. The reality of life in southern Somalia can be best understood in shifting our thinking away from the lulling view of warlordism as a brief, circumstantial and interim situation that could be easily overcome once law and order returns. We should rather think of warlordism as a self-contained phenomena, and a full fledged known paradigm that has a substantive existence of its own right.  It is a state of existence that draws its validation by default due to the absence of enforceable legal order. It has a de-facto underpinning of a legitimate operational practicality by the sole virtue of the absence of any credible challenge. And, it is a self-perpetuating bstinate state of power politics that is here to stay, unless proven otherwise. The only thing political about warlordism is the fact it acts and plans for its survival which can be only achieved through securing the supremacy and the upper hand for the control of the country, region,city or fiefdom. The rest of its manifestations are all-out belligerence of personal nature. Despite that, I argue, worlordism is not all about drunkenness and mayhem; it has a life (reason), sense of direction (goal) and adheres unto its own norms (laws) - albeit laws that don't make sense.
 
The life of a typical warlord could be characterized as being paranoid at best, if not schizophrenic. Like all criminals at lose, his life is plagued with a constant and impeding insecurity and suspicion. He secretly harbors the unsettling realization that he has inflicted gross inhumanities to many people and looted many public and private wealth; and he would logically want to get away with it. Trying to get away with it, however, requires a towering vigil and expediency from his part to identify, predict and eliminate what he regards as a potential source of danger to himself. As a result, the worst kind of fear ( the bodily one) is the hallmark of the life of a warlord and it is what makes him tick. Warlordism as a profession, thus, thrives on the dynamics of sheer survival and that is what gives life and reason for the justification of its core operational norms (laws) of shrewd plotting and cold brutality. Consequently, you can expect everything from a warlord but to willingly undo himself by dismantling his power-base for the sake of the nation, his own family or anything in-between.
 
The goal of a warlord is to deny justice as we know it and replace it with a justice of his own making and taste. It is a justice that would polish him as a benevolent moral statesman and as a hero who has struggled and dearly sacrificed for the common good of the nation as a whole. It is a justice that must erase his shameful past and purge all traces of his criminality by compelling the nation to  submit to his wanton desires of survival, wealth, fame and power. A warlord can never conceive of any other way out of this predicament of his own making, except through the choice between two evils: (a) the  inevitable continuation of the mayhem, and (b) the eventual wise decision of the people to let him realize his goal of reaching the apex of power by becoming the head of the state. His will to power is intimately connected with his will to  live. Hypothetically, even if the nascent state promises a grant of a retroactive blanket amnesty for the warlords, it would not be a sufficient guarantee for their insatiable security needs. This underlines how entrenched is the resolve of a warlord and as far as he is concerned, he is here to stay.
 
The operational norms (laws) of Warlordism are simple, unwritten and tactical in nature. They are not "laws" per se, but laws nevertheless, in as much as they make sense and can be explained by the rational mind. They are akin to the raw tenets of balance of power and the logic of maximizing gains. Sometimes securing any scant of a relative gain over other warlords might be about enough for a given warlord. Often times, however, a warlord of good standing may raise the stakes and aim for an absolute gain. When such a warlord emerges, the rest of the warlords would suddenly cease all active hostilities between them and form a tactical alliance for the purpose of confronting him. Curiously though, even if the alliance succeeds in defeating their common enemy, it would not go the extra mile and form a government.  What may explain this unwitting loss of opportunity is primarily the simple fact that forming a government and thereby ending warlordism would involve the emergence of one of them as the leader, and that spells as horrific a scenario as the one they just collectively defeated. Their need (use) for each other stops there and they would invariably resume their perpetual enmity of each other. A warlord for a warlord is both a sworn enemy and an occasional tactical ally (savior). This neurosis that trips between [H]ate-love dichotomy stems from the dictates of being realistic and not letting lofty ideals of any kind undermine ones sacred desire for survival and perseverance. It is what gives credence to the old classical theories of balance of power and Real-Politick which are the passionate breechings of realism.
 
Interestingly, this is where the meaning of anarchy gets its philosophical depth of understanding. A well-rounded, broad view of how anarchy and fear affect both the minds of the people and the warlords, would make us understand better why many seemingly senseless atrocities are taking place. This narrative hasn't been giving any fair emphasis on the atrocities of warlords. The purpose of the paper was to shed some light on warlordism as a paradigm and to provide some insights and analysis in its attributes and dynamics. As most people would agree the major conundrum about the culture of warlordism is the anarchy of disorder that it imposes on the society. Due to its prevalence, randomness and unpredictability anarchy takes its toll in every aspect of social living. Inversely, however, a typical warlord may view order itself as the source of anarchy as a semblance of order may quickly grow in size and capacity by gaining the allegiance of the war weary population. That in turn, quickly renders him powerless and terrified as he then becomes exposed to the due process of the law. While the anarchy of disorder is understandable to all people, the anarchy of order is only understandable to a criminalized soul and a counter-culture warlord.
 
One should not confuse warlordism with power hungary dictators. Although they are similar in many ways, they are inherently different in many other important ways. A dictator is usually a head of a state and he strives to remain in power as long as possible. What is significant about this, is the fact that, according to current international norms, he holds the power legitimately. In addition, a dictator may sometimes have a measure of the common-good in mind and excessively seeks to instill law and order in his country. In contrast a warlord loathes order, the common-good and laws other than his own. He would want to become the head of the state but he can realize most of his immediate goals without being one. In modern history, the world has seen many dictators and some of them have been - despite varying brutalities - timely saviors of their respective nations, such as Mao, Stalin, Nasser and others. Most of them, however, have ruined their nations and their lives beyond redemption. They lost everything including their souls while dashing the hopes and aspirations of their people, such as Barre, Mbuto and others. In today's world warlordism emerged in few places like Somalia, Afghanistan and others. Warlords could be viewed as individuals whose lives have been devoid of moral restraints and who has been leading depraved lives both morally and materially. The elapse of order gave them a window of opportunity to at least do away with their material depravity through looting and appropriating. Hence there is nothing more to warlordism than the desire to reap the bountifulness of the country, while trying to further the time lag of the law ideally forever or as much as they can. Many dictators have been toppled either by way of reforms or organized resistance. Warlords, on the hand are far more difficult to overcome them. To overcome the warlords in Afghanistan, it took no less than the massive attack of the American military. And even then, Afghanistan is still a hotbed of active warlordism. Similarly, 30 nations spearheaded by the US tried to pacify Somali warlords and utterly failed.
 
World recognition and support, notwithstanding, mediocre dictators often  deteriorate into the level of warlords in their governance and leadership style. When a dictator realizes that his public hatred is hopelessly stable at its peak and that the affairs of the nation is in progressive decline, he becomes wary of his people and starts to undermine the integrity of state institutions. This simplifies his total control of the nation as it renders all legal jurisprudence and administrative lingo to boil down into the flip-flops of his mind. He soon realizes that he can not control the country through order because the people now regard him as a mere scheming rascal and a criminal. If keeping the order was his initial flip, he now takes a flop by creating disorder. He declares segment(s) of the society as the enemy of the nation and that they must be eradicated. Pitting groups against groups makes him the powerful arbitrator. Through the institutionalization of disorder and fear, he believes, most of the society  would want to ally themselves with the powerful. Institutionalization of disorder, thus shifts the whole debate of the common-good into a group survival, in which the dictator sees his survival too. This opens a rare opportunity for the slum boys and the ruffians of the society to take the arms and wage the ugly internal war of the dictator. They quickly pick up the simplicity of his governance and excel in it. The country falls for them but they do not want to reinstall a state because they are conscious of the crimes they have done. This is the birth place of Warlordism.
 
Neither the failed dictators nor the warlords after them, are fully cognizant of what their fate and that of their culture would ultimately be. It is a grim political reality usually referred to as the "race to the bottom". To borrow a phrase from aeronautics, it is akin to when an aircraft takes a "nose-dive"; unrestrained and irreversible. The pilot who might think that he is making it to a taxiway is either impaired or possessed by heavenly aliens. If dictators were the harbingers of warlords by sponsoring controlled violence, warlords are the harbingers of cultural suicide by sponsoring a diffused violence. They are taking the entire nation onto a one track trajectory towards sure doom. Since violence begets even more violence, Somalia has now more warlords than 1991, because warlordism tends to breed its kind and mutate every so often, until violence becomes so diffused to the point of "man against man". The warlord who might think that he would benefit from the cultural death of his nation and still survive is either mimicking angels or aping God. In order to understand what "the race to the bottom" may entail, we only have to listen what the philosophers had to say.
 
The foregoing does not do any justice to the full understanding of all about warlordism. It is more complex than that. But if the above litany could be considered as a fair sketch of warlordism, the question that comes to mind is,  who qualifies as a warlord among the competing Somali faction leaders? Those, I would say, who always whine and wiggle to undermine all Somali Reconciliation Conferences. Those who would rather keep their fiefdoms than opt for the rebirth of a Somali state. Those who would never visit other Somali regions outside their control, for consensus building and political consultations. A warlord doesn't have the luxury of being diplomatic. Diplomats juggle many probable option while a warlord - because of his criminal past - does not have other alternatives besides remaining a warlord.

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