Regrettable Episode
Unfolding Again!!
By
Roobdoon Forum
__________________
Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi’s recent comments
on the issue of “One Somalia” principle (or Somali
Weyn concept) raised some eyebrows
[1]. The Prime
Minister spoke about the relations between the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the neighbouring
countries of Kenya and Ethiopia, pointing out that there is
no territorial (and people) dispute between them. Ghedi’s
comments underlined that Somalia and its neighbours
together, as IGAD members, could form the starting point for
securing stability in the region and building an economic
and political cooperation. This, in turn, can guarantee the
basis for a new socio-political framework of permanent
well-being of all Somalis in the Horn of Africa.
This “optimistic outreach” has been interpreted differently,
especially Somalis in the Diaspora. However, the majority
of the Somalis in the Diaspora insist that Ghedi chose to
shorten his journey to political ascendancy; and more
importantly, the new TFG which also opted to mute Somali
Weyn cause will surely find itself navigating in
unmarked, maybe dangerous waters, like the elected 1967
civil government. To realize to the extent of the problem,
many Somalis in the Diaspora have never, to begin with,
accepted the peace-brokered efforts of Ethiopia and Kenya as
genuine; they believe that it was a careful orchestrated
scheme set up to lead Somalis to relax its Somali
Weyn vigilance. In gathering places, you see Somalis
fiercely debating whether any peace brokered by Somali
neighbours could be real!
Furthermore, some political analysts have recently drawn to
the conclusion that the Somali nation-State, as it was
before the civil wars, is hardly to re-emerge. Yet, as an
ethnic group, Somalis do play a vital role in the stability
and the development of the region. This paradox is
seemingly but exceptionally contradictory. Somali nomads
were roaming in the Somali Peninsula for centuries, mostly
without a Central Authority. Despite the many instances of
clan-warfare, dismemberment, and anarchy, Somalis have
always maintained the capabilities to deflect any permanent
domination/occupation. There is always a common Somali
denominator in the minds of the nomads, even though it does
not manifest in their dealings of clan-politics. Therefore,
foreign observers often find difficult to read nomads’
clan-politics; and therefore reach an elusive conclusion
which frequently manifest itself in futile. This short paper
will therefore attempt to reflect on the history of foreign
complicity and manipulation in making “One Somalia”
principle somehow redeemable.
Since 1991, Somali neighbours (particularly, Ethiopia and
Kenya) have launched a series of political maneuvers to
realize their determination of convincing the general Somali
populace to swallow the unassailable Somali Weyn
identity and unification. Taking advantage of the current
Somali debacle, our neighbours have regularly intimidated
Somali clan-elders, faction leaders/warlords, and regional
leaders to first and foremost abandon any attempts that
unify the Somalis and thus regenerate challenges against the
existence artificial boundaries inherited from the European
colonial administrations in the region. Thus, whenever a
Somali peace reconciliation conference is held in Ethiopia
or Kenya, the host takes a more drastic, but obvious covert
actions to indicate to the Somalis that its toleration of
any tendencies of Somali Weyn is wearing thin.
However, failure of such political maneuvers to generate the
desired intimidating effect will surely force the
neighbouring countries to resort to either more reckless
military attacks on Somalia or galvanize the West to
“contain” Somalia for them. To measure Kenya and Ethiopia’s
success or failure in resolving the territorial disputes,
one has to look back the 1960s conflicts in the region.
The
1960s Scenario
At the inception of the Somali Republic in July 1st
1960, Somali leaders openly put forth their ambitions to
rehabilitate the sovereignty of all Somalis in the Horn of
Africa, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the
Northern Frontier District/Province of Kenya. This
political line has immediately strained the relations
between the new born Somali Republic and Ethiopia. For some
time, the two sides accused each other for territorial
violation and armed aggression on its borders. These border
clashes led Somalia to seek military aid from the former
U.S.S.R. On an interview conducted in English at his office
in November 30, 1963, the Prime Minister of Somalia,
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, declared that “military aid
promised by the Soviet Union is being accepted only because
Somalia must defend itself from the Ethiopian attacks and
pillaging of the Somali peoples.” Premier Shermarke also
explained Somalia’s critical dilemma from an economic stand
point in which he underlined that “ Somalia’s treasury could
not much longer cope with the problem of feeding and
sheltering thousands of Somali refugees”, escaping from the
mayhem caused by the Ethiopian soldiers in the Ogaden region
[2].
Extensive Political and media provocations between the two
sides have instigated a sudden but sporadic bloody border
clashes, as early as January of 1964. The Somali Foreign
Minister, Abdullahi Isse Mohamud had submitted an
official protest letter to the Ethiopian Ambassador in
Mogadishu, Ahadu Sabura. By March of that year, the
conflict widened into a full-scale war, both arms
confronting at border between Somalia and Ethiopia. In
these border clashes, Ethiopian military planes destroyed
numerous police posts and civilian houses inside Somalia.
Ethiopian military campaigns caused indiscriminate killings
of civilians and wounding many others. Ethiopian border
soldiers raided livestock belonging to Somali nomads and
opened fire when the nomads resisted.
Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to form a mutual defense
pact that they referred as “a joint measures of dealing with
the Somali disturbances” – a move which Somalis considered
“as contrary to the spirit of the OAU”
[3]. The few
reconciliation efforts, in regional level, that have been
arranged also failed to produce any peace settlements. At
the Organization for African Union (OAU) Summit
Conference in Cairo (July 23, 1964), African leaders
have attempted to reach a ‘Resolution’ that satisfies on
both sides; however, it failed to do so. Somali News in
Mogadishu published that “Somalia will not be bound by the
OAU ruling [which states] that its member-States’ present
frontier are to be maintained”, in which the Somali National
Assembly had passed a motion against OAU ruling, in October
of 1964. That is, the Somali government officially rejected
the outcome of the Cairo Conference, regarding on frontier
issues.
In a net assessment of the outcome of the Somali-Ethiopian
border skirmishes is that Super Power interventions in the
region have officially began. Somali sought the military
and technical aid of the Soviets; while the Ethiopian regime
involved actively in convincing, as it seems, the American
Administration to tackle Somali Weyn cause.
In September 1974, a conference held in Washington,
sponsored by the Center for the National Security Studies
was presented proceedings and papers on the subject of “The
CIA and Covert Action”. Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy
presented a comprehensive piece of research which is, as
they state, based on both written sources and many oral
conversations that they had with US decision-makers and
foreign policy officials who supplied them many of their
research discourse [4].
The title of their research paper is: Following the
Scenario: Reflection on Five Case Histories in the Mode and
Aftermath of CIA Intervention.
Morris and Mauzy unveil that the U. S. Central Intelligence
Agency had been clandestinely funneling mainly a financial
support to the political actors in Somalia since mid 1960s,
in an effort to ward off Somali Weyn tendencies
inside top brass leadership. In 1967 election campaigns,
for example, the CIA provided thousands of dollars to assist
in the election of the Prime late Prime Minister Mohamed
Haji Ibrahim Egal and some of his fellow Somali Youth
League (SYL) members. Here is a selection from Morris and
Mauzy’s case history of CIA ‘campaign of financing’ in the
1967 Somali elections:
An impoverished land of less than three million along the
northeastern coast of Africa where the Indian Ocean meets
the Gulf of Aden, Somalia was of concern to Washington for a
number of reasons. Irredentist claims threatened border
warfare with both Kenya and Ethiopia, the latter a
long-time U.S. client state under Haile Selassie and the
site of a major intelligence base. Somalia was also an
early recipient of Soviet aid in Africa, and its coastline
held potentially strategic ports for any future rivalry in
the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, an interest shared by
France and Britain. At that, however, the country was
apparently not an urgent concern in U.S. diplomacy. When
Somalia predictably rejected a 1963 American offer of
"defensive" arms, conditioned on the exclusion of all other
supplies, the State Department leaked its "displeasure" but
seemingly did no more.
Over the next four years, 1963-1967, official U.S.-Somali
relations were distant and U.S. aid next to nothing while
Somali leaders visited the Soviet bloc, Somali newspapers
published anti-American forgeries planted by Soviet
intelligence, and the country fought a brief but bloody
border war with Ethiopia. Then suddenly, early in 1967,
history took a turn for the better. President Abd-i-Rashid
Shermarke was elected for a six-year term as President in
June and in July appointed as Premier Muhammad Egal,
American-educated and avowedly pro-Western. By fall, U.S.
aid was resumed in amounts twice the previous total since
independence, and Somalia had concluded a border agreement
with Ethiopia [see the footnote to read the 1967-68
Somali Border Agreements with Ethiopia and Kenya] [5].
In 1968 Egal visited the United States, following a visit to
Somalia by Vice President Humphrey, and was hailed by
President Johnson as "enormously constructive in a troubled
area of Africa." What the two leaders did not discuss, say
official sources, was how "constructive" the CIA had been
for Mr. Egal, whose rise, to power was reportedly
facilitated by thousands of dollars in covert support to
Egal and other pro-Western elements in the ruling Somali
Youth League party prior to the 1967 Presidential election.
In retrospect, this clandestine bankrolling in Somalia seems
very modest by CIA standards, only a tiny fraction of what
the Agency has spent in a month in Southeast Asia or even
what it spent in the Congo in the early sixties. And its
immediate benefits-in rising U.S. influence, in the detente
with a grateful Ethiopia-no doubt seemed real enough at the
time. In any event, several sources say the subsidies were
discontinued in 1968. But the withdrawal was to be perhaps
too late. On October 15, 1969, while Egal was again
visiting the United States, President Shermarke was
assassinated. A week later the Army seized power,
dissolving the National Assembly and Constitution and
arresting the entire Cabinet, including Egal. Among the
charges against Egal would be corruption of the electoral
process and complicity with foreign intelligence services.
Ironically, the bizarre CIA political contributions before
1967 may have been a decisive factor in the eventual fall of
the Agency's candidate [6].
Reflecting the unwise decisions made by the CIA about its
covert political interventions and subsidies, Premier Egal’s
government lasted less than three years. In October 21st
1969, a military led coup d'état replaced the civilian
government, detaining and charging (as mentioned above) the
civilian Prime Minister of ‘complicity with foreign
intelligence’. The military men have actually spoiled the
CIA agenda – whether this was also instance of complicity of
another foreign factor/s or genuine local revolutionary
respond that vehemently opposed to the unfolding scenarios
of border agreements, is debatable. However, one thing was
sure: the military takeover was a bloodless transition that
succeeded to frustrate the pro-American elements in the
country and ended the American subsidiary civilian
government. Italian writer, Luigi Pestalozza, who
observed and recorded the early unfolding events of the
Somali military Revolution states that “No tears were shed
for the men who thus left the stage forever, disappearing
from the [political] history of Somalia
[7].”
The military regime soon declared to the commitments of
“Greater Somali” doctrine, stressing that colonialism comes
in all shades: White and Black – i.e. there are both White
(European) and Black (referring to Ethiopians) colonizers.
Despite the ousted government’s ‘marathon’ Border
Agreements, the revolutionary regime simply regarded all
border treaties as null and void; and thus an atmosphere of
“no war and no peace” was created in the region.
The Somali military leadership also declared without
hesitation that they will employ the use of force, as an
ultimate answer, to unite Somalis in the region and resolve
the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. The
leader of the Somali Revolution, Mohamad Siyad
Barre, expressed his dissatisfaction with the OAU and
the UN efforts to solve the prolonged Somali dilemma; and
subsequently, he prepared the Somali nation to go to war.
Therefore, the lessons to be learned from the 1960s’ foreign
intervention in the politics of the Somali State have been
disastrous. So far, all the previous means utilized by
foreign forces/agencies to intervene in Somali politics –
including misinformation, manipulation, and conspiracy
against the Somali nation-State – produced bad harvests or
may I say remained in the memories of few Somali
individuals.
Premier Ghedi’s Remarks: Flippant or Optimistic Outreach
Unless we overturn Premier Ghedi’s remarks (on Somali
Weyn issue) and read it in the context of ‘optimistic
outreach’, mainly catered to the ‘spirit’ of IGAD
propositions and efforts of regional stability and
cooperation, the 1960s futile strategies of “I jiid aan
ku jiidee” scenario inside the Somali parliament seems
unfolding again. For example, in mid 1964, an uproar and
misunderstanding created a heated debate in the parliament,
splitting the Somali National Assembly when the then Prime
Minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein put forth a
sensitive program on the table, regarding the issue of
Somali Weyn. Regrettably, the program was
named: “The Destiny of the Somalis Living in Ethiopian
Territory and NFD.” The importance and the sensitivity of
the Somali Weyn feelings, inside the walls of
the Somali Parliament, have been recorded expressively by
Jeanne Contini in this manner:
All opposition speakers chose to interpret the reference to
“in Ethiopian territory, etc.” as government acknowledgment
of Ethiopian and Kenyan Sovereignty over Somali in-habited
areas, thus concluding that the government had no intention
of liberating the territories under foreign rule. The Prime
Minister explained that there had been a misprint in the
first published version of the program, and that the
reference was later corrected to read “The Destiny of Somali
Territories under Ethiopian and Kenyan Domination.” In
countering the attack, he also called the attention to the
fact that a Minister (without portfolio) for Somali Affairs
had been included in the Cabinet for the first time, and
that his function was expressly to deal with the problems of
“Greater Somalia.” (One deputy thereupon criticized the
title of the new Minister as having been inspired by
foreigners, because it should have been “Minister for the
Somali Affairs under Foreign Rule”) [8].
Bearing in mind the history of Somali Weyn
controversy, conventional wisdom also informs us that due to
the current tragic situation the TFG would not dare now to
risk losing the support of Ethiopia and Kenya for the sake
of Somali Weyn Principle. In addition, the
clan-infested Somalis of today might also be reluctant to
deal now any border disputes with their neighbours.
Although we could not be certain about how Ethiopia and
Kenya may respond to the re-emergence of Somali
Weyn tendencies in Somalia, a military option will be
their least option. Our neighbours are aware of the fact
that Somali clannism presented them a valuable gift – i.e.
an opportunity for covert operation. An open conflict
between Clan-loyalty and State-loyalty is now fighting on
the common grounds of Somali once again. It is therefore
very difficult to tell a Somali from a Kenyan or Ethiopian;
in fact, all sides are represented by Somali clans. A token
subsidy can provide opportunities for recruiting
clan-oriented Somalis as foreign agents.
Publicly, Prime Minister Ghedi should not however
risk appearing to be too soft on “One Somalia” Principle
because, as he is aware of it, recruiting Somali nomads by
foreigners will not last that long. After all,
nomad-loyalty is like a moving cloud which often betrays,
and often shows us the nakedness of the true blue-sky.
Thus, he should rather be remembered for achieving a “truce’
and understanding that concerns on our neighbours, without
creating a political blunder. Yet, he has also to make
sense to attract Somalis in order to look credible and
trustworthy.
In doing so, the Prime Minister freezes his local enemies
without a battle; he alienates them without insulting them
and crushes their Isbaaro fiefdoms without military
operations. To succeed in this strategy, the Premier has to
convince all sides of the equation that he is prepared to
act as a goodwill politician who is willing to avoid
flippant remarks, irrespective of the consequences. In this
way, the Prime Minister can reason his intent to tone down
his declamatory speeches on the issue of Somali
Weyn, unlike the forthright declamation speeches
delivered by his predecessors. Finally, he should remind
the Somali populace to espouse and commit their efforts to
rebuild their shattered Somali Republic; and only then, when
the Republic earns the rightful international recognition
for the status of “recuperated” Somalia, can the issue of
border talks resume on an equal footing.
A. S.
Faamo
Roobdoon Forum
Toronto, Canada
roobdoon2000@yahoo.ca
______________________
References:
[1]
A telephone- interview with the BBC World Service, Somali
Section, on November 11, 2005.
[2]
An interview conducted at the Premier’s Office in November
30th 1963. Sources from The New York Times
and
Hindustan
Times, New Delhi.
[3]
Africa Confidential, No. 1, (January 10, 1964), p. 7.
[4]
Rogers Morris and Richard Mauzy, “Following the Scenarios:
Reflections on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath
of CIA Intervention”, in The CIA File (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited by Robert L. Borosage and
John Marks, p. 28.
[5]
On the first week of September, 1968, the Ethiopian
Herald covered Premier Egal’s four-day official visit to
Addis Ababa. Mr. Egal signed a joint communiqué with
Ethiopia that aimed to create a good neighbourly relation
between the two countries. Immediately after he signed the
communiqué with his counterpart, Mr. Akilu Habtewold,
Ethiopian Herald published Egal’s comments about the
talks between the two sides, stating that he has said, “It
is going to be the beginning of a new era in the
Ethiopian-Somali relation.” Also, Roobdoon Forum has
posted the Somali Border Agreements on the following
websites:
http://www.biyokulule.com/somali%20border.htm
http://www.dhahar.com/articles/roobdoon101105.html
http://www.laasqoray.net/article.php?articleid=565
http://www.radiosanaag.com/roob.htm
[6]
Rogers Morris and Richard Mauzy, “Following the Scenarios:
Reflections on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath
of CIA Intervention”, in The CIA File (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited by Robert L. Borosage and
John Marks, p. 3-38.
[7]
Luigi Pestalozza, The Somalian Revolution, translated
from Italian by Peter Glendening (Paris: Editions Afrique
Asie Amerique Latine, 1974), p. 40.
[8]
Jeanne Contini, “The Somali Republic: Politics with a
Difference,”
Africa
Report,
Vol. 9. No. 10 (November, 1964), p. 6.