IRIN Special Report On Interim Government Of Somalia..

Interim president Abdiqasim Salad Hasan arrived in Somalia's devastated capital on Saturday to an ecstatic public welcome and huge show of force.

But his "hero's welcome", as reported by the local and international press, is chiefly symbolic of high expectations by a people desperate for real leadership after a decade without a central government.

The country and infrastructure is fragmented; the international community cautious in its recognition and backing; and the seat of government, Mogadishu, destroyed by years of inter-clan fighting.

Elected in the Djibouti-hosted Somali peace talks, the interim president and his 245-strong Transitional National Assembly (TNA) - chosen on a strict clan basis - now begin the real task of setting up an operational government of national unity. But there are many hurdles to overcome.

INTERNAL OBSTACLES

Destroyed infrastructure

The new government is expected to hold a meeting within the week to decide on a "plan of action", government sources told IRIN. With government, civic and private buildings destroyed - including parliament - the government will have to decide first where such a meeting can take place.

"There are no chairs, desks, typewriters, computers, transportation and no building fit enough to accommodate a ministry let alone the whole government", a businessman in Mogadishu told IRIN. So far the government is operating out of four hotels provided by the business community. The members of the TNA were provided with mobile phones on arrival, so they can at least communicate.

An immediate task will be the naming of the cabinet, which will be risky, Somali political sources said. All clans are expecting to be represented in the new cabinet, and the new charter allows for "a maximum of 25" ministers.

Competition between clans will be compounded by personalities within the clans. "This is going to be a very tough balancing act, not to antagonise any group while at the same time keeping to the letter of the law," said one Mogadishu resident. It is the prime minister's job to appoint the cabinet. "He will come in for a lot of criticism no matter what he does", said one parliamentarian.

Security

The biggest hurdle is the security situation, particularly in Mogadishu - which the new government decided was nevertheless secure enough to move to. Although the security situation has improved considerably over the last two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on protection from militia, and an absence of law and order means fire fights between gunmen and clans can break out without restraint. Talking to reporters after his arrival, Abdiqasim said the security situation would be his priority.

Over the last one month the new government has been encamping militia in three designated camps in Mogadishu. So far, the militia have been encamped on a clan basis, with exception of the Islamic court militias. This has attracted criticism that the new government is providing for its support base rather than dealing with the militia allied to the faction leaders and other clans. Head of the National Commission for Security, General Muhammad Nur Galal said this was a temporary measure and an early means of organising the demobilisation effort. He said all the militia would eventually be integrated into new security force.

Somali political sources pointed out that, in order to succeed, the government must have a cohesive cross-clan force that answers only to a centralised authority, and not to their respective clans. Presently, the militia and their 'technicals' - jeeps mounted with heavy weaponry - belong to the clan.

"We have to break the link between the security forces and the clans" said a businessman. Previously, faction leaders proved unable to break the clan's grip on the militias and their weapons. They depended on clan allegiance to utilise gun men they were otherwise unable to pay or equip.

As a central authority, the interim government now faces the challenge of finding the means to pay its nascent security force - and also equip it. The Mogadishu business community, tired of large overhead costs on security, have so far pitched in to the tune of $300,000 a month toward the establishment of a security force for Mogadishu. "How long can they sustain this?" a Mogadishu resident posed.

Local and international expectations will focus on the ability of the new government to get a grip on Mogadishu. During the Djibouti peace process, when clan representatives negotiated power, the Hawiye, who control the capital, were given the presidency in recognition that it was the only way to reestablish peace and security in Mogadishu - after a decade of competing Hawiye sub-clans laying waste to the city. "The Hawiye created this mess, they have to sort it out", one of the clan representatives said during the peace talks.

Faction leaders

Crucial to the security situation will be how the government leaders deal with the Mogadishu faction leaders. Their influence is much diminished, but they are nevertheless still a major issue in Mogadishu.

The government has a number options to deal with the faction leaders, Somali political sources said. First, some can be "bought out". Operating on a mafia-style basis, dealing in drugs, guns, and regional trade, some may accept a cash pay-off. Some started to indicate as much as the peace process gained momentum. A buy-off would entail purchasing the 'technicals' and bringing in their remaining militias to the demobilisation camps.

A second option is to go through their clans, and persuade their clan to withdraw support, say Mogadishu political sources.

But there is already some international pressure on the new government to co-opt the factional leaders - notably from Kenya, Libya and Ethiopia. This option is likely to have limited appeal to the new president, who is experienced in administration and government and despises the "warlords" of the civil war, said a source close to the new government.

When newly elected, Abdiqasim said some of the "warlords" would be ignored, and a dialogue would be established with others. Co-option has the added risk that some clan members who abandoned the faction leaders in order to support the new government may be unhappy about such a deal - "any position given to the faction leaders is a position taken away from the deserving", Somali political sources warned.

No clear policy towards the faction leaders has yet been demonstrated, although Abdiqasim has met with Hussein Aydid in Libya and has shown a willingness to continue talks in Mogadishu. However, some observers believe that the reason Abdiqasim's government has not made any serious overtures to the Mogadishu faction leaders is to increase pressure on them - the language of the faction leaders has become noticeably defensive, rather than aggressive, since Abdiqasim's first successful visit to the capital in September.

Independent leaders

In international terms, one of the greatest tests of the new government is how it deals with the leaders in the self-declared state of Somaliland, northwest Somalia, and with the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeast Somalia.

As stable areas, Somaliland in particular has attracted aid and international support - but not recognition - and is led by elder statesman, former prime minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

Both the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland boycotted the peace process, and condemned the elections as manipulated. They rejected Abdiqasim as a national president, and pointed to his past position, as a former deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, as making him a "stooge" of the previous ousted regime.

Since his election, Abdiqasim has ruled out as force as an option - and he cannot afford to resort to it, say observers. Supporters of the regions, however, maintain it is a possibility. The favoured option of dialogue is compounded by the fact that the people from these two regions elected as national parliamentarians are viewed by the leaders as representing political opposition. The government will have to decide whether to deal with the parliamentarians from these area and allow them to dictate policy, or to deal directly with the existing administrations through dialogue.

And while there is no question that some of the TNA members enjoy some support in their respective regions, they will clearly be unable to operate as government. Political sources close to the new president believe he will probably prefer to deal with the leaders directly, while taking on board any constructive views from the MPs from the regions.

EXTERNAL HURDLES

International caution

When the interim president was inaugurated in Djibouti on 27 August, heads of state from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen attended, along with senior representatives from Kenya, Egypt, Libya, France, United Nations and the European Union. He was later feted by the Arab League conference in Cairo, the UN Millennium Summit in New York, and received in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya.

But despite this demonstration of international and regional support there is a deep-seated wariness to throw substantial weight behind the newly elected government. After ten years of a devastating civil war, where various faction leaders have claimed political hegemony, the new government has to "prove itself", diplomatic sources told IRIN.

This presents an almost impossible task in a country laid virtually to waste by fighting, poverty and international disengagement. "It's a real 'chicken and egg' situation. Can the government get anything done without international funding? And can it get international funding before it gets anything done?", one regional diplomat said.

Still vivid in the memory of the US is the failed intervention of 1991. Out-going President Bill Clinton recently told the press that Somalia featured in his list of regrets. In 1992, US and UN troops failed to disarm the fighting faction leaders, or bring peace to the country, and eventually pulled out in 1995. Little humanitarian assistance went into the country thereafter, with international and local staff endangered by shootings and kidnappings in a climate of lawlessness.

Some "goodwill" financial backing was reportedly provided by Saudi Arabia when Abdiqasim visited in September, but to date, nothing has officially been donated by any country or organisation. Sources in Mogadishu said the planes used to fly the new government from Djibouti to Mogadishu were provided by Egypt.

But so far, the government has had to depend entirely on backing from the local business community. Many Somali entrepreneurs used lack of government restrictions to accumulate enormous wealth through trade with the Arab states. This crucial financial support by the Somali business community - which includes remittances from north America, Europe and the Arab states - has enabled the government to begin a demobilisation programme and settle into hotels in Mogadishu; but this funding will have its limitations, and will become politically uncomfortable.

The Arab world

An important international factor will be the government's relationship with the Arab world, regional experts say. Vital for financial support, a strong association with the Arab world is nevertheless likely to make the West, specifically the US, uneasy. After his election, Abdiqasim met immediate criticism that he was too closely associated with "Islamic fundamentalism" - a US foreign policy pre-occupation since the end of the Cold War.

Egypt - a necessary supporter - initially showed disengagement from the Djibouti peace initiative, and was accused, like Ethiopia, of smarting from the fact its own peace attempts during the civil war had failed. But it came under diplomatic and local Somali pressure to demonstrate support. Despite reluctance, Egypt was "lucky", said one diplomatic source, to find that the president elected was "someone it felt it could deal with". Abdiqasim was a fluent Arabic speaker and lived in Cairo from 1991-93.

Libya has declared its support for the new government, but is seen as unpredictable, diplomatic sources said. The new government will want to secure its backing mainly to ensure that the flow of money and weapons to opposing faction leaders dries up.

Critics of the new government have said it is a "Djibouti creation" and will be controlled by a Djibouti agenda. While it was generally recognised that any workable peace process could not be effectively hosted inside the devastated country, there was always a danger that any peace process hosted outside Somalia would be controlled by the agenda of the host country. Those who supported the Djibouti initiative say the country - a Somali state - was able to give a unique cultural and political opportunity to Somalis to hold lengthy peace talks. Djibouti has comparatively little political clout in the region, and a "Djibouti agenda" is most likely to be dictated by business and trade interests.

Uncomfortable neighbours

As a general rule, the new government will struggle to deal with neighbours and international organisations who have grown used to a country where there have been no diplomatic or international consequences for interference and manipulation.

During the ten years of fragmentation and civil war, neighbouring states and regional brokers backed different faction leaders, supplying them with money, guns and, in some cases, direct military support. Somalia had become a fertile arena for proxy war and regional interference.

Although the peace talks were a Djibouti initiative, pursued through the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), it was therefore "vital" for regional heads of state to demonstrate recognition and support for the newly elected government for other reasons, diplomatic sources said.

Regional superpower

Ethiopia is likely to be the "number one external issue" for the new government, Somali political sources told IRIN. A senior Ethiopian government official in the foreign office recently described Ethiopia as the "regional super-power".

Although Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi attended the inauguration, Ethiopia continued to appear ambiguous about the election of Abdiqasim.

A scheduled visit by the new Somalia interim president was cancelled in September, by Ethiopia, according to diplomatic sources. Instead, the president travelled to Libya - where he met with Hussein Aydid - dashing early hopes that Ethiopia may broker talks in Addis Ababa with Somaliland leader Mohamed Egal and, possibly, Puntland leader, Abdullahi Yusuf.

By September, there were also local reports of Ethiopian military movements in the southern Bay and Bakool regions, with rumoured splits and discontent in the Ethiopian-backed Rahanwien Resistance Army (RRA). The new government sent its first constituted high-level "foreign advisor" delegation to Addis Ababa to talk with Meles Zenawi and senior government officials. On its return, key members of the new Somali government said the mission had been successful, although no details of the talks were released.

Initially, when Meles Zenawi came to power in 1991, genuine attempts were made by the new Ethiopian government to broker Somali peace talks, regional experts say. The two countries - which have a shared border, shared populations, and an Ethiopian Somali region still characterised by secession sentiment - are intimately connected and have a long history of conflict, particularly during the Cold War. Both countries were pumped full of weapons as the US and the Soviet Union fought over the region (see timeline http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/webspecials/somalia_npc/chronology.phtm l). But attempts by the new Ethiopian leader to bring the warring factions together went sour in 1993, when he was accused to trying to push his own agenda.

Diplomatic sources and Somali political sources say that in the late 1990's, Ethiopia was instrumental in creating the Rahanwien Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakool to oppose the Islamic extremist organisation, Al'Ittihad and Somali and Oromo opposition groups operating on the shared border. Since 1998, Ethiopia has sent military units across the a border that it said was, in the absence of a central authority, a security risk.

Proxy war

With the flare up of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict in 1998, Somalia became grounds for proxy war. In 1999, Eritrea shipped weapons to Hussein Aydid for Ethiopian Oromo rebels, encamped in Qoriole, in lower Shebelle, and operating out of Bay and Bakool. Hussien Aydid and Oromo opposition groups, in turn, accused Ethiopia of being behind the killing and kidnapping Oromo leaders in Mogadishu. Diplomatic sources said during this time Libya used Eritrea as a means of channelling weapons to Aydid.

Despite the fact a cessation of hostilities was brokered between Ethiopia and Eritrea in June, the new Somali government is likely to continue to feel uncomfortable with the effects of the dispute.

Conclusion

The new government will be under great pressure to "achieve" in circumstances which are difficult in the extreme, a regional expert said. High expectations could quickly turn to disappointment. As a result, it will be tempting for Abdiqasim to rely heavily on supporters - his sub-clan, Hawiye-Ayer, and the business community - but achievement will be measured by how far he can reach beyond this and establish security, national unity and reconstruction.