The Quest for Peace and National Reconciliation in Somalia: What it takes

  by Medhane Tadesse

Medhane Tadesse is assistant professor of history and consultant and analyst on conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Medhane Tadesse can be reached at Mt3002et@Yahoo.com

 

Nov. 05, 2001

This paper will try to address timely questions regarding peace and reconciliation in Somalia.  This interalia include the need for answers to whether the Arta process is alive?  whether it is possible to convene a new reconciliation conference? And What the likely scenario could be and what should be done? depending on the ensuing scenario.

Launching a new initiative on national peace and reconciliation in Somalia, although the only remaining alternative, is not possible at this time simply because the Transitional Government of Somalia /TNG/ and its mentor Djibouti are suspicious about such a move as they consider it as reversal of the achievements of the Arta process.  They believe that the Arta process is not only genuine but also complete. By virtue of the external quasi recognition it has secured, the TNG considers itself as the only legal representative of Somalia, a claim rejected by other Somali forces.  The TNG considers itself as a government while most of the other Somali forces recognize it as another faction.

The Arta process was an important milestone in the search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia but it was far from complete.  It was characterized by several faultiness. Well it could have served as a nucleus around which a series of reconciliation processes must have been launched.  Indeed that was the expectation of many.  The resolution of the 8th IGAD summit Heads of State and Government, which met in Khartoum on November 23, 2000 clearly highlighted the same expectation.

The summit, in which the TNG president attended in a controversial manner and circumstance asserted that the Arta process is only a 'good' beginning and the peace process in Somalia must continue and be completed through dialogue and not by resorting to the use of force. No doubt the resolution was influenced by the weakness of the Arta process and the reality on the ground in Somalia.  IGAD could not help avoid the fact that those Somali forces left out of the Arta process control more than 90% of Somalia. Thus , without accommodating them in a peaceful way Somalia will not have peace and a government of national unity.  The reading of IGAD was accurate, hence the resolution was excellent.

To follow up on its decision, an IGAD delegation went to Somalia to consult with the  TNG and  Somali forces and continued the reconciliation process.  The TNG rejected it.  For one thing the TNG does not want to be treated at par with the other forces in Somalia.  Although militarily, organizationally and in terms of the area under its influence in Somalia is much lower than that of its opponents, the recognition it has won externally gave it a comparative moral boost and refused to negotiate without preconditions.  In fact the major hurdle is that the TNG wants to negotiate as a government while most of its opponents want it to present itself  (in any talks) as one of the factions in Somalia.

The TNG had at one point (May 2001) accepted talks without preconditions in Addis, i.e.  to talk with its opponents only as an important force in  Somalia. But now it has changed its position and is saying that it could only accommodate its opponents with in the existing framework.  One can argue that such a position is influenced by many other factors.

Although militarily weak, the TNG had recently claimed to have succeeded in inciting conflicts and anarchy in the regions controlled by its opponents.  In a kind of subversion by proxy the TNG tried to create some problems in the opposition controlled areas outside of Mogadishu, mainly using two main forces.  The first one which is also a new tendency in Somalia is the TNG's use of traditional leaders against modern structures in the opposition controlled areas.  It was used against the RRA controlled Bay and Bakol area (Baidoa) but failed to materialize.  The same was applied against Puntland which resulted in dislodging Abdullahi Yousuf from the center of power, at Gerewe.  It also led to anarchy and instability in Puntland.  Similar strategy was used in Somaliland.   Last august some Sultans tried to challenge president Igal and the peace and stability in Somaliland.  Unable to extend its military power to the other regions in Somalia, the TNG uses its comparative financial power to incite some traditional leaders to weaken its opponents and extend its influence.

But the developments in Puntland show that the strategy of the TNG is shortsighted. Well it weakened Abdullahi Yusuf but failed to bring about an alternative administration.  The problem is that although the TNG is equipped with the capacity to destabilize Puntland or any other region in South Somalia, it lacks both the will and capacity to fill in the vacuum created as a result of such a ploy.

Reportedly the pro-TNG/ Alitihad  (evidently anti-Abdullahi Yusuf) forces in Puntland complained about the lack of enough support from the TNG, enough support which enables them consolidate their power as leaders of Puntland.  As it turned out the TNG's interest in supporting the anti-Abdullahi forces was to destabilize Puntland and prove to the world that the so-called peace zones (self-administrations) are fake and the building block approach is crumbling.  So even helping the anti-Abdullahi forces effectively to the extent of making them create an alternative administration was seen by the TNG as promoting the cause and survival of Puntland.  In this case the target was peace, the target was Puntland as an entity and not Abdullahi Yosuf as such.  But this again seems to have backfired.

Many in Puntland began to regret the fact that they are left without an administration.  Businessmen and intelligentsia alike and many in diaspora are feeling a sense of remorse by what happened after Abdullahi Yosuf.  Banks were looted, even rudimentary levels of administration ceased to exist, business and investment declined and above all insecurity prevailed. In the past years people were beginning to appreciate the peace and calm in Puntland which comparing with the other parts in the south was highly appreciable. But now Puntlanders fear that they are going back to anarchy and instability. Although Abdullahi Yosuf was undemocratic, his rule is associated with the emergence of Puntland as an entity and with some form of administration and some degree of peace. The anti-Abdullahi Yosuf forces were expected to deliver at least some kind of administration. But they failed to achieve unity among themselves and remained weak. They are not ready to deliver peace and order.  Indeed they couldn't control the situation. Even most of the clan leaders are not reportedly happy with the new situation. They seem to realize that whatever mistakes committed by Abdullahi Yosuf should not be over emphasized given his commitment to peace and some kind of workable administration in Puntland.

Besides all Puntlanders seem to agree that Puntland should remain as an independent entity. This is so not only due to its meaning to peace but also as a bargaining card in any political dispensation in Somalia. The mejerteen who inhabit Puntland feel a historic sense of seniority over other clans in Somalia. The Mejerteen Sultan was the supreme Sultan among other Sultans in the South mainly the Hawiya. Their identity clouded by seniority convinced them to have their own area in Somalia which could give them some kind of leverage in any future negotiations with the other clans. So one can say that both the political and business elite and mainly clan leaders of Puntland are not ready to negotiate on the survival of Puntland as an entity until final resolution of the Somali problem is realized. It is not surprising that Puntland clan leaders are busy organizing conferences to restore peace and self-administration in Puntland and most probably bring Abdullahi Yosuf to power. That is the most likely scenario. Well the efforts of the clan leaders deserves appreciation and encouragement. This shows that even in the face of timely set backs, the grass-roots approach, the traditional local-based mechanisms of conflict resolution and resolving the Somali crisis on a region to region basis  (the building blocks approach) is still the only realistic approach.

Nevertheless, the anarchy in Puntland gave a kind of moral boost to the TNG and gave it the message that it has the power to destabilize the other areas, the it has the support of some elements in the other regions as well and it can go its own way. It harbours the feeling that it can afford to ignore its opponents. It went to the extent of claiming that the other areas will face similar fate like that of Puntland. So in the eyes of the TNG its opponents should choose between submission /cooperation or anarchy. Hence, the TNG changed its declaration of last May in Addis and hopping that events in Somalia will develop in its favour, it withdrew its commitments to negotiate without preconditions.

It is not only money and traditional leaders which are being used by the TNG as instruments of subversion in areas of Southern Somalia controlled by its opponents. Islamist forces mainly the Al-itihad Al-islamia is the second arm of the TNG's war by proxy. The recent takeover of the port city of Kismayo by the Al-itihad with some involvement of A'ir militia units is a good case in point.  No doubt the swift reoccupation of Kismayo from the forces of General Morgan, who belongs to the SRRC, was taken on the part of the TNG as a show of strength vis-à-vis its opponents. The TNG seem to feel that it could beat the SRRC militarily. This could be partly true but it is not the TNG as such which has the capability to militarily extend its influence in Somalia.

All sources reveal that, it was an Al-itihad force which came from Ras Camboni and Merca with some support of technicals from the A'ir militia that re-occupied kismayo. The operation was conducted by the Al-itihad with some blessings from the TNG against the common enemy, the SRRC. The Al-itihad is an independent force with its own agenda for the future of Somalia but it has a tactical alliance with mainly the A'ir part of the TNG. So the re-occupation of kismayo should not be simply taken as a military victory for the TNG. Even politically Kismayo is a liability than an asset for the TNG. But TNG leaders wrongly think that they had a victory in Kismayo simply because it was a set back to the SRRC. They think that they are at an advantage in Kismayo simply because the SRRC is at a disadvantage, another factor for the TNG's refusal to negotiate without pre-conditions.

Needless to say the issue of Kismayo does not prove that the TNG is flexing its military muscles in other parts of Somalia. After all, even though the SRRC failed to maintain Kismayo, the whole Juba Valley area is under its direct or indirect influence. Thus, in terms of military balance of power the TNG/Al-itihad alliance is at a disadvantage in the whole Juba Valley area. The same is true in Bay and Bakol, the Benadir, Mudug and Gedo. Developments in Puntland are also heading towards an anti-TNG/Alitihad dispensation. This explains the claim that at present the SRRC and other anti-TNG groups control more than 85% of Southern Somalia. Let alone in the other peripheral regions, militarily the TNG is unable to expand its area of influence in Mogadishu, the capital city.

In Mogadishu the two strongest anti-TNG forces led by Aideed and Mussa Sudi still control the presidential palace and the port respectively. Unable to open the port and clear militia road blocks, the TNG turned Mogadishu into the most insecure place in the whole of south Somalia. Frankly speaking Mogadishu was much safer before the formation of the TNG. It was more safe for visitors because the warlords had an agreement and a system of joint security which allowed delegations and journalists some degree of protection. The more the TNG remained in Mogadishu the more the town became dangerous to live and move around. No doubt, no foreign journalist visited Mogadishu in the last several months. Abductions and ransom taking became the order of the day. The TNG's policy of pacifying Mogadishu militarily turned to be a fiasco. Its policy of extending its influence to other districts by force has failed. Far from achieving success, it only pushed Mogadishu and the other areas to the verge of anarchy and instability. Undoubtedly by now any military option is not only difficult but also impossible. However the status quo could give the TNG the necessary time to continue asserting itself in its foreign contacts.

All the same, even the SRRC is not militarily strong. It could maintain the areas under its control but I don't think it has the necessary military, organizational and political capacity to push further and dislodge the TNG/Al-itihad forces from all over the south. The paradox  is that neither of them is strong enough to militarily solve the predicament in southern Somalia. For sometime the military statuesque will continue without a significant change. This reality should convince both sides to come to the negotiating table. If the SRRC is not as such strong then what hindered the TNG from extending its power to other regions of South Somalia. Well as far as I am concerned the problem of the TNG is mainly of its own making and the complexity of its clan composition. It's problem is internal, mainly the Mogadishu factor as well as its thinking and modus operandi on how to solve the Somali problem. It applied subversion as opposed to persuasion in trying to extend its influence to the different regions of South Somalia.

Nevertheless the Mogadishu factor and the inter-clan (mainly inter Hawiya) rivalry figures prominently in the factors which arrested the TNG from moving around.  Well the historic Darod-Hawiya fued mainly the Harti factor of the Darold remained at the back of the mutual distrust within the TNG.  Harti Ministers of the TNG are not comfortable with the issue of Kismayo mainly when they see that the TNG's hand in the area is represented by the A'ir part of the Habergedir.  Incidentally Hawiya mainly Habergedir presence in areas which historically belong to other clans is the root cause of the post- 1991 Somali crisis.  Clan identity intertwined with competition over resources seem to remain the main problem to be addressed in the Somali case.  Alas, the Mudug factor will continue to haunt Somalia.  And as long as some clans continue to occupy resource rich areas historically claimed by other clans, it is almost impossible to find a solution to the Somali crisis.  Apart from resource, the issue of status and pride influences the attitude of the Harti within the TNG.  Thus it is not surprising that the relationship within the TNG mainly between Hawiya and Harti/Darod ministers is characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion.  The fate of personalities like Ali Khalif Ghalayde depends on what comes out of this state of affairs.

Worse for the TNG, is the inter-Hawiya or even the smallest intra-Habergedir rivalry.  Militarily the backbone of the TNG are the Al-itihad and the A'ir militia.  The A'ir are one of the sub-clan of the Habergedir.  The other major sub-clan is the Sa'ad to which both Aideed and Atto belong.  Mainly represented by the A'ir, the Habergedir part of Hawiya dominate the TNG.  But the Habergedir are considered as a "guest, who came from the Mudug area" to Mogadishu by the other major Hawiya sub-clan, the Abgals.  The Abgals claim Mogadishu and its environs.  The anti-TNG Abgal force mainly represented by Mussa Sudi offers the most serious challenge to the TNG.  Mussa Sudi's slogan is Mogadishu for the Abgals.  Nothing more nothing less! 

The TNG is trying its best to persuade many Abgal elders to its side but thus far it didn't yield any result.  It's policy of persuasion (in the Abgal case) seem to be overshadowed by its policy of subversion, and the resultant animosity it has bred.  A series of battles with the forces of Mussa Sudi only contributed to aggravate the rift between the TNG and the Abgals.  This fact is also partly responsible for the TNG's inability to pacify Mogadishu in its favor.  Although it claims to have a policy of accommodation, the TNG was busy launching a series of military offensives against Abgal stronghold.  Military failures aside, the policy of the TNG only aggravated the inter Hawiya i.e. Habergedir - Abgal rivalry to the extent that the force led by Mussa Sudi is not ready to negotiate with the TNG under any circumstances.  The formation of the TNG and its subsequent policies did not only widen the rift with the Abgals, it also led to the marginalization of the Sa'ad. Evidently it created animosity within the Habergedir sub-clan.

The post-SiadBarre resurgence of the Hawiya in Somali politics is attributed to the G. Aideed's sub-clan, the Sa'ad, which is part of the Habergedir sub-clan. Habergedir prominence was mainly represented by the Sa'ad who were at the forefront of Habergedir expansion to many parts of South Somalia.  But after Ethiopia's successful military operation against the joint forces of the OLF, Al-itihad and Aideed in Baidoa in 1998, Aideed and the Sa'ad's lost their supremacy.  That event coupled with the formation of the TNG marked the decline of the Sa'ad and the eventual prominence of the Ai'r (within the Habergedir supremacy) in Somali politics.  Hence, the Sa'ad mainly represented by the Aideed junior seem to feel that they were outsmarted and autmaneuvered  by the A'ir.  They feel that they were overpassed by the A'ir and eventually pushed to the background.  Thus, it is not accidental that Aideed offers the most serious resistance against the TNG in the heart of Mogadishu.  He is also active role player in the SRRC.  Aideed seems to have realized, since the Baidoa debacle, that any Somali force should at least avoid provoking Ethiopia and at best secure its support.  So of all the problems, the issue of Hawiya unity remained as the most serious challenge to the TNG.

It is against this background that any kind of reconciliation process should be envisaged for Somalia.  The Arta process brought a new force to Mogadishu, a force with wide external recognition as a legal government of Somalia.  Well the formation of the TNG is an anomaly. With a narrow political and military base in Mogadishu, the TNG is one of the factions inside Somalia but it is a government outside Somalia.  It is difficult to ignore its foreign status as a government.  That is irreversible.  On the other hand the TNG failed to consolidate itself as a government.  Not only that.  Its policies contributed to the proliferation of conflicts in Somalia.  It prolonged the suffering of the Somali people. Thus in the absence of peace and a promising political trend, it is inescapable to launch a new reconciliation process in Somalia.  Somalia is crying for a new broad based reconciliation process.

TNG leaders should realize that they failed to deliver peace and stability to the Somali people.  The international community recognized them as a government simply as  an expression of good wish to the Somali people and  way of encouragement.  But they should not use the issue of recognition to block any effort for peace and reconciliation in Somalia.  In this case the UN, the OAU and IGAD should unequivocally tell TNG leaders that they should not stand in the way of any new peace initiative in the name of legality and procedural preconditions.  What can we make out of this?

No doubt the Arta process is dead, but any peace initiative should not necessarily be a negation of the Arta process.   Whether it is termed as Arta II or Arta III, a new broad based national reconciliation is necessary. Experience shows that the TNG is ready for talks without preconditions only when it feels at a disadvantage militarily. In this regard  it is imperative for the SRRC to remain strong and united.  Evidently, the strength of the SRRC turned to be a stimulant for peace and reconciliation in Somalia.  The same is true with regard to Puntland and Abdullahi Yosuf. Unfortunately TNG leaders are encouraged to talk even about talks when they sense that they are losing on the ground.  So bringing about peace and unity in Puntland  seem to be another major precondition which could prepare Somalia for serious and meaningful national dialogue. Puntland should remain a strong ally of the SRRC.  Without such a dispensation it is difficult to secure the good will of the TNG to talk with its opponents in a frank and constructive way.

Besides any dialogue in Somalia, although the target should be the formation of a broad-based government in Mogadishu, should start at intra-clan level.  Any talks between the TNG and the SRRC should be accompanied by a parallel reconciliation process within the major regions and clans. e.g. within the Abgals, the Habergedir, the Merihan, Mejerteen etc.  This way the grass-roots approach to peace will be consolidated, but also clans will have the chance to choose their true representatives for a broad based national reconciliation.  This in turn would facilitate inter-clan dialogue and harmony. Such forums will also have the chance to address the issue of resource along the clan divide.  Any separate initiative (like the recent Kenyan talk show) aimed at quick fix dispensations will only complicate the process and delay national reconciliation in Somalia.

Secondly, IGAD should meet at a summit level to deliberate and resolve the crisis in Somalia.  IGAD leaders should make sure whether the TNG is living up to the expectations of the resolutions of the 8th IGAD summit in Khartoum.  Such a meeting should give a clear signal to the TNG as well as the OAU and the UN.  The Djibouti government should not feel any kind of discomfort about any new initiative.  An IGAD summit must assure Djibouti leaders that still they have a pivotal role to play in Somali reconciliation. They had initiated the Arta process and they should either complete it or allow others to bring added value to it and complete the process. The same is true with the UN. In fact Djibouti should use its leverage in Mogadishu (on the TNG) to enhance opportunities for a new national peace forum.  IGAD should keep the OAU, the UN and IGAD partners informed on its resolutions and on the position of the TNG with regard to peace and reconciliation in Somalia.  Unless the TNG is ready for constructive dialogue IGAD should officially spell out its opposition and inform the UN and the OAU to revise their half backed diplomatic positions towards the TNG.

Although the best way to bring about a sustainable peace in Somalia is to start not at the center but at intra-clan and regional level, if there is a need for a central authority in Mogadishu then for the time being the focus should be on direct TNG-SRRC dialogue. Djibouti created Arta while Ethiopia facilitated the formation of the Awassa group (SRRC) then, an IGAD summit should deliberate on how to bridge the two.  Creating an all inclusive broad based caretaker government in Mogadishu should be the focus of any diplomatic effort.  A government for reconciliation and national unity.  But, the first task of any such government for reconciliation and national unity in Mogadishu should be encouraging regional conferences (within the major clans) to promote a building block approach for sustainable peace and unity. 

Any broad based national task force (or government) in Mogadishu should not try to impose itself on the other parts of Somalia, it should rather prepare the ground for subsequent regional reconciliation forums and focus on networking major clan forces with minimum central authority.  Such a quasi government should act as a forum of reconciliation than a government in the strict sense of the term.  It should be viewed as a symbol of national consensus with a plan of action on how to solve the Somali problem. Such a government in Mogadishu should be more of an actor of conflict resolution and nation building than political and military consolidation.  Parallel to this broad based government for reconciliation based in Mogadishu should liaise with Somaliland and work out the modalities on the nature of its future relations or possible arrangements with the self-declared state. With all the attempts made so far the reality in Somalia still dictates that the only realistic approach is the building block approach.  Priority should be given to peace building along the major clans/regions than forming a government at the center.  Still the only way out is a newly reconstituted Somalia in the form of a commonwealth of clans.  After all it is not difficult to realize that there will always be clan politics in Somalia but there will never be clan supremacy.