SOMALIA VERSUS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM- THE LINK?

Eng. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein.  London, the United Kingdom
E-mail: Abukaraah@aol.com

There is a widespread consensus that US's global war on terrorism is moving towards Somalia, a country suspected by the US of sponsoring and harbouring terrorists. This suspicion is obviously based on the general condition of Somalia and the existence of Islamist movements of which some of them are political. Political Islamic movements are probably known to resort to violence and terrorist activities in order to gain a political end. "The US administration is studying countries in which Al-Qaida could function and is taking a particular interest in Somalia," said Secretary of State Colin L. Powel in a recent interview with Wahington Post.

Not all the Islamist movements in Somalia have political agendas. There are of course the mainstream groups that are engaged in genuine and legitimate objectives aimed at working to build and deepen the Islamic faith and pursue activities such as supporting the provision of education and health services. However, whether the Somali political Islamist movement, the Al-Ittihad group has ties with international terrorism remains to be established. It was known that Al-Ittihad had a focus on domestic agenda, including political one that is the establishment of an Islamic state.

Conflicting perspectives

General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US army said that there are strong indications that show Al-Qaida has a link with Somalia. However, the details of those links are not described openly. Also some regional diplomats could not go further than to say it has 'influence' within the justice system in Mogadishu and in the transitional national government and within the government of Puntland, the autonomous state of northeast Somalia, and that Al-Qaida gave it money when it ran into financial crises in recent years. Furthermore, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner, after a shuttle between Addis Ababa and Nairobi said, "the US had reason to believe terrorist cells existed in Somalia, and that Al-Qaida was linked to Somalia's Al-Ittihad Al-Islami group."

The Somali president and head of the Transitional National Government in a recent interview by Dr. Bob Arnot of MSNBC asked that if allegations made by warlord Hussein Aideed's SRRC [an Ethiopian-backed umbrella of opposition groups] is true. President Abdiqaasim said, "Members of Binladin's Al-Qaida or other people associated with this group are not present in Somalia. The Americans, the UN Security Council staff and the international media are all welcome to Somalia in order to investigate these allegations and see for themselves because we don't have anything to hide." Contrary to this in Addis Ababa three Somali warlords called for international military intervention in their country, saying Osama Binladin's Al-Qaida group and other foreign terrorists have bases in Somalia. The warlords cited bases in and around Mogadishu, the southern port city of Kismayo and Bosaso, and their surroundings.

Evidences:

Based on deductive grounds (indirect evidences), Somalia appears to make a high potential candidate. Somalia is primarily a Muslim country and does not have a functioning government since the collapse of the state in 1991. The failed state has a long coastal line, which is readily permeable to infiltration of foreign terrorists. Being also very poor, it is possible that alliances, security and other operational services may be purchased at relatively low cost. The country is also inhospitable, inaccessible and dangerous to westerners, intelligence and non-governmental organisations. By these criteria and the power of deduction Somalia makes the short list and a perfect candidate, at least in the first phase of listing potential countries that may harbour or assisting international terror cells operating with or without the consent of its segmental governing bodies. Collin Powel said, "Somalia makes itself ripe for misuse by those who would take that chaos and thrive on the chaos. That is why we're really looking at Somalia - not to go after Somalia as a nation or a government but because Somalia is a place where terrorists suddenly find haven."

The neglect and complete disengagement policy, (except of little humanitarian and relief aid), practised by the US and UK governments and many western countries after the incident of the Black Hawk on the 3rd October 1993, backfired because it resulted in lack of knowledge of what was going inside Somalia. Therefore, the west had to rely nearly for eight years on over-exaggerated information coming from Ethiopia that pursues its own agenda towards Somalia or from distant embassies located in Addis Ababa, Nairobi or Jibouti.

Direct evidences:

It is obvious that the war on the alleged terror cells supposed to exist in Somalia cannot be based on those general arguments of a deductive approach. There must be direct tangible evidences of terrorist activities launched from Somalia, or even involving Somalis. Here below are some allegations by Ethiopia and others linking Al-Ittihad to some external terrorist activities carried out in the past:

· The Ethiopians argue the attempt to murder former ethnic-Somali Ethiopian minister for Transport and Communication and the subsequent bombings of some hotels in Addis Ababa, Harar and Dirdewa in 1996 was carried by Al-Ittihad. This is solely an argument of Ethiopia.

· During Al-Ittihad's control of the border town of Luuq, Ethiopian intelligence noted some foreign involvement [meaning Sudanese groups which hosted Binladin in Sudan at that time]. This made the Ethiopian insecure and attacked across the border to crack down on Al-Ittihad in 1996.

· The US embassies bombing in Kenya and Tanzania may have involved some transhipment and passage of material, equipment and personnel through Somalia.

However, one can also challenge the Ethiopian allegations because there were other secular groups very active in that time and opposed to the EPRDF political domination in government, like the All-Amhara, Oromo Liberation and Western Somali Liberation Fronts. The brutal crackdown of the Ogaden Liberation Front in 1993 and the continuous oppression, marginalisation, economic isolation and lack of empowering of indigenous Somalis in Ethiopia resulted in severe resentment of Ethiopian policies. It is possible that there are other possible culprits. Al-Ittihad in Somalia has a general focus on domestic agenda and it is not only Al-Ittihad operating from Somalia can pose threat to Ethiopia. In addition Al-Ittihad never targeted at American interests.

The Rise and Fall of Al-Ittihad

· Al-Ittihad in Somalia was created by young educated returnees in 1980s who went to Arab Gulf to work, or to school and universities in Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and upon their arrival became frustrated by the authoritarian repressive government, violation of human rights, appalling level of corruption, and above all frustrated with divisiveness of clanism. The movement started from study groups and small networks.

· When the state collapsed in early 1991, a new opportunity emerged for this Islamic group to actually take direct control of some territories. Just after the exodus from Mogadishu in 1991, the organisation took control of Kismayo's sea-port. But soon it clashed with the advancing army of General Aideed who wanted to capture Kismayo. Al-Ittihad was badly defeated at Araare (between Kismayo and Jamama).

· In Puntland state the organisation administered the port of Boosaaso in which Al-Ittihad received recognition for their diligence, honesty and above all their efficiency in operating and managing the port. However, SSDF led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf did not like the emerging group and he fought and defeated them sending them to flee to the Golis mountain range in the North-east of Somalia.

· Again Al-Ittihad established itself in Marka [near Mogadishu] and operated the seaport for a short time and abandoned Marka to move to Luuq, where it was destroyed by strong clan sentiments and invading Ethiopian forces in 1996. The Islamist control of Luuq provided an unknown level of law and order but however failed to tackle inter-clan suspicions due to participation of forces from other clans and a fear of taking their territory.

· Strategy: After 1996 Al-Ittihad concluded that for the moment Somalia was not ready for an Islamic rule and its strategy shifted away from taking direct power and controlling some territories. It has to build the bases and work on the pre-requisites for eventual Islamic rule. That means a long-term plan that emphasises education and general awareness. Therefore, Al-Ittihad started to concentrate on provision of charity services such as education, orphanages, health, and clean water to win the hearts and minds of the people. They also decided to integrate into the local and business communities and started commercial establishments. The new Al-Ittihad objective converged to Al-Islah's role [funded by the Saudis] in the communities. Al-Islah is a movement without a political agenda, and it plays a very significant role in furthering its purely Islamic agenda through development and specifically capacity and grassroots building. This blurred the line between Al-Islah's more social agendas and Al-Ittihad, which is fundamentally a political movement and it rather difficult to recognise who is who.

· Main features of the strategy post-1996:

1. Decentralisation: Rather than working as a trans-clan movement in the country, Al-Ittihad members work locally within their own clan, defusing clanism in the highly segmented society. This means that Al-Ittihad was left to disintegrate as an organisation and ceased to function. There is no structure, policies, annual general assembly and even there is no coordination. It is decentralised force and are not visible as fixed targets.

2. Integrated into local and business communities: Holding fixed regions, towns makes them fixed targets. Members avoided being fixed targets and joined business and local communities. Al-Ittihad was very successful by recruiting young pragmatic risk-savvy entrepreneurs to their cause. Al-Ittihad set its own individual members as business people. Al-Barakat Company [for money transfer and in tele-communication] was black-listed by American authorities, shut down and frozen its assets because of alleged involvements of international money laundering and its affiliations to Al-Ittihad. However, according to some knowledgeable Somalis, this company was not in any way a platform for Al-Ittihad's political agenda of carrying out related activities.

3. Alliances of convenience and using Turabi strategy: Infiltrate secular local governments, and in the national government as individuals and try to snatch positions of key power base or build alliances for short-time deals to further the aims of political Islam without being visible at the top. The Ethiopians suspect that the Transitional National Government of Somalia, headed by President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan is influenced greatly by Islamic radical elements and seems to successfully convince the Americans. However, Prof. Ken Menkhaus believes that the " TNG is a secular government by all accounts, and the top individuals involved are known and friendly to Americans and there is no fear of being a Trojan horse for some radical elements." This statement was clearly spelt out in his briefing at the International Symposium on Africa, Islam and Terrorism by Carnegie Endowment.

Professor Ken Menkhaus's Assessment of Al-Ittihad

1. Somali involvement with Islamist agenda runs a wide and shifting spectrum. Most Somalis tend to support and sympathise Islamic issues at least in rhetoric even if some of them are not especially devout.

2. Some Somalis are very devout and promote greater and deeper Islamisation of the society but are not political. Al-Islah activities fall under this category.

3. But otherwise they are political and embrace activities such as the expansion of Shariah Courts to maintain law and order but are uninterested in Islamic state.

4. Of those who support Al-Ittihad, some view it as tactical and short-tem affiliation, others a real commitment.

5. Of those committed to Al-Ittihad, most are concerned with domestic aims such as the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia but not an overseas agenda.

6. Even among those few Somalis who want to harness Al-Ittihad for violence abroad, they are primarily focussed on waging jihad against Ethiopia.

7. The number of Somalis who actively support Al-Ittihad as part of a global struggle are by all accounts very small in number. The outcome of investigations into Al-Ittihad

"Following September 11 there was some concern among American officials that Al-Ittihad represented a legitimate threat," said Ted Dagne, a specialist in African affairs at the US Congressional Research Service. But he said that investigations into Al-Ittihad proved otherwise and that large-scale military strikes against the group are unlikely. He added that Al-Ittihad does not pose a major threat to US interests because it simply doesn't have the ability to carry out a terrorist act globally.

Prof. Ken Menkhaus assessment of the terrorist threat coming from Somalia is summarised below:

· Somalia is inhospitable terrain for Al-Qaida and related terrorist network
· It features unpredictable alliances
· It features an absence of secrets

The above reasons indicate that Somalia is not suitable as permanent base to serve Al-Qaida or similar networks. However, Somalia is very attractive for short-time operations such as trans-shipment base in moving materials, equipment and men through the country as a passage to East Africa and Ethiopia.

US/EU policy considerations on Somalia

· The neglect and disengagement policy on Somalia needs to be reversed. Surely Somalia needs their assistance in order not to become a transhipment country for international terrorists, where potential growth of terrorists can occur, or where ethnic conflict grows rapidly.

· Regional self-governments such as the one in Baydhaba, Puntland, Somaliland and the National Transitional Government (NTG) need encouragement and assistance in moving towards appropriate democracy and market economy.

· Engagement policies of the US/EU need to focus on decentralisation, business communities and empowerment of the civil societies.

· Avoid over-reliance on Ethiopia, and choosing some local Somali factions over others

· Who does the international community work with? For the time being, it is best to work with legitimate groups who are really governing: providing services, police, courts, education, health, removing trash and so on in all the emerging self-government territories.

· The US should not resort to military intervention (punitive ones) and instead choose preventive measures and engagement policies.

Eng. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
London, the United Kingdom
E-mail: Abukaraah@aol.com