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- [SW Column](The Washington Times - David Hackworth ) "BLACK
HAWK DOWN" IN CONTEXT :Posted on [18 Feb 2002]
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Opinions expressed in this column
are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of SW.
'BLACK HAWK DOWN' IN CONTEXT
David Hackworth
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The five-star movie "Black Hawk Down" smacks you right
between the eyes with the sheer brutality of infantry
combat, however magnificently portrayed by film maestro
Ridley Scott. But while it showcases the professionalism and
bravery of our U.S. Army Special Operations warriors in
Mogadishu, it's far too light on the lessons to be learned
from that terrible disaster.
In December 1992, I went to Somalia. On a much smaller
scale, the conditions were like those in Vietnam: snipers,
mines and booby traps were killing and wounding our
soldiers, and we had a hard time finding the guerrilla enemy
— who fought only on their terms.
This time, I was looking at the battlefield as a war
correspondent, but there was no way to take the young
soldier out of the old reporter. My style was to hang out
with one of the rifle platoons for five days and then send
in my copy. Pretty soon, eating and sleeping with the
grunts, I became just a guy who had been around a war or
two. It wasn't long before "Hey, Hack, does this machine gun
have a good field of fire?" and "What do you think of this
patrol formation?"
I was tagging along with Maj. Martin Stanton of the
2/87th Infantry, an old pal, when he asked me to give a
class on how we used choppers in Vietnam. "Are you sure?" I
asked. "Remember, I'm bad news as far as the Army's
concerned. What's the Pentagon going to say when they hear
you've got me teaching a class?"
Maj. Stanton was sure. I gave a two-hour lecture on
airmobile operations in a guerrilla environment. "This is
how we did it in Vietnam," I told them.
Most looked at me with blank faces as if I were talking
"Star Wars" to the moon. I realized with an electric shock
that these fine young 10th Division soldiers were like
explorers in an unknown land without a map or compass, and
one single cram session on airmobile missions wasn't going
to be much help. All the lessons paid for so dearly from
Vietnam had disappeared.
After I left Somalia, a Ranger Task Force, some of the
best warriors going, deployed to Mogadishu. They conducted
six chopper operations, all using identical tactics and
techniques, during which they dropped into the objective,
conducted a raid and returned to base. On their seventh
raid, they were tasked to capture Mohammed Aidid, a clan
guerrilla leader. But because their leaders hadn't factored
into the equation that Aidid's boys were watching — the way
smart terrorists do — they ended up surrounded, trapped and,
except for their courage and fighting skill, would have been
destroyed to the man.
Besides employing a bush-league tactical plan, the
general in charge, William Garrison, had no contingency plan
to bail out his boys if the op turned bad. No U.S. Air Force
tactical air support. No tanks ready to break through to the
besieged Rangers — even though Marine tanks were close, the
Army didn't want the Marines to ride to the rescue because
of interservice rivalry. And so our warriors were severely
bloodied — 18 died, and more than 100 were wounded, a rout
that caused the sole surviving superpower to beat feet out
of Somalia, dragging its tail.
For personal and professional reasons, I went to Walter
Reed Hospital in D.C., to talk to the wounded, then to Fort
Benning, Ga., to meet with some of the Rangers who had been
in the fight. They told me officially and again unofficially
at night over beers how they'd been sucked in and then
out-guerrillaed, outmaneuvered, outsmarted. A detailed
assessment of the debacle is in my book "Hazardous Duty."
As today's top military leaders go up the chain, like
most executives in large organizations, they develop a
disease called CRN — Can't Remember Nothing — and forget
what it's like to be at the bottom. Somewhere along the
line, they stop listening to the grunts who do the fighting
and dying, the ones who know what they need to defeat our
enemies and survive.
We must protect the troops in Afghanistan by applying
what we learned the hard way in Somalia, starting with
sending some tanks into Kandahar as soon as possible.
David Hackworth is a nationally syndicated
columnist.
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